The strategic value of recall
This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results (Lehrer, 1988; Neyman and Okada, 2009) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.
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- Gilad Bavly & Abraham Neyman, 2003. "Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players," Discussion Paper Series dp336, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Abraham Neyman, 2008.
"Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000002427, David K. Levine.
- Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001945, David K. Levine.
- Abraham Neyman, 2008. "Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size," Discussion Paper Series dp476, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Neyman, Abraham & Okada, Daijiro, 2009.
"Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 404-425, May.
- Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000920, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Abraham Neyman & Daijiro Okada, 2005. "Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall," Discussion Paper Series dp411, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Scarsini, Marco & Renault, Jérôme & Tomala, Tristan, 2008.
"Playing off-line games with bounded rationality,"
Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine
123456789/6127, Paris Dauphine University.
- Lehrer, Ehud, 1988. "Repeated games with stationary bounded recall strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 130-144, October.
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