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Continuous Reaction Functions In Duopolies

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  • FRIEDMAN, J.W.
  • SAMUELSON, L.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Friedman, J.W. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Continuous Reaction Functions In Duopolies," Working papers 90-25, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  • Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:90-25
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    Cited by:

    1. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2007. "Global Dynamics in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 210, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    2. Shaffer, Sherrill & Shogren, Jason F., 2009. "Repeated contests: A general parameterization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 159-161, November.
    3. Sherrill Shaffer, 2000. "Correlation Tests for Competitive and Cournot Equilibria," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 16(3), pages 313-318, May.
    4. Lu, Yuanzhu & Wright, Julian, 2010. "Tacit collusion with price-matching punishments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 298-306, May.
    5. Margaret Meyer & Ines Moreno de Barreda & Julia Nafziger, 2016. "Robustness of Full Revelation in Multisender Cheap Talk," Economics Series Working Papers 789, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    6. Wright, Julian, 2013. "Punishment strategies in repeated games: Evidence from experimental markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 91-102.
    7. Takashi Kamihigashi & Taiji Furusawa, 2006. "Immediately Reactive Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Additively Separable Continuous Payoffs," Discussion Paper Series 199, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    economic equilibrium ; strategies ; oligopolies;

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