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On some agency costs of intermediated contracting

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  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine
  • Martimort, David

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  • Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Martimort, David, 2001. "On some agency costs of intermediated contracting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 75-82, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:71:y:2001:i:1:p:75-82
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    1. Mookherjee, D & Reichelstein, S, 1997. "Budgeting and hierarchical control," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(2), pages 129-155.
    2. Jacques Cremer & Michael H. Riordan, 1987. "On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 436-451, Autumn.
    3. David P. Baron & David Besanko, 1992. "Information, Control, and Organizational Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 237-275, June.
    4. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October.
    5. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1999. "The endogenous transaction costs of delegated auditing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1039-1048, April.
    6. Nahum D. Melumad & Dilip Mookherjee & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Hierarchical Decentralization of Incentive Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(4), pages 654-672, Winter.
    7. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1995. "Organizational Diseconomies of Scale," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 399-426, Fall.
    8. repec:bla:jemstr:v:4:y:1995:i:3:p:399-426:a is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Baron, David P & Besanko, David, 1992. "Information, Control, and Organizational Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 237-275, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stephane Lavertu & Long Tran, 2025. "For‐profit milk in nonprofit cartons? The case of nonprofit charter schools subcontracting with for‐profit education management organizations," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(1), pages 236-265, January.
    2. Gamal Atallah, 2002. "Production Technology, Information Technology, and Vertical Integration Under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 0203EClassification-JEL: , University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
    3. Zhibin (Ben) Yang & Volodymyr Babich, 2015. "Does a Procurement Service Provider Generate Value for the Buyer Through Information About Supply Risks?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(5), pages 979-998, May.
    4. Gick, Wolfgang, 2015. "A Theory of Delegated Contracting," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113069, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Celik, Gorkem, 2009. "Mechanism design with collusive supervision," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 69-95, January.
    6. Dominique Demougin & Anja Schöttner, 2010. "Technology adoption under hidden information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 100(1), pages 1-18, May.
    7. Canton, Joan & De Cara, Stéphane & Jayet, Pierre-Alain, 2009. "Agri-environmental schemes: Adverse selection, information structure and delegation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 2114-2121, May.
    8. Michela Cella, 2011. "Monitoring subcontracting in a suppliers' hierarchy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 523-548, July.
    9. Wolfgang Gick, 2004. "Optimal Auditing Under Intermediated Contracting," Microeconomics 0411003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Schöttner, Anja & Deffains, Bruno, 2006. "Technological choice under organizational diseconomies of scale," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2006-028, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    11. Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2020. "Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: A real options approach," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 273-287.
    12. Jonathan Treussard, 2005. "Life-Cycle Consumption Plans and Portfolio Policies in a Heath-Jarrow-Morton Economy," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2005-033, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    13. Leonardo Felli, 1996. "Preventing Collusion Through Discretion," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1996/303, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    14. Theilen, Bernd, 2009. "Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring," Working Papers 2072/42863, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    15. Rosar, Frank, 2013. "Optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79812, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Gick, Wolfgang, 2008. "Delegated contracting, information, and internal control," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 179-183, December.
    17. Felli, Leonardo & Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, 2016. "Collusion, Blackmail and Whistle-Blowing," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(3), pages 279-312, October.
    18. Rosar, Frank, 2017. "Strategic outsourcing and optimal procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 91-130.
    19. Rong, Jianxin & Wang, Dazhong, 2023. "Contracting in hierarchical platforms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
    20. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2006-028 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Pattarin Adithipyangkul & T. Y. Leung, 2018. "Incentive pay for non-executive directors: The direct and interaction effects on firm performance," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 943-964, December.

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