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Work Practices as Implicit Incentives to Cooperate / Pratiques de travail et coopération entre collègues

  • Marisa Ratto

    ()

    (DOT - CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé)

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    This paper provides an empirical test of the relation between the use of some specific work practices and mutual help among colleagues. Information from a very detailed French matched employer/employee survey is used to construct a measure of cooperation among colleagues and to identify five work practices that, according to the predictions of the theoretical literature, promote cooperation: repeated job interactions, interdependencies in production, job autonomy, and peer monitoring and task variety. The findings suggest a statistically significant, positive and important correlation between job autonomy and mutual help and between peer monitoring and mutual help. However, pairwise combinations of those work practices result to be more strongly associated to mutual help: in particular, interdependencies in production combined with job autonomy and task variety combined with job autonomy. Extrinsic incentives such as team pay and performance evaluation schemes that have actual consequences on salary and career are also positively associated to mutual help. Results on the interplay between explicit and implicit incentives are not statistically significant. Hence the prediction that explicit incentives may crowd out implicit incentives to cooperate is not supported.

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    Date of creation: 01 Nov 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00966235
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    1. Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Papers 90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    2. Nicholas Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2010. "Human Resource Management and Productivity," NBER Working Papers 16019, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    5. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
    6. Annalisa Cristini & Tor Eriksson & Dario Pozzoli, 2013. "High-Performance Management Practices and Employee Outcomes in Denmark," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(3), pages 232-266, 07.
    7. Michael J. Handel & Maury Gittleman, 1999. "Is There a Wage Payoff to Innovative Work Practices?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_288, Levy Economics Institute.
    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    9. Drago, Robert & Garvey, Gerald T, 1998. "Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, January.
    10. Che,Y.K. & Yoo,S.W., 1998. "Optimal incentives for teams," Working papers 8, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    11. Knez, Marc & Simester, Duncan, 2001. "Firm-Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 743-72, October.
    12. Itoh, Hideshi, 1992. "Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 321-45, April.
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