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Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade

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  • Calzolari, Giacomo
  • Immordino, Giovanni

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  • Calzolari, Giacomo & Immordino, Giovanni, 2005. "Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 145-172, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:49:y:2005:i:1:p:145-172
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    3. Kihlstrom, Richard E & Riordan, Michael H, 1984. "Advertising as a Signal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 427-450, June.
    4. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January.
    5. Prat, A., 1997. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," Other publications TiSEM f8eafa82-fa74-4556-a34d-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Robert C. Feenstra & Tracy R. Lewis, 1991. "Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political Pressure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(4), pages 1287-1307.
    7. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001. "A Model of Expertise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775.
    8. Andrea Prat, 2002. "Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 999-1017.
    9. Julie A. Caswell & Daniel I. Padberg, 1992. "Toward a More Comprehensive Theory of Food Labels," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 74(2), pages 460-468.
    10. Yang, Bill Z, 1994. "Simultaneous Advertising as a Signal of Product Quality," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(63), pages 186-199, December.
    11. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    12. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. "Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-292, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Furtan, William Hartley & Jensen, Maria Skovager & Sauer, Johannes, 2008. "Rent Seeking and the Common Agricultural Policy: Do member countries free ride on lobbying?," 107th Seminar, January 30-February 1, 2008, Sevilla, Spain 6600, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    2. Dominik Boddin & Frank Stähler, 2024. "Import tariffs and transport prices," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 57(2), pages 430-458, May.
    3. Hartley Furtom & Johannes Sauer & Maria Jensen, 2009. "Free-riding on rent seeking—an empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 479-500, September.
    4. Okimoto, Madoka, 2015. "International price competition among food industries: The role of income, population and biased consumer preference," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 327-339.
    5. De Chiara, Alessandro & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Corruption, regulation, and investment incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).

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