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Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer


  • Hiroshi Osano

    () (Kyoto Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University, Sakyo, Kyoto 606-8501, Japan)


The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for supporting desired equilibrium actions in a one-principal, multi-agent model when the principal makes a renegotiation offer. We show that there exists a mechanism in which the principal's most preferred mixed strategy is always supported.

Suggested Citation

  • Hiroshi Osano, 1999. "Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(2), pages 161-177.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:2:p:161-177 Note: Received: 30 May 1997 / Accepted: 10 October 1998

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Osano, Hiroshi & Kobayashi, Mami, 2005. "Double moral hazard and renegotiation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(4), pages 345-364, December.

    More about this item


    Renegotiation; multi-agent; implementation;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design


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