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Voting under contradictory news

Author

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  • Mitra, Arnab
  • Shahriar, Quazi

Abstract

How much do opposing news sources distort private information and how do voters use distorted contradictory information regarding candidate quality? In a two candidate voting game, we derive and experimentally test an “average-opinion” hypothesis, where two opposingly biased sources, capable of forming an unbiased estimate of candidate quality as well as a distorted estimate within a bound, symmetrically distort their reported estimates in opposite directions, and voters split the estimate difference to decipher the unbiased estimate. Data support the hypothesis and show that voters benefit from sources’ competition, compared to a control treatment without competition. When sources are allowed to distort unrestrictedly, babbling equilibrium is predicted, but results still indicate the average-opinion behavior. Finally, even when sources are asymmetric in their ability to distort, voters perform remarkably well to form an adjusted average-opinion, which allows them to vote for the right candidate.

Suggested Citation

  • Mitra, Arnab & Shahriar, Quazi, 2025. "Voting under contradictory news," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 240(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:240:y:2025:i:c:s0167268125004202
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.107303
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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