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Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: A real options approach

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  • Zormpas, Dimitrios

Abstract

We examine the case of a firm holding the option to make an uncertain and irreversible investment. The firm is decentralized and there is information asymmetry between the owner and the investment manager regarding the price of an input (e.g. a key equipment) that needs to be purchased by an outside supplier with market power. We show that the total loss attributed to the information asymmetry has two components: i) the loss in the decentralized firm itself and ii) a negative externality that the outside input supplier endures. We show that the latter is not just a part, but likely the main component of the total loss. Last, we prove that the negative externality is reduced when the principal uses an audit technology in parallel with the bonus-incentive mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2020. "Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: A real options approach," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 273-287.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:70:y:2020:i:c:p:273-287
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2020.06.017
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Real options; Vertical relations; Asymmetric information; Agency conflicts; Audit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General

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