Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
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- Margaret Meyer & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Papers 2016-W02, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Meyer, Margaret & Moreno de Barreda, Inés & Nafziger, Julia, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 11224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Margaret Meyer & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2019. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Series Working Papers 789, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
- Meyer, Margaret & Moreno de Barreda, Inés & Nafziger, Julia, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 11224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Margaret Meyer & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Papers 2016-W02, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
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Cited by:
- Meyer, Margaret & Moreno de Barreda, Inés & Nafziger, Julia, 2019.
"Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
- Meyer, Margaret & Moreno de Barreda, Inés & Nafziger, Julia, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," CEPR Discussion Papers 11224, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Margaret Meyer & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Papers 2016-W02, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Margaret Meyer & Inés Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2019. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Series Working Papers 789, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2015.
"Information, authority, and smooth communication in organizations,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
10969, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Szalay, Dezsö & Deimen, Inga, 2016. "Information, Authority, And Smooth Communication In Organizations," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145668, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Lu, Shih En, 2017. "Coordination-free equilibria in cheap talk games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 177-208.
- Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014.
"Smooth, strategic communication,"
VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy
100333, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Deimen, Inga & Szalay, Dezsö, 2014. "A Smooth, strategic communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 479, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Szalay, Dezső & Deimen, Inga, 2014. "Smooth, strategic communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 10190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Feddersen, Timothy & Gradwohl, Ronen, 2020. "Decentralized advice," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
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More about this item
Keywords
Cheap talk; information transmission; multisender; full revelation; robustness;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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