Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring
The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. the main result shows that when beliefs about the monitoring structure have full support, efficiency can be sustained with sequential equilibria that are independent of the players' beliefs. Stronger results are obtained when only acyclic monitoring structures are allowed or players have unit discount rates. These equilibria satisfy numerous robustness properties.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mario Gilli, 1999.
"On Non-Nash Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2084, David K. Levine.
- Fernando Vega Redondo, 2002.
"Building Up Social Capital In A Changing World,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2002-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Kandori, Michihiro, 1992.
"Social Norms and Community Enforcement,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80, January.
- Itay Fainmesser, 2010.
"Community Structure and Market Outcomes: A Repeated Games in Networks Approach,"
2010-14, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Itay P. Fainmesser, 2012. "Community Structure and Market Outcomes: A Repeated Games-in-Networks Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 32-69, February.
- Markus Kinateder, 2006.
"Repeated Games Played in a Network,"
UFAE and IAE Working Papers
674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- McBride, Michael, 2006. "Imperfect monitoring in communication networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 97-119, January.
- Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Kahneman, Michael, 1996. "Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 281-297, August.
- Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2000.
"social Norms, Local Interaction and Neighborhood Planning,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2049, David K. Levine.
- Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, And Neighborhood Planning ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 265-296, 02.
- Matthew Haag & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "Social Norms, Local Interaction, and Neighborhood Planning," Game Theory and Information 9907004, EconWPA.
- Renault, J. & Tomala, T., 1997.
"Repeated Proximity Games,"
Papiers d'Economie MathÃ©matique et Applications
97.14, UniversitÃ© PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
- Alexander Wolitzky, 2013. "Cooperation with Network Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(1), pages 395-427.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:54250. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (LSERO Manager)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.