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Securitization and Optimal Retention under Moral Hazard

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  • Sara Malekan
  • Georges Dionne

Abstract

Securitization is one of the most important innovations in financial markets. It is a process of converting illiquid loans that cannot be sold readily to third-party investors into liquid securities and selling them to dispersed investors. As a result, securitization improves liquidity in capital markets by allowing originators to remove the issued loans from its balance sheet and use the proceeds for other purposes or even to originate new loans. In spite of all its advantages, securitization is often suspected of being one of the main reasons for the recent financial crisis. One concern that is frequently raised in the literature is that securitization leads to moral hazard in lender screening and monitoring. By selling loans to investors and removing them from their books, banks have a lesser incentive to carefully evaluate and monitor borrowers’ credit quality to ensure that they can repay the loans, because the risk of delinquencies falls on investors rather than lenders. One problem in the literature is that the analysis of securitization is very general and suffers from a lack a specific security design analysis under asymmetric information. We address the moral hazard problem using a principal-agent model where the investor is the principal and the lender is the agent. We show that the optimal contract must contain a retention clause in the presence of moral hazard.

Suggested Citation

  • Sara Malekan & Georges Dionne, 2012. "Securitization and Optimal Retention under Moral Hazard," Cahiers de recherche 1221, CIRPEE.
  • Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1221
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Xiong, 2020. "Convertible tranche in securitization," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    2. Krahnen, Jan-Pieter & Wilde, Christian, 2022. "Skin-in-the-game in ABS transactions: A critical review of policy options," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    3. Jedidi, Helmi & Dionne, Georges, 2019. "Nonparametric testing for information asymmetry in the mortgage servicing market," Working Papers 19-1, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, revised 28 Oct 2019.
    4. Pituwan Poramapojn, 2012. "Effect of Securitization on the Bank’s Equity Risk in the U.S," Applied Economics Journal, Kasetsart University, Faculty of Economics, Center for Applied Economic Research, vol. 19(1), pages 68-86, June.
    5. Norvald INSTEFJORD & NAKATA Hiroyuki, 2015. "Loan Monitoring and Bank Risk," Discussion papers 15121, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    6. Gürtler, Marc & Koch, Florian, 2021. "Multidimensional skin in the game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    7. Georges Dionne & Sara Malekan, 2017. "Optimal Form of Retention for Securitized Loans under Moral Hazard," Risks, MDPI, vol. 5(4), pages 1-13, October.
    8. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Zhou, Yifan, 2019. "Securitization, bank behaviour and financial stability: A systematic review of the recent empirical literature," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 245-254.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Securitization; optimal retention; moral hazard; principal-agent model; default; screening monitoring;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage

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