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Tristan Tomala

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," Post-Print halshs-02400053, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Yaron Azrieli & Rachana Das, 2025. "Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2508.09464, arXiv.org.
    2. Wu, Wenhao, 2023. "Sequential Bayesian persuasion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).

  2. Frederic Koessler & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2021. "Correlated Equilibria in Large Anonymous Bayesian Games," Papers 2107.06312, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.

    Cited by:

    1. Fedor Sandomirskiy & Ben Wincelberg, 2026. "Delegation in Strategic Environments and Equilibrium Uniqueness," Papers 2602.21470, arXiv.org.
    2. Emir Kamenica & Kyungmin Kim & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2021. "Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 701-704, October.

  3. Wei Zhao & Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou & Tristan Tomala, 2020. "Contracting over persistent information," Papers 2007.05983, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2024. "Shuttle diplomacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    2. Jan Knoepfle, 2024. "Dynamic Competition for Attention," Papers 2409.18595, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    3. Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 127889, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Li, Xuelin & Szydlowski, Martin & Yu, Fangyuan, 2025. "Dynamic information design in an entry game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    5. Aïd, René & Bonesini, Ofelia & Callegaro, Giorgia & Campi, Luciano, 2025. "Continuous-time persuasion by filtering," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).

  4. Emilien Macault & Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2020. "Social Learning in Nonatomic Routing Games," Papers 2009.11580, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Maria Elena Latino & Marta Menegoli & Fulvio Signore & Maria Chiara De Lorenzi, 2023. "The Potential of Gamification for Social Sustainability: Meaning and Purposes in Agri-Food Industry," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(12), pages 1-18, June.

  5. Tomala, Tristan & Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie, 2018. "Interactive Information Design," HEC Research Papers Series 1260, HEC Paris, revised 02 May 2018.

    Cited by:

    1. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci & Ludovic Renou, 2021. "Cross-verification and Persuasive Cheap Talk," Papers 2102.13562, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
    2. Atakan, Alp & Ekmekci, Mehmet & Renou, Ludovic, 2024. "Cross-verification and persuasive cheap talk," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    3. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games," TSE Working Papers 19-1021, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Ju Hu & Xi Weng, 2021. "Robust persuasion of a privately informed receiver," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(3), pages 909-953, October.
    5. Lucas Pahl, 2024. "Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(1), pages 71-104, March.

  6. Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Information-Theoretic Limits of Strategic Communication," HEC Research Papers Series 1288, HEC Paris.

    Cited by:

    1. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.

  7. Rivera, Thomas J & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Efficiency of Correlation in a Bottleneck Game," HEC Research Papers Series 1289, HEC Paris.

    Cited by:

    1. Wiseman, Jim & Wiseman, Thomas, 2023. "When do traffic reports make traffic better?," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 36(C).
    2. Ryo Kawasaki & Hideo Konishi & Junki Yukawa, 2023. "Equilibria in bottleneck games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(3), pages 649-685, September.

  8. Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Zero-Sum Revision Games," TSE Working Papers 17-751, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

    Cited by:

    1. Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Existence of trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in games with stochastic timing of moves," Working Paper 6757, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    2. Zhuohan Wang & Dong Hao, 2022. "Characterizing Agent Behavior in Revision Games with Uncertain Deadline," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, November.
    3. Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.
    4. Dong Hao & Qi Shi & Jinyan Su & Bo An, 2021. "Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games," Papers 2112.02271, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    5. Pierre Bernhard & Marc Deschamps, 2021. "Dynamic Equilibrium with Randomly Arriving Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 242-269, June.
    6. Roy, Nilanjan, 2023. "Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    7. Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.

  9. Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Persuasion with Limited Communication Capacity," HEC Research Papers Series 1244, HEC Paris.

    Cited by:

    1. Hedlund, Jonas, 2024. "Signaling through Bayesian persuasion," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 15-27.
    2. Ian M. Schmutte & Nathan Yoder, 2022. "Information Design for Differential Privacy," Papers 2202.05452, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    3. Yaron Azrieli & Rachana Das, 2025. "Sequential Non-Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2508.09464, arXiv.org.
    4. Shiri Alon & Sarah Auster & Gabi Gayer & Stefania Minardi, 2023. "Persuasion with Limited Data: A Case-Based Approach," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 245, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    5. Hyeonggyun Ko, 2025. "Persuasion in the Long Run: When history matters," Papers 2508.01662, arXiv.org.
    6. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Constrained Information Design," Papers 1811.03588, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
    7. Reema Deori & Ankur A. Kulkarni, 2024. "Informativeness and Trust in Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2408.13822, arXiv.org.
    8. Shih-Tang Su & Vijay G. Subramanian & Grant Schoenebeck, 2021. "Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials," Papers 2110.09594, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    9. Vora, Anuj S. & Kulkarni, Ankur A., 2024. "Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 48-66.
    10. Sosung Baik & Sung-Ha Hwang, 2021. "Auction design with ambiguity: Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions," Papers 2110.08563, arXiv.org.
    11. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Long Information Design," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02400053, HAL.
    12. Eitan Sapiro-Gheiler, 2022. "Discovery through Trial Balloons," Papers 2211.02743, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2022.
    13. Matysková, Ludmila & Montes, Alfonso, 2023. "Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    14. Tsakas, Elias & Tsakas, Nikolas, 2021. "Noisy persuasion," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 44-61.
    15. Wilfried Youmbi Fotso & Xun Chen, 2026. "Moral Hazard in Delegated Bayesian Persuasion," Papers 2604.10006, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
    16. Xu, Shuo, 2025. "Persuasion through information cost design," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    17. Lian, Zeng & Xu, Shuo & Zheng, Jie, 2025. "Entrant-optimal learning in a contest game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    18. Yunus C. Aybas & Eray Turkel, 2019. "Persuasion with Coarse Communication," Papers 1910.13547, arXiv.org, revised May 2024.
    19. Mark Whitmeyer, 2019. "Bayesian Elicitation," Papers 1902.00976, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    20. Eilat, Ran & Neeman, Zvika, 2023. "Communication with endogenous deception costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    21. Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton, 2024. "The persuasion duality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.
    22. Francesco Bilotta & Christoph Carnehl & Justus Preusser, 2026. "Delegated Information Provision," Papers 2603.10867, arXiv.org.
    23. Monte, Daniel & Linhares, Luis Henrique, 2023. "Stealth Startups, Clauses, and Add-ons: A Model of Strategic Obfuscation," MPRA Paper 115926, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    24. Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2018. "Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment," Papers 1811.03579, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2021.
    25. Yaron Azrieli, 2021. "Constrained versus Unconstrained Rational Inattention," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-22, January.

  10. Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Post-Print halshs-01503768, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Simo Sun & Hui Yang & Guanghui Yang & Jinxiu Pi, 2021. "Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(15), pages 1-16, July.

  11. Tomala , Tristan & Gensbittel , Fabien, 2015. "Comparisons of Ambiguous Experiments," HEC Research Papers Series 1074, HEC Paris.

    Cited by:

    1. Cheaheon Lim, 2026. "Partially Identified Ambiguity," Papers 2602.07634, arXiv.org.
    2. Wang, Zichang, 2024. "Informativeness orders over ambiguous experiments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    3. Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie, 2020. "Information order in monotone decision problems under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    4. Hill, Brian, 2020. "Dynamic consistency and ambiguity: A reappraisal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 289-310.
    5. Karni, Edi & Safra, Zvi, 2022. "Hybrid decision model and the ranking of experiments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
    6. Li, Jian & Zhou, Junjie, 2016. "Blackwell's informativeness ranking with uncertainty-averse preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 18-29.

  12. Lovo , Stefano & Tomala , Tristan, 2015. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games," HEC Research Papers Series 1093, HEC Paris.

    Cited by:

    1. Sofia Moroni, 2019. "Existence of trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in games with stochastic timing of moves," Working Paper 6757, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    2. Sofia Moroni, 2016. "Sniping in Proxy Auctions with Deadlines," Working Paper 5875, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
    3. Ryota Iijima & Akitada Kasahara, 2016. "Gradual Adjustment and Equilibrium Uniqueness under Noisy Monitoring," ISER Discussion Paper 0965, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    4. Zhuohan Wang & Dong Hao, 2022. "Characterizing Agent Behavior in Revision Games with Uncertain Deadline," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-13, November.
    5. Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.
    6. Dong Hao & Qi Shi & Jinyan Su & Bo An, 2021. "Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games," Papers 2112.02271, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    7. Yuichiro Kamada & Michihiro Kandori, 2020. "Revision Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1599-1630, July.
    8. Sofia Moroni, 2020. "Existence of Trembling hand perfect and sequential equilibrium in Stochastic Games," Working Paper 6837, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.

  13. Tristan Tomala, 2013. "Belief-Free Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games," Post-Print hal-01026126, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.

  14. Renou , Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2013. "Approximate Implementation in Markovian Environments," HEC Research Papers Series 1015, HEC Paris.

    Cited by:

    1. Doval, Laura & Smolin, Alex, 2026. "Calibrated Mechanism Design," TSE Working Papers 26-1718, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Āzacis, Helmuts & Vida, Péter, 2019. "Repeated implementation: A practical characterization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 336-367.
    3. Vora, Anuj S. & Kulkarni, Ankur A., 2024. "Shannon meets Myerson: Information extraction from a strategic sender," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 48-66.
    4. Juan F. Escobar & Gastón Llanes, 2015. "Cooperation Dynamic in Repeated Games of Adverse Selection," Documentos de Trabajo 311, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    5. Bruno Sultanum, 2014. "Financial fragility and over-the-counter markets," 2014 Papers psu420, Job Market Papers.
    6. Juan I. Block & David K. Levine, 2016. "Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(4), pages 971-984, November.
    7. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    8. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017. "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.

  15. Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated Games with Complete Information," Post-Print hal-00712075, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. ,, 2012. "A partial folk theorem for games with private learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.

  16. Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," Post-Print hal-00718046, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Berliant, Marcus, 2023. "Daily commuting," MPRA Paper 119020, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Social learning in nonatomic routing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 221-233.

  17. Tristan Tomala & Yuval Heller & Eilon Solan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Post-Print hal-00715606, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Forges, Françoise & Ray, Indrajit, 2024. "“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    2. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    3. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    4. , & ,, 2013. "Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 8(1), January.

  18. Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Post-Print hal-00632806, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    2. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
    3. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    4. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
    5. Somayeh Kokabisaghi & Eric J Pauwels & Andre B Dorsman, 2019. "To snipe or not to snipe, that is the question! Transitions in sniping behaviour among competing algorithmic traders," Papers 1912.04012, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
    6. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Post-Print hal-04836057, HAL.
    7. Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
    8. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.

  19. Tristan Tomala & Pauline Contou-Carrère, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00580938, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Hörner, Johannes & Renault, Jérôme, 2023. "A folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring," TSE Working Papers 23-1473, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

  20. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," HEC Research Papers Series 926, HEC Paris.

    Cited by:

    1. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    2. Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
    3. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
    4. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    5. David Lancashire, 2026. "Beyond Hurwicz: Incentive Compatibility under Informational Decentralization," Papers 2602.01790, arXiv.org.
    6. Mohamed Belhaj & Sebastian Bervoets & Frédéric Deroïan, 2013. "Network Design under Local Complementarities," AMSE Working Papers 1309, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 12 Feb 2013.
    7. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
    8. Jan-Peter Siedlarek, 2023. "Making friends meet: network formation with introductions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1037-1076, December.
    9. Rene Saran & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Implementation by Sortition in Nonexclusive Information Economies," Economics Working Papers 2015-13, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    10. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    11. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Post-Print hal-04836057, HAL.
    12. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
    13. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.

  21. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Informationally optimal correlation," Post-Print hal-00485282, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Valizadeh, Mehrdad & Gohari, Amin, 2019. "Playing games with bounded entropy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 363-380.

  22. Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Post-Print hal-00464537, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
    2. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2023. "Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication," Papers 2311.12242, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    3. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    4. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
    5. Allen Vong, 2025. "Dynamic Correlation as an Incentive Device," Papers 2511.02436, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
    6. David Rahman, 2012. "But Who Will Monitor the Monitor?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(6), pages 2767-2797, October.
    7. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 163-194.
    8. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October.
    9. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    10. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    11. McLean, Richard & Obara, Ichiro & Postlewaite, Andrew, 2014. "Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 191-212.
    12. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi, 2016. "How Fast Do Equilibrium Payoff Sets Converge in Repeated Games"," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2029, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  23. Johannes Horner & Stefano Lovo & Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1739, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

    Cited by:

    1. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    2. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
    3. Marina Bánnikova & José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, 2022. "The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-8, November.
    4. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo.
    5. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
    6. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
    7. Eliaz, Kfir & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Rozen, Kareen, 2016. "The Silent Treatment," CEPR Discussion Papers 11335, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Carmona, G. & Sabourian, H., 2021. "Approachability with Discounting," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2124, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    9. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem," Papers 2006.16206, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
    10. Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
    11. Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
    12. Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    13. Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
    14. Mihm, Maximilian & Toth, Russell, 2020. "Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    15. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic information exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 444-467.
    16. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
    17. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    18. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    19. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2023. "Bad apples in symmetric repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
    20. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
    21. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    22. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    23. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
    24. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    25. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  24. Tristan Tomala & J. Hörner & S. Lovo, 2009. "Existence of belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information and known-own payoffs," Post-Print hal-00495690, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    2. Marina Bánnikova & José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, 2022. "The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-8, November.
    3. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
    4. Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
    5. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
    6. Carmona, G. & Sabourian, H., 2021. "Approachability with Discounting," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2124, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
    8. Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
    9. Johannes H�rner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Working Papers 1397, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    10. Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
    11. Mihm, Maximilian & Toth, Russell, 2020. "Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    12. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    13. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  25. Stefano Lovo & Johannes Hörner & Tristan Tomala, 2009. "Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information," Post-Print hal-00459955, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Sugaya, Takuo & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2020. "Common learning and cooperation in repeated games," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    2. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
    3. Marina Bánnikova & José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, 2022. "The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-8, November.
    4. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
    5. Songzi Du & Haoxiang Zhu, 2014. "Welfare and Optimal Trading Frequency in Dynamic Double Auctions," NBER Working Papers 20588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo.
    7. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.
    8. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2014. "We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-011, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Apr 2017.
    9. Eliaz, Kfir & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Rozen, Kareen, 2016. "The Silent Treatment," CEPR Discussion Papers 11335, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Carmona, G. & Sabourian, H., 2021. "Approachability with Discounting," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2124, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    11. Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
    12. Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
    13. Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
    14. Carlsson, Hans & Wichardt, Philipp C., 2012. "On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 504-507.
    15. Gabrel, Virginie & Murat, Cécile & Thiele, Aurélie, 2014. "Recent advances in robust optimization: An overview," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 235(3), pages 471-483.
    16. Mihm, Maximilian & Toth, Russell, 2020. "Cooperative networks with robust private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    17. Rosenberg, Dinah & Solan, Eilon & Vieille, Nicolas, 2013. "Strategic information exchange," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 444-467.
    18. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2175-2202, September.
    19. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
    20. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    21. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    22. Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2020. "Observations on Cooperation," Papers 2006.15310, arXiv.org.
    23. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    24. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    25. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
    26. Takuo Sugaya & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2019. "Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 19-008, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    27. ,, 2015. "Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(1), January.
    28. Breitmoser, Yves, 2012. "Cooperation, but no reciprocity: Individual strategies in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," MPRA Paper 41731, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    29. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.

  26. Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," Post-Print hal-00464554, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
    2. Benjamin Van Roy & Xiang Yan, 2009. "Manipulation Robustness of Collaborative Filtering Systems," Working Papers 09-21, NET Institute, revised Sep 2009.
    3. Benjamin Van Roy & Xiang Yan, 2010. "Manipulation Robustness of Collaborative Filtering," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(11), pages 1911-1929, November.

  27. Tristan Tomala, 2008. "Probabilistic Reliability and Privacy of Communication Using Multicast in General Neighbor Networks," Post-Print hal-00464542, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. , & ,, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    2. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    3. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
    4. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    5. Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
    6. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Post-Print hal-04836057, HAL.
    7. Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
    8. Andrea Benso, 2025. "A Folk Theorem for Indefinitely Repeated Network Games," Papers 2507.10148, arXiv.org.

  28. Tristan Tomala & Jerome Renault & Marco Scarsini, 2007. "A Minority Game with Bounded Recall," Post-Print hal-00538967, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Bavly, Gilad & Peretz, Ron, 2019. "Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 131-145.
    2. Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016. "Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    3. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
    4. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.
    5. Mailath, George J. & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 174-192, January.

  29. Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2007. "Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring," Post-Print hal-00487954, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    2. Bavly, Gilad & Peretz, Ron, 2019. "Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 131-145.
    3. Nora, Vladyslav & Uno, Hiroshi, 2014. "Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 866-877.
    4. Valizadeh, Mehrdad & Gohari, Amin, 2019. "Playing games with bounded entropy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 363-380.
    5. Mehrdad Valizadeh & Amin Gohari, 2021. "Simulation of a Random Variable and its Application to Game Theory," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 46(2), pages 452-470, May.
    6. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    7. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    8. Cingiz, Kutay & Flesch, Janos & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2016. "Perfect Information Games where Each Player Acts Only Once," Research Memorandum 036, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    9. Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 63-84, January.
    10. Ron Peretz, 2011. "Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies," Discussion Paper Series dp579, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    11. Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    12. Jiaying Deng & Hossein Ghasemkhani & Yong Tan & Arvind K Tripathi, 2023. "Actions speak louder than words: Imputing users’ reputation from transaction history," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(4), pages 1096-1111, April.
    13. Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
    14. Ron Peretz, 2013. "Correlation through bounded recall strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(4), pages 867-890, November.
    15. Bavly, Gilad & Neyman, Abraham, 2014. "Online concealed correlation and bounded rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 71-89.

  30. Olivier Gossner & Tristan Tomala, 2006. "Empirical Distributions of Beliefs Under Imperfect Observation," Post-Print hal-00487960, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
    2. Hernández, Penélope & Urbano, Amparo, 2008. "Codification schemes and finite automata," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 395-409, November.
    3. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Discussion Papers 1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Andrew Caplin & Daniel J. Martin, 2020. "Framing, Information, and Welfare," NBER Working Papers 27265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Gossner, Olivier & Hörner, Johannes, 2010. "When is the lowest equilibrium payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 63-84, January.
    6. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    8. Olivier Gossner & Penélope Hernández & Ron Peretz, 2016. "The complexity of interacting automata," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 45(1), pages 461-496, March.
    9. Antonio Cabrales & Olivier Gossner & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Entropy and the value of information for investors," PSE Working Papers halshs-00648884, HAL.

  31. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.

    Cited by:

  32. Tristan Tomala & Olivier Gossner, 2004. "Secret correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00587232, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
    2. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
    3. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2007. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation and Debt," Discussion Papers 1441, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Olivier Gossner & Jöhannes Horner, 2006. "When is the individually rational payoff in a repeated game equal to the minmax payoff?," Discussion Papers 1440, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

  33. Tristan Tomala, 2004. "On Subgame-Perfect Communication Equilibria in Repeated Games with Imperfect monitoring," Working Papers hal-00587231, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.

  34. GOSSNER, Olivier & TOMALA, Tristan, 2003. "Entropy and codification in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    Cited by:

    1. Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2003. "Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players," Discussion Paper Series dp336, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Yair Goldberg, 2003. "On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example," Discussion Paper Series dp345, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

  35. Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997. "Repeated Proximity Games," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications 97.14, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).

    Cited by:

    1. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
    2. Olivier Gossner & Rida Laraki & Tristan Tomala, 2004. "Maxmin computation and optimal correlation in repeated games with signals," Working Papers hal-00242940, HAL.
    3. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    4. Markus Kinateder, 2006. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    5. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
    6. Marie Laclau, 2013. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," Post-Print hal-02552216, HAL.
    7. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
    8. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    9. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
    10. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    11. Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
    12. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Post-Print hal-04836057, HAL.
    13. Nava, Francesco & Piccione, Michele, 2012. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 54250, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
    15. Richard McLean & Ichiro Obara & Andrew Postlewaite, 2025. "Uniformly strict equilibrium for repeated games with private monitoring and communication," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 80(2), pages 493-514, September.
    16. Fainmesser, Itay P. & Goldberg, David A., 2018. "Cooperation in partly observable networked markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 220-237.
    17. Andrea Benso, 2025. "A Folk Theorem for Indefinitely Repeated Network Games," Papers 2507.10148, arXiv.org.
    18. King, Maia, 2020. "The probabilities of node-to-node diffusion in fixed networks," SocArXiv dfq8y, Center for Open Science.
    19. Joyee Deb & Julio González Díaz & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Uniform Folk Theorems in Repeated Anonymous Random Matching Games," Working Papers 13-16, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    20. , & ,, 2014. "Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    21. Polanski, Arnold, 2024. "Close-knit neighborhoods: Stability of cooperation in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    22. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.
    23. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
    24. Yair Goldberg, 2003. "On the Minmax of Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: A Computational Example," Discussion Paper Series dp345, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Articles

  1. Zhao, Wei & Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2024. "Contracting over persistent information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Koessler, Frederic & Laclau, Marie & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Long information design," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Frédéric Koessler & Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2022. "Interactive Information Design," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 47(1), pages 153-175, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Macault, Emilien & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2022. "Social learning in nonatomic routing games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 221-233.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Le Treust, Maël & Tomala, Tristan, 2019. "Persuasion with limited communication capacity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Gensbittel, Fabien & Lovo, Stefano & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Zero-sum revision games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 504-522.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2018. "Belief-free price formation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 342-365.

    Cited by:

    1. Bryzgalova, Svetlana & Pavlova, Anna & Sikorskaya, Taisiya, 2025. "Strategic arbitrage in segmented markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 166(C).
    2. Yan Han & Xue-Feng Shao & Xin Cui & Xiao-Guang Yue & Kelvin Joseph Bwalya & Otilia Manta, 2019. "Assessing Investor Belief: An Analysis of Trading for Sustainable Growth of Stock Markets," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(20), pages 1-18, October.

  8. Laclau, Marie & Tomala, Tristan, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 400-424.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2015. "Approximate implementation in Markovian environments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 401-442.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.

    Cited by:

    1. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    2. Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
    3. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    4. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
    5. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).

  11. , & ,, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  12. Marco Scarsini & Tristan Tomala, 2012. "Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 651-669, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  13. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2012. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 222-234.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  14. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    2. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    3. Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.

  15. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  16. Tristan Tomala, 2011. "Fault Reporting in Partially Known Networks and Folk Theorems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(3), pages 754-763, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  17. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  18. Renault, Jérôme & Scarsini, Marco & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Playing off-line games with bounded rationality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 207-223, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Peretz, Ron, 2012. "The strategic value of recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 332-351.

  19. Gossner, Olivier & Tomala, Tristan, 2008. "Entropy bounds on Bayesian learning," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 24-32, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  20. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Learning the state of nature in repeated games with incomplete information and signals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 124-156, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    2. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    3. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
    4. Hörner, Johannes & Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1770-1795, September.
    5. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    6. Marie Laclau, 2016. "Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication," PSE Working Papers hal-01285070, HAL.
    7. Andrea Benso, 2025. "A Folk Theorem for Indefinitely Repeated Network Games," Papers 2507.10148, arXiv.org.

  21. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Tomala, Tristan, 2009. "Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 682-694, November.
    2. Johannes Horner & Satoru Takahashi & Nicolas Vieille, 2012. "On the Limit Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated and Stochastic Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000412, David K. Levine.
    3. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
    4. Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
    5. Allen Vong, 2025. "Dynamic Correlation as an Incentive Device," Papers 2511.02436, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2026.
    6. Forges, Françoise & Ray, Indrajit, 2024. "“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C).
    7. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "Blackwell's comparison of experiments and discounted repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 163-194.
    8. Flesch, János & Laraki, Rida & Perchet, Vianney, 2018. "Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 411-431.
    9. Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.
    10. Nicolas Jacquemet & Frédéric Koessler, 2011. "Using or Hiding Private Information? An Experimental Study of Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00565157, HAL.
    11. Laclau, Marie, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games played on a network," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 711-737.
    12. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    13. Takuo Sugaya, 2022. "Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 89(4), pages 2201-2256.
    14. Sugaya, Takuo & Wolitzky, Alexander, 2017. "Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), May.
    15. Heller, Yuval & Solan, Eilon & Tomala, Tristan, 2010. "Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information," MPRA Paper 25895, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Lovo, Stefano & Tomala, Tristan & Hörner, Johannes, 2009. "Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence," HEC Research Papers Series 921, HEC Paris.
    17. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Lehrer, Ehud, 2019. "What you get is what you see: Cooperation in repeated games with observable payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 197-237.
    18. Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Post-Print halshs-01503768, HAL.
    19. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.
    20. Laclau, M., 2014. "Communication in repeated network games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 136-160.
    21. Jérôme Renault & Bruno Ziliotto, 2020. "Limit Equilibrium Payoffs in Stochastic Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 45(3), pages 889-895, August.

  22. Tomala, Tristan, 1999. "Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 310-324, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Deb, Joyee & González-Díaz, Julio & Renault, Jérôme, 2016. "Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 1-23.
    2. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
    3. Renault, Jerome & Tomala, Tristan, 2004. "Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 313-344, November.
    4. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    5. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2016. "Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 166-173.
    6. Laura Gomez-Ruiz & María J. Sánchez-Expósito, 2020. "The Impact of Team Identity and Gender on Free-Riding Responses to Fear and Cooperation Sustainability," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(19), pages 1-21, October.

  23. Tristan Tomala, 1998. "Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(1), pages 93-109.

    Cited by:

    1. Hörner, Johannes & Takahashi, Satoru & Vieille, Nicolas, 2014. "On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 70-83.
    2. Tomala, Tristan, 1999. "Nash Equilibria of Repeated Games with Observable Payoff Vectors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 310-324, August.
    3. Renault, Jerome & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2005. "A folk theorem for minority games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 208-230, November.
    4. Contou-Carrère, Pauline & Tomala, Tristan, 2011. "Finitely repeated games with semi-standard monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 14-21, January.
    5. Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2016. "Repeated games with public information revisited," Working Papers hal-01285326, HAL.
    6. Jérôme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 2011. "General Properties of Long-Run Supergames," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 319-350, June.
    7. Heng Liu, 2017. "Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1037-1069, November.
    8. Marie Laclau & Tristan Tomala, 2017. "Repeated games with public deterministic monitoring," Post-Print halshs-01503768, HAL.
    9. Renault, Jérôme & Scarlatti, Sergio & Scarsini, Marco, 2008. "Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 44-74, July.

  24. JÊrÆme Renault & Tristan Tomala, 1998. "Repeated proximity games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 539-559.
    See citations under working paper version above.
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