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A Multitask Model Without Any Externalities

Author

Listed:
  • Meg Sato

    () (The Australian National University (ANU) - Crawford School of Public Policy)

  • Kazuya Kamiya

    (University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics)

Abstract

This paper shows that offering a fixed wage maximizes the principal's welfare when the agent needs to engage in multitask and that the effort needed to achieve one task can be induced by suppressing the effort needed for the other task, in the absence of externalities. In the existing literature, it is argued that these results are obtained because externalities exist between the costs of tasks or production of tasks. The former is typically represented by a perfect substitute in the cost function. In this paper, we demonstrate that if the agent is engaged in multitask in which one task produces verifiable output and the other task produces unverifiable output, the same results are obtained without externalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Meg Sato & Kazuya Kamiya, 2011. "A Multitask Model Without Any Externalities," Crawford School Research Papers 1106, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  • Handle: RePEc:een:crwfrp:1106
    as

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    File URL: http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/crwf_ssrn/crwfrp_1106.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Itoh, Hideshi, 1992. "Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 321-345, April.
    2. Nobuo Akai & Keizo Mizuno & Hiroshi Osano, 2010. "Incentive Transfer Schemes with Marketable and Nonmarketable Public Services," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(4), pages 614-640, December.
    3. Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Multitask; Unverifiable Outputs; Unverifiable Investments;

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials

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