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Work Practices as Implicit Incentives to Cooperate / Pratiques de travail et coopération entre collègues

  • Marisa Ratto

    ()

    (CEE - Centre d'études de l'emploi - Ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur et Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé)

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    Novembre 2013 Télécharger au format PDF : Document 167 (267 Ko) Ce document de travail fournit une analyse empirique de la relation entre utilisation de certaines pratiques de travail et coopération entre collègues. À partir des données de l'enquête couplée Changements organisationnels et informatisation-COI 2006, cinq pratiques de travail sont identifiées qui, selon la littérature économique, favorisent la coopération entre collègues : les interactions répétées entre collègues, les interdépendances dans la production, l'autonomie décisionnelle au travail, le contrôle réciproque du travail entre collègues et l'accomplissement de tâches variées. On repère ainsi une importante corrélation positive entre l'autonomie décisionnelle au travail et l'entraide, et entre le contrôle réciproque du travail et l'entraide. Quand on considère l'adoption de deux de ces pratiques à la fois, ce sont deux combinaisons particulières qui sont les plus fortement corrélées à l'entraide : les interdépendances dans la production combinées à l'autonomie décisionnelle et la diversité des tâches également combinée à l'autonomie décisionnelle. Les incitations telles que la rémunération basée sur la performance de l'équipe et les systèmes d'évaluation de la performance, qui ont des conséquences réelles sur le salaire et la carrière, sont aussi associées positivement à l'entraide.

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    File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/96/62/35/PDF/167_work_practices_implicit_incentives_cooperate.pdf
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    Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00966235.

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    Date of creation: 01 Nov 2013
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    Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00966235
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00966235
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