Financial safety nets, bailouts and moral hazard
The paper argues that policymakers bail out banks with financial problems to avoid the costs of financial repression. After financial liberalization and when risk is verifiable, in some circumstances policymakers can commit to policies that discipline banks ex-ante and ex-post, by providing bailout to conservative banks and threatening the takeover of risky banks. When these policies are time consistent, regulatory policies to deal with moral hazard ex-ante, like for example prudential regulation, become redundant and policymakers refrain from implementing them.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:||2010|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://phdschool-economics.dse.uniroma1.it/website/|
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- Eduardo Levy Yeyati & Tito Cordella, 1999.
"Bank Bailouts; Moral Hazard vs. Value Effect,"
IMF Working Papers
99/106, International Monetary Fund.
- Graciela L. Kaminsky & Carmen M. Reinhart, 1996.
"The twin crises: the causes of banking and balance-of-payments problems,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
544, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Carmen M. Reinhart & Graciela L. Kaminsky, 1999. "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance-of-Payments Problems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 473-500, June.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 2000.
"Las crisis gemelas: las causas de los problemas bancarios y de balanza de pagos
[The twin crises: Te causes of banking and balance of payments problems]," MPRA Paper 13842, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Reinhart, Carmen & Kaminsky, Graciela, 1999. "The twin crises: The causes of banking and balance of payments problems," MPRA Paper 14081, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Philippe Aghion, Patrick Bolton & Steven Fries, 1999. "Optimal Design of Bank Bailouts: The Case of Transition Economies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(1), pages 51-, March.
- Osano, Hiroshi, 2002. "Managerial compensation contract and bank bailout policy," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-49, January.
- Gary Gorton & Lixin Huang, 2002.
"Liquidity, Efficiency and Bank Bailouts,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
02-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
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