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Exclusive Intermediation

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  • Itay Fainmesser

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that an important function fulfilled by intermediaries is to facilitate trust by enabling social pressure towards the enforcement of informal agreements. To that end, we develop a new model that uses network theory to show that intermediaries who have exclusivity over a large enough number of interaction opportunities are able to exploit their position in the chains of interactions in the market to overcome incentive problems that would otherwise shut down the market. We derive conditions on the network structure under which intermediaries fulfill this function. Finally, we analyze two applications: (1) the market for short termapartment rentals; and (2) a financial market with investors and entrepreneurs. We provide additional examples suggesting that this paper uncovers an important channel through which intermediaries operate.

Suggested Citation

  • Itay Fainmesser, 2014. "Exclusive Intermediation," Working Papers 2014-3, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bro:econwp:2014-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Emily Breza & Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Horacio Larreguy, 2014. "Social Structure and Institutional Design: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field," NBER Working Papers 20309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Gofman, Michael, 2017. "Efficiency and stability of a financial architecture with too-interconnected-to-fail institutions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 113-146.
    3. Babus, Ana & Hu, Tai-Wei, 2017. "Endogenous intermediation in over-the-counter markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 200-215.
    4. Fainmesser, Itay P. & Goldberg, David A., 2018. "Cooperation in partly observable networked markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 220-237.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Networks; intermediation; long-term relationships; self-governance; community enforcement; trust; social capital; cooperation; strategic default; financial intermediation; Airbnb.com;
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