Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer
The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for supporting desired equilibrium actions in a one-principal, multi-agent model when the principal makes a renegotiation offer. We show that there exists a mechanism in which the principal's most preferred mixed strategy is always supported.
Volume (Year): 4 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: 30 May 1997 / Accepted: 10 October 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10058/index.htm|
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