IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory and Evidence

Listed author(s):
  • John M. de Figueiredo
  • Charles M. Cameron
Registered author(s):

    Special interests attempt to influence lawmakers through campaign contributions and through informational lobbying. Both avenues have been explored extensively in theoretical models. Only the former, however, has received much empirical scrutiny. We provide the first empirical tests of the major class of models of costly legislative lobbying, the Potters-van Winden-Grossman-Helpman (PWGH) model. To do so, we extend a simple PWGH model to encompass situations in which a legislature adjusts a pre-existing policy only periodically. We then test predictions of the model using data derived from over 50,000 observations of annual lobbying expenditures by special interest groups in the American states. We find that, as predicted, special interest groups 1) increase lobbying expenditures when the legislature is controlled by "enemies" rather than by "friends"; 2) increase lobbying expenditures in budget years in states with biennial budgeting, relative to budget years in states with annual budgeting; and, 3) increasingly exit the lobbying process as lobbying costs rise. Overall, the results provide substantial empirical support for the PWGH class of signaling models of interest group lobbying in legislative settings.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University in its series Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series with number d05-156.

    in new window

    Date of creation: Mar 2006
    Handle: RePEc:hst:hstdps:d05-156
    Contact details of provider: Postal:
    2-1 Naka, Kunitachi City, Tokyo 186

    Phone: +81-42-580-8327
    Fax: +81-42-580-8333
    Web page:

    More information through EDIRC

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    in new window

    1. John M. de Figueiredo & Brian S. Silverman, 2002. "Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying," NBER Working Papers 9064, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Snyder, James M, Jr, 1990. "Campaign Contributions as Investments: The U.S. House of Representatives, 1980-1986," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1195-1227, December.
    3. Robert Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2005. "Producing and Manipulating Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(500), pages 185-199, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hst:hstdps:d05-156. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tatsuji Makino)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.