Two-sided Strategic Information Transmission
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More about this item
Keywords
Cheap Talk; Two-Sided Asymmetric Information; Two-Way Communication;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2020-04-27 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2020-04-27 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2020-04-27 (Operations Research)
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