IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/e/pos19.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Hiroshi Osano

Personal Details

First Name:Hiroshi
Middle Name:
Last Name:Osano
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pos19
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Institute of Economic Research
Kyoto University

Kyoto, Japan
http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/

: +81-75-753-7102
+81-75-753-7193
Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501
RePEc:edi:iekyojp (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2017. "Debt Maturity, Default, and Investment under Rollover Risk and Solvency Concern," KIER Working Papers 979, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  3. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," KIER Working Papers 863, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options," KIER Working Papers 768, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  5. Hiroshi Osano, 2003. "Prudential Regulation and Capital Injection under Moral Hazard in Banks and Entrepreneurs," KIER Working Papers 576, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  6. Hiroshi Osano & Mami Kobayashi, 2003. "Double Moral Hazard and Renegotiation," KIER Working Papers 563, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  7. 内田, 浩史 & 小佐野, 広, 2003. "日本における銀行モニタリングのガバナンス機能," CEI Working Paper Series 2003-5, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  8. Mami Kobayashi & Hiroshi Osano, 2002. "Lender Liability and Cleanup Procudure: A Comparison," KIER Working Papers 561, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  9. Hiroshi Osano, 2001. "Stock Options and Employees' Firm-Specific Human Capital under the Threat of Divesture and Aquisition," Working Papers 01-10, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
  10. Hiroshi Osano, 1989. "Coordination Failure and Long Run Growth," Discussion Papers 831, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. H. Osano & T. Inoue, 1988. "Testing Between Competing Models of Business Cycles: The Efficient Long-Term Contract Hypothesis Versus the Intertemporal Substitution Hypothesis," Discussion Papers 768, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Hiroshi Osano, 1988. "Real Business Cycles in a Dynamic Labor Contract Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 809, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Hiroshi Osano, 1988. "Involuntary Unemployment and the Threat to Shirking Workers," Discussion Papers 795, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

Articles

  1. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
  2. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2014. "Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 607-627.
  3. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
  4. Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi, 2012. "Nonrecourse financing and securitization," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 659-693.
  5. Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 202-223, June.
  6. Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi, 2011. "The new main bank system," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 336-354, September.
  7. Nobuo Akai & Keizo Mizuno & Hiroshi Osano, 2010. "Incentive Transfer Schemes with Marketable and Nonmarketable Public Services," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(4), pages 614-640, December.
  8. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2009. "Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(12), pages 1962-1980, December.
  9. Hiroshi Osano, 2005. "An Optimal Scheme For Injecting Public Funds Under The Moral Hazard Incentive For Banks," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(2), pages 223-247.
  10. Osano, Hiroshi & Kobayashi, Mami, 2005. "Double moral hazard and renegotiation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 345-364, December.
  11. Hiroshi Fujiki & Hiroshi Osano & Hirofumi Uchida, 2004. "Optimal Contracts For Central Bankers And Public Debt Policy," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(4), pages 372-400.
  12. Osano, Hiroshi, 2004. "Stock options and employees' firm-specific human capital under the threat of divestitures and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 615-638, September.
  13. Hiroshi Osano, 2003. "Wealth Dynamics and the Endogenous Design of Firm Organization," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 54(3), pages 300-323.
  14. Osano, Hiroshi, 2002. "Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-49, January.
  15. Hiroshi Osano, 1999. "Security Design, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 2(3), pages 273-302.
  16. Hiroshi Osano, 1999. "Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(2), pages 161-177.
  17. Osano, Hiroshi, 1998. "Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 207-230, October.
  18. Hiroshi Osano, 1998. "Default and Renegotiation in Financial Distress in the Multiple Bank Model: An Analysis of the Main Bank System," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 138-157, June.
  19. Osano, Hiroshi, 1997. "An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Contracts," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 403-436, September.
  20. HIROSHI Osano, 1996. "Breach Of Contracts And Renegotiation In Corporate Takeovers," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 346-367, December.
  21. Osano, Hiroshi, 1996. "Intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the Japanese firm," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 1047-1068, July.
  22. Osano H., 1995. "Renegotiation-Proof Lotteries Equilibrium in an Economy with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 435-467, April.
  23. Osano, Hiroshi & Inoue, Tohru, 1991. "Testing between Competing Models of Real Business Cycles," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 669-688, August.
  24. Osano, Hiroshi, 1990. "Dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 175-192, February.
  25. Osano, Hiroshi & Inoue, Touru, 1988. "Implicit contracts in the Japanese labor market," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 181-198, June.
  26. Osano, Hiroshi & Tsutsui, Yoshiro, 1986. "Credit rationing and implicit contract theory : An empirical study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 419-438, December.
  27. Osano, Hiroshi & Tsutsui, Yoshiro, 1985. "Implicit Contracts in the Japanese Bank Loan Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(02), pages 211-229, June.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Cheng, 2005. "Termination of Dynamic Contracts in an Equilibrium Labor Market Model," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12403, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    2. Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.

  2. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," KIER Working Papers 863, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
    2. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    3. Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.

  3. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options," KIER Working Papers 768, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Stephen Spear & Cheng Wang, "undated". "When to Fire a CEO: Optimal Termination in Dynamic Contracts," GSIA Working Papers 2002-E5, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.

  4. Hiroshi Osano, 1988. "Real Business Cycles in a Dynamic Labor Contract Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 809, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Danthine, Jean-Pierre & Donaldson, John B., 1990. "Risk Sharing, the Minimum Wage, and the Business Cycle," Institut des Mathématiques Economiques – Document de travail de l’I.M.E. (1974-1993) 9007, Institut des Mathématiques Economiques. LATEC, Laboratoire d'Analyse et des Techniques EConomiques, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.

Articles

  1. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2014. "Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 607-627.

    Cited by:

    1. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
    2. Katsunori Kume & Takao Fujiwara, 2016. "Production Flexibility of Real Options in Daily Supply Chain," Global Journal of Flexible Systems Management, Springer;Global Institute of Flexible Systems Management, vol. 17(3), pages 249-264, September.
    3. Lukas, Elmar & Welling, Andreas, 2017. "Efficient non-cooperative bargaining despite keeping strategic information private," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 287-294.
    4. Gan, Liu & Luo, Pengfei & Yang, Zhaojun, 2016. "Real option, debt maturity and equity default swaps under negotiation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 278-284.

  3. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2013. "Managerial Incentives and the Role of Advisors in the Continuous-Time Agency Model," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(10), pages 2620-2647.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi, 2012. "Nonrecourse financing and securitization," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 659-693.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Zhizhen & Liu, Frank Hong & Opong, Kwaku & Zhou, Mingming, 2017. "Short-term safety or long-term failure? Empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 48-74.

  5. Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 202-223, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Fanti, Luciano, 2013. "Cross-ownership and unions in a Cournot duopoly: When profits reduce with horizontal product differentiation," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 34-40.
    2. Fanti, Luciano, 2016. "Social welfare and cross-ownership in a vertical industry: When the mode of competition matters for antitrust policy," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37, pages 8-16.
    3. Fanti, Luciano & Buccella, Domenico, 2016. "Passive unilateral cross-ownership and strategic trade policy," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 10, pages 1-22.
    4. Luciano Fanti, 2011. "Product differentiation and duopoly: when social welfare benefits from cross-shareholding," Discussion Papers 2011/129, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.

  6. Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi, 2011. "The new main bank system," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 336-354, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi, 2012. "Nonrecourse financing and securitization," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 659-693.
    2. Mami Koyama & Tomohisa Kitada & Takehisa Kajiwara, 2016. "Financial Risk, Main Bank System, and Cost Behavior: Empirical Evidence from Japan," Discussion Papers 2016-14, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.

  7. Nobuo Akai & Keizo Mizuno & Hiroshi Osano, 2010. "Incentive Transfer Schemes with Marketable and Nonmarketable Public Services," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(4), pages 614-640, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Meg Sato & Kazuya Kamiya, 2011. "A Multitask Model Without Any Externalities," Crawford School Research Papers 1106, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.

  8. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2009. "Optimal timing of management turnover under agency problems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(12), pages 1962-1980, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Gijsbert Zwart & Peter Broer, 2012. "Optimal regulation of lumpy investments," CPB Discussion Paper 214, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    2. Keiichi Hori & Hiroshi Osano, 2017. "Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 521-554, December.
    3. Hori, Keiichi & Osano, Hiroshi, 2014. "Investment timing decisions of managers under endogenous contracts," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 607-627.
    4. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2013. "Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement ," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-890, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

  9. Hiroshi Osano, 2005. "An Optimal Scheme For Injecting Public Funds Under The Moral Hazard Incentive For Banks," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(2), pages 223-247.

    Cited by:

    1. Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike & Vieten, Thomas, 2011. "Reestablishing stability and avoiding a credit crunch: Comparing different bad bank schemes," DICE Discussion Papers 31, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    2. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.

  10. Hiroshi Fujiki & Hiroshi Osano & Hirofumi Uchida, 2004. "Optimal Contracts For Central Bankers And Public Debt Policy," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 55(4), pages 372-400.

    Cited by:

    1. Fujiki, Hiroshi & Uchida, Hirofumi, 2011. "Inflation target and debt management of local government bonds," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 178-189.

  11. Osano, Hiroshi, 2004. "Stock options and employees' firm-specific human capital under the threat of divestitures and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 615-638, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Angélica María Sánchez-Riofrío & Luis Ángel Guerras-Martín & Francisco Javier Forcadell, 2015. "Business portfolio restructuring: a comprehensive bibliometric review," Scientometrics, Springer;Akadémiai Kiadó, vol. 102(3), pages 1921-1950, March.
    2. Kobayashi, Mami, 2007. "Ownership structure, shareholder intervention, and success in takeovers," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 425-440, December.

  12. Osano, Hiroshi, 2002. "Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-49, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Jaime Hurtubia & Claudio Sardoni, 2011. "Policy Implications of Using Audits to Detect Bank Insolvencies," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 651, Central Bank of Chile.
    2. João Paulo Vieito & António Cerqueira & Elísio Brandão & Walayet A. Khan, 2009. "Executive Compensation: the Finance Perspective," Portuguese Journal of Management Studies, ISEG, Universidade de Lisboa, vol. 0(1), pages 3-32.
    3. Jaime Hurtubia Torres & Claudio Sardoni, 2010. "Financial safety nets, bailouts and moral hazard," Working Papers 8, Doctoral School of Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, revised 2010.
    4. Hauck, Achim & Neyer, Ulrike & Vieten, Thomas, 2011. "Reestablishing stability and avoiding a credit crunch: Comparing different bad bank schemes," DICE Discussion Papers 31, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
    5. García-Palacios, Jaime H. & Hasman, Augusto & Samartín, Margarita, 2014. "Banking crises and government intervention," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 32-42.
    6. Misa Tanaka & Glenn Hoggarth, 2006. "Resolving banking crises - an analysis of policy options," Bank of England working papers 293, Bank of England.
    7. Uwe Vollmer & Ralf Bebenroth, 2012. "The Financial Crisis in Japan: Causes and Policy Reactions by the Bank of Japan," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 9(1), pages 51-77, April.
    8. Hauck, Achim & Vollmer, Uwe, 2013. "Emergency liquidity provision to public banks: Rules versus discretion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 193-204.

  13. Hiroshi Osano, 1999. "Security Design, Insider Monitoring, and Financial Market Equilibrium," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 2(3), pages 273-302.

    Cited by:

    1. Malekan, Sara & Dionne, Georges, 2014. "Securitization and optimal retention under moral hazard," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 74-85.

  14. Hiroshi Osano, 1999. "Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(2), pages 161-177.

    Cited by:

    1. Hiroshi Osano & Mami Kobayashi, 2003. "Double Moral Hazard and Renegotiation," KIER Working Papers 563, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

  15. Osano, Hiroshi, 1998. "Moral hazard and renegotiation in multi-agent incentive contracts when each agent makes a renegotiation offer," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 207-230, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Hiroshi Osano & Mami Kobayashi, 2003. "Double Moral Hazard and Renegotiation," KIER Working Papers 563, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    2. Franck, Raphaël & Krausz, Miriam, 2008. "Why separate monetary policy from banking supervision?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 388-411, September.

  16. Hiroshi Osano, 1998. "Default and Renegotiation in Financial Distress in the Multiple Bank Model: An Analysis of the Main Bank System," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 138-157, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Kobayashi, Mami & Osano, Hiroshi, 2011. "The new main bank system," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 336-354, September.

  17. Osano, Hiroshi, 1997. "An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Contracts," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 403-436, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Josep Tribo, 2005. "An analysis of the length of labour and financial contracts: a study for Spain," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(8), pages 905-916.
    2. Osano, Hiroshi, 2004. "Stock options and employees' firm-specific human capital under the threat of divestitures and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 615-638, September.
    3. Raquel Fonseca & Natalia Utrero González, 2004. "Do Market Regulation and Financial Imperfections Affect Firm Size? New Empirical Evidence," CSEF Working Papers 119, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.

  18. HIROSHI Osano, 1996. "Breach Of Contracts And Renegotiation In Corporate Takeovers," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 346-367, December.

    Cited by:

    1. HIROSHI Osano, 1996. "Breach Of Contracts And Renegotiation In Corporate Takeovers," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 346-367, December.

  19. Osano, Hiroshi, 1996. "Intercorporate shareholdings and corporate control in the Japanese firm," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(6), pages 1047-1068, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Cabrales & Piero Gottardi & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2014. "Risk-sharing and contagion in networks," Working Papers 2014-18, FEDEA.
    2. Fanti, Luciano, 2013. "Cross-ownership and unions in a Cournot duopoly: When profits reduce with horizontal product differentiation," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 34-40.
    3. Fung, K. C., 2002. "International Trade and Bank Groups: Welfare Enhancing or Welfare Reducing?," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 212-226, June.
    4. Ang, James S. & Constand, Richard, 2002. "The portfolio behavior of Japanese corporations' stable shareholders," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 89-106, April.
    5. Richard W. Carney & Travers Barclay Child, 2015. "Business Networks and Crisis Performance: Professional, Political, and Family Ties," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-135/V, Tinbergen Institute, revised 20 Feb 2015.
    6. Shaif Jarallah & Wali Ullah, 2014. "Evolving corporate governance and the dividends behaviour regime in Japan," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 279-303, September.
    7. Akinobu Shuto & Takuya Iwasaki, 2014. "Stable Shareholdings, the Decision Horizon Problem and Earnings Smoothing," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(9-10), pages 1212-1242, November.
    8. Yasuhiro Arikawa & Atsushi Kato, 2015. "Cross Shareholding and Initiative Effects," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 5(2), pages 305-319, February.
    9. Konari Uchida & Peng Xu, 2008. "US Barbarians at the Japan Gate: Cross Border Hedge Fund Activism," Bank of Japan Working Paper Series 08-E-3, Bank of Japan.
    10. Gugler, Klaus & Mueller, Dennis C. & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2008. "Insider ownership, ownership concentration and investment performance: An international comparison," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 688-705, December.
    11. Hiroshi Osano, 2011. "Partial Ownership and Strategic Alliances with Reallocation of Corporate Resources," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 167(2), pages 202-223, June.
    12. Hiraki, Takato & Inoue, Hideaki & Ito, Akitoshi & Kuroki, Fumiaki & Masuda, Hiroyuki, 2003. "Corporate governance and firm value in Japan: Evidence from 1985 to 1998," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 239-265, July.
    13. Osano, Hiroshi, 1997. "An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Contracts," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 403-436, September.
    14. Nobuyuki Isagawa, 2006. "Cross-Shareholding and Unwinding of Cross-Shareholding Under Managerial Entrenchment," Discussion Papers 2006-02, Kobe University, Graduate School of Business Administration.
    15. Shinichi Hirota & Kohei Kawamura, 2005. "Managerial Control inside the Firm," ISER Discussion Paper 0635, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    16. Hirota, Shinichi & Kawamura, Kohei, 2007. "Managerial control inside the firm," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 324-335, September.

  20. Osano H., 1995. "Renegotiation-Proof Lotteries Equilibrium in an Economy with Private Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 435-467, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Jovanovic, B. & Ueda, M., 1998. "Stock-Returns and Inflation in a Principal-Agent Economy," Working Papers 98-15, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.

  21. Osano, Hiroshi & Inoue, Tohru, 1991. "Testing between Competing Models of Real Business Cycles," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 669-688, August.

    Cited by:

    1. de la Croix, David & Palm, Franz C. & Pfann, Gerard A., 1996. "A dynamic contracting model for wages and employment in three European economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 429-448, February.
    2. Kuroda, Sachiko & Yamamoto, Isamu, 2008. "Estimating Frisch labor supply elasticity in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 566-585, December.
    3. Ken Yamada, 2009. "Labor Supply Responses to the 1990s Japanese Tax Reforms," Working Papers 12-2009, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    4. Christopher Otrok & Panayiotis M. Pourpourides, 2011. "On the Cyclicality of Real Wages and Wage Differentials," Working Papers 2011-4, Central Bank of Cyprus.
    5. John C. Ham & Kevin T. Reilly, 2002. "Testing Intertemporal Substitution, Implicit Contracts, and Hours Restriction Models of the Labor Market Using Micro Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 905-927, September.
    6. John C. Ham & Kevin T. Reilly, 2013. "Implicit Contracts, Life Cycle Labor Supply, And Intertemporal Substitution," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54, pages 1133-1158, November.
    7. Irina Khvostova & Alexander Larin & Anna Novak, 2014. "Euler equation with habits and measurement errors: estimates on Russian micro data," HSE Working papers WP BRP 52/EC/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    8. de la Croix, David & Fagnart, Jean-Francois, 1995. "Underemployment of production factors in a forward-looking model," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 131-159, June.

  22. Osano, Hiroshi & Inoue, Touru, 1988. "Implicit contracts in the Japanese labor market," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 181-198, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Rülke, Jan-Christoph, 2012. "Do professional forecasters apply the Phillips curve and Okun's law? Evidence from six Asian-Pacific countries," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 317-324.

  23. Osano, Hiroshi & Tsutsui, Yoshiro, 1986. "Credit rationing and implicit contract theory : An empirical study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 419-438, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Okamuro, Hiroyuki, 2001. "Risk sharing in the supplier relationship: new evidence from the Japanese automotive industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(4), pages 361-381, August.

  24. Osano, Hiroshi & Tsutsui, Yoshiro, 1985. "Implicit Contracts in the Japanese Bank Loan Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 20(02), pages 211-229, June.

    Cited by:

    1. UCHINO Taisuke, 2011. "Bank Dependence and Financial Constraints on Investment: Evidence from the corporate bond market paralysis in Japan," Discussion papers 11073, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    2. Luke Gower, 2000. "Some Structural Causes of Japan’s Banking Problems," RBA Research Discussion Papers rdp2000-03, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    3. Hasumi, Ryo & Hirata, Hideaki & Ono, Arito, 2012. "Differentiated Use of Small Business Credit Scoring by Relationship Lenders and Transactional Lenders: Evidence from Firm-Bank Matched Data in Japan," Working Paper Series 23, Center for Interfirm Network, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Nemoto, Tadanobu & Ogura, Yoshiaki & Watanabe, Wako, 2016. "Inside bank premiums as liquidity insurance," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 61-76.
    5. Uchino, Taisuke, 2013. "Bank dependence and financial constraints on investment: Evidence from the corporate bond market paralysis in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 74-97.
    6. Winker, Peter, 1994. "Eine makroökonometrische Analyse von Kreditmarkt und Kreditrationierung: Bankkredite in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1974 - 1989," Discussion Papers, Series II 220, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    7. Winker, Peter, 1996. "A macroeconomic disequilibrium model of the German credit market," Discussion Papers, Series II 302, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    8. Radygin Alexandr & Entov Revold & Apevalova E. & Shvetsov P., 2008. "Market Discipline and Contracts: Theory, Empiric Analysis, Law," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 117P.
    9. Winker, Peter, 1993. "Die Trägheit von Zinssätzen und Kreditrationierung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Discussion Papers, Series II 208, University of Konstanz, Collaborative Research Centre (SFB) 178 "Internationalization of the Economy".
    10. NEMOTO Tadanobu & OGURA Yoshiaki & WATANABE Wako, 2011. "An Estimation of the Inside Bank Premium," Discussion papers 11067, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2011-04-23 2013-05-22 2015-04-25
  2. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (3) 2011-04-23 2013-05-22 2015-04-25
  3. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2017-12-18
  4. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (1) 2013-05-22
  5. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2013-05-22
  6. NEP-PPM: Project, Program & Portfolio Management (1) 2011-04-23

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Hiroshi Osano should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.