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Mehmet Ekmekci

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020. "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers 658, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

    Cited by:

    1. Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
    2. In-Koo Cho, 2023. "Signaling games with endogenous types," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 157-174, March.

  2. Mehmet Ekmekci & Leandro Gorno & Lucas Maestri & Jian Sun & Dong Wei, 2020. "Learning from Manipulable Signals," Papers 2007.08762, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.

    Cited by:

    1. Pei, Harry, 2022. "Reputation for playing mixed actions: A characterization theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).

  3. Mehmet Ekmekci & Stephan Lauermann, 2019. "Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_066, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin, 2019. "Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 12/2019, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    2. Campante, Filipe & Durante, Ruben & Tesei, Andrea, 2021. "Media and Social Capital," CEPR Discussion Papers 16500, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Yves Breitmoser & Justin Valasek & Justin Mattias Valasek, 2023. "Why Do Committees Work?," CESifo Working Paper Series 10800, CESifo.
    4. Breitmoser, Yves & Valasek, Justin, 2023. "Why do committees work?," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 18/2023, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    5. Stephan Lauermann & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2019. "Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_125, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    6. Kemal Kivanç Aköz & Cemal Eren Arbatli, 2016. "Information Manipulation in Election Campaigns," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 181-215, July.
    7. Carl Heese & Stephan Lauermann, 2021. "Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 112, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    8. Spyros Galanis & Christos A. Ioannou & Stelios Kotronis, 2023. "Information Aggregation Under Ambiguity: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Department of Economics Working Papers 2023_04, Durham University, Department of Economics.
    9. Midjord, Rune & Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás & Valasek, Justin, 2021. "When voters like to be right: An analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem with mixed motives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).

  4. Mehmet Ekmekci & Stephan Lauermann, 2019. "Informal Elections With Dispersed Information," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_080, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Battaglini, Marco & Morton, Rebecca & Patacchini, Eleonora, 2020. "Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests," CEPR Discussion Papers 14385, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Boris Ginzburg, 2023. "Slacktivism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(2), pages 126-143, April.
    3. Meirowitz, Adam & Pi, Shaoting, 2022. "Voting and trading: The shareholder’s dilemma," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1073-1096.
    4. Christina Luxen, 2020. "Pollsand Elections: Strategic Respondents and Turnout Implications," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 020, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

  5. Stephan Lauermann & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2019. "Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_125, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Stephan Lauermann & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2019. "Information Aggregation in Poisson-Elections," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2019_125, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

  6. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2019. "Reputation and screening in a noisy environment with irreversible actions," MPRA Paper 100885, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation for Playing Mixed Actions: A Characterization Theorem," Papers 2006.16206, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2021.
    2. Pei, Harry, 2022. "Reputation for playing mixed actions: A characterization theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    3. Li, Yingkai & Pei, Harry, 2021. "Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    4. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022. "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).

  7. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2016. "Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices," MPRA Paper 75632, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2017. "Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1399-1429, June.
    2. Stephan Lauermann & Andre Speit, 2023. "Bidding in Common‐Value Auctions With an Unknown Number of Competitors," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 91(2), pages 493-527, March.

  8. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2014. "Value of Information and Fairness Opinions in Takeovers," Working Papers 510, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

    Cited by:

    1. Dalkır, Elif, 2015. "Shareholder information and partial tender offers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 64-66.
    2. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Kos, Nenad, 2023. "Signaling covertly acquired information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).

  9. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.

  10. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Just Enough or All: Selling a Firm," Working Papers 470, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

    Cited by:

    1. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2016. "Optimal Allocation With Ex-Post Verification And Limited Penalties," Working Papers 2016_21, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    2. Tingjun Liu & Dan Bernhardt, 2021. "Rent Extraction with Securities Plus Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 76(4), pages 1869-1912, August.
    3. Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2014. "Entry by Takeover: Auctions vs. Negotiations," CSEF Working Papers 353, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2024. "Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1516, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Kiho Yoon, 2020. "Bilateral trading with contingent contracts," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(2), pages 445-461, June.
    6. Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2019. "Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).

  11. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation," Discussion Papers 1553, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Elmira Aliakbari & Ross McKitrick, 2017. "Information Aggregation in a Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes," Working Papers 1702, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    2. Ljungqvist, Alexander & Back, Kerry E. & Collin-Dufresne, Pierre & Fos, Vyacheslav & Li, Tao, 2017. "Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 12372, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Axelson, Ulf & Makarov, Igor, 2023. "Informational black holes in financial markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 105042, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Raphael Boleslavsky & David L Kelly & Curtis R Taylor, 2013. "Selloffs, Bailouts, and Feedback: Can Asset Markets Inform Policy," Working Papers 2013-11, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    5. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    6. Anne-Sophie V. E. Radermecker, 2019. "Artworks without names: an insight into the market for anonymous paintings," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, vol. 43(3), pages 443-483, September.
    7. Heumann, Tibor, 2019. "An ascending auction with multi-dimensional signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    8. Debin Fang & Qiyu Ren & Qian Yu, 2018. "How Elastic Demand Affects Bidding Strategy in Electricity Market: An Auction Approach," Energies, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-13, December.
    9. José Luis Montiel Olea & Pietro Ortoleva & Mallesh Pai & Andrea Prat, 2021. "Competing Models," Working Papers 2021-89, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    10. Prat, Andrea & Montiel Olea , José Luis & Ortoleva, Pietro & Pai, Mallesh, 2019. "Competing Models," CEPR Discussion Papers 14066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Jose Luis Montiel Olea & Pietro Ortoleva & Mallesh M Pai & Andrea Prat, 2019. "Competing Models," Papers 1907.03809, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2021.
    11. Chahrour, Ryan & Gaballo, Gaetano, 2017. "Learning from prices: amplication and business fluctuations," Working Paper Series 2053, European Central Bank.
    12. Meirowitz, Adam & Pi, Shaoting, 2022. "Voting and trading: The shareholder’s dilemma," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(3), pages 1073-1096.
    13. Gaballo, Gaetano & Chahrour, Ryan, 2019. "Learning from House Prices: Amplification and Business Fluctuations," CEPR Discussion Papers 14120, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Anne-Sophie Radermecker, 2019. "Artworks without names: an insight into the market for anonymous paintings," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/296529, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    15. Axelson, Ulf & Makarov, Igor, 2016. "Informational black holes in financial markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118982, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    16. Michael Adusei & Ngozi Adeleye, 2022. "Credit information sharing and non‐performing loans: The moderating role of creditor rights protection," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(4), pages 4756-4769, October.

  12. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2012. "Information in tender offers with a large shareholder," Working Papers 453, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

    Cited by:

    1. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2016. "Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices," MPRA Paper 75632, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Ordóñez-Calafí, Guillem & Thanassoulis, John, 2020. "Stock selling during takeovers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    3. Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2014. "Entry by Takeover: Auctions vs. Negotiations," CSEF Working Papers 353, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    4. Liu, Tingjun & Bernhardt, Dan, 2024. "Auctioning control and cash-flow rights separately," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1516, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    5. Burkart, Mike & Lee, Samuel, 2022. "Activism and takeovers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111564, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos & Rakesh Vohra, 2013. "Just Enough or All: Selling a Firm," Working Papers 470, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.

  13. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems," Discussion Papers 1505, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Silva, 2020. "An informational Ponzi-scheme," Documentos de Trabajo 539, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    2. Christina Aperjis & Yali Miao & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 2010. "Variable Temptations and Black Mark Reputations," NBER Working Papers 16423, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Wiseman, Thomas, 2008. "Reputation and impermanent types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 190-210, January.
    4. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2010. "Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations," Discussion Papers 1511, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Ivan Marinovic & Martin Szydlowski, 2019. "Monitor Reputation and Transparency," 2019 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
    7. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
    8. Bar-Isaac, Heski & Deb, Joyee, 2016. "Reputation with Opportunities for Coasting," CEPR Discussion Papers 11513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Benjamin Sperisen, 2018. "Bad Reputation Under Bounded And Fading Memory," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(1), pages 138-157, January.
    10. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    11. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    12. Qingmin Liu, 2006. "Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics," Discussion Papers 06-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    13. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.
    14. Sergey Kovbasyuk & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2021. "Memory And Markets," Working Papers w0284, New Economic School (NES).
    15. Daniel Hauser, 2016. "Promoting a Reputation for Quality," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-014, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 29 Sep 2016.
    16. Daniel Monte & Roberto Pinheiro, 2017. "Costly Information Intermediation: Quality vs. Spillovers," Working Papers 17-21R2, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 05 Dec 2024.
    17. Silva, Francisco, 2022. "The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 379-388.
    18. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2175-2202, September.
    19. Ayca Kaya & Santanu Roy, 2020. "Market Screening with Limited Records," Departmental Working Papers 2006, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    20. Harry Pei, 2020. "Reputation Building under Observational Learning," Papers 2006.08068, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
    21. Johannes Hörner & Nicolas S Lambert, 2021. "Motivational Ratings [Toward the Next Generation of Recommender Systems: A Survey of the State-of-the-Art and Possible Extensions]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(4), pages 1892-1935.
    22. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Incentives and Reputation when Names can be Replaced: Valjean Reinvented as Monsieur Madeleine," Documentos de Trabajo 447, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    23. Harry Pei, 2020. "Trust and Betrayals: Reputational Payoffs and Behaviors without Commitment," Papers 2006.08071, arXiv.org.
    24. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
    25. Aislinn Bohren, 2016. "Using Persistence to Generate Incentives in a Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 15 Oct 2016.
    26. Andrew Mell, 2011. "Re-Thinking Reputation," Economics Series Working Papers 565, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    27. Doraszelski, Ulrich & Escobar, Juan F., 2012. "Restricted feedback in long term relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 142-161.
    28. Benjamin Sperisen, 2016. "Bounded Memory, Reputation, and Impatience," Working Papers 1602, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
    29. Yingkai Li & Harry Pei, 2020. "Equilibrium Behaviors in Repeated Games," Papers 2007.14002, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
    30. Wang, Yan & Yang, Jian & Qi, Lian, 2017. "A game-theoretic model for the role of reputation feedback systems in peer-to-peer commerce," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 178-193.
    31. Margherita Bottero & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2013. "Limited credit records and market outcomes," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 903, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    32. Heski Bar-Isaac & Joyee Deb, 2012. "Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," Working Papers 12-08, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    33. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2013. "Reputation-Driven Industry Dynamics," Documentos de Trabajo 436, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    34. Heski Bar-Isaac Jr. & Joyee Deb Jr., 2014. "(Good and Bad) Reputation for a Servant of Two Masters," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 293-325, November.
    35. Lorecchio, Caio & Monte, Daniel, 2023. "Bad reputation with simple rating systems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 150-178.
    36. Harry Pei, 2022. "Reputation Effects under Short Memories," Papers 2207.02744, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    37. Li, Yingkai & Pei, Harry, 2021. "Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    38. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
    39. Bohren, J. Aislinn, 2024. "Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    40. Zhou, Xi & Chen, Shou, 2021. "FinTech innovation regulation based on reputation theory with the participation of new media," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

  14. Mehmet Ekmekci & Olivier Gossner & Andrea Wilson, 2010. "Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations," Discussion Papers 1511, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Francisco Silva, 2020. "An informational Ponzi-scheme," Documentos de Trabajo 539, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
    2. Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022. "A reputation for honesty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    3. Liu, Qingmin & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2014. "Limited records and reputation bubbles," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 2-29.
    4. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2012. "Cycles of Distrust: An Economic Model," NBER Working Papers 18257, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Sperisen, Benjamin, 2018. "Bounded memory and incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 382-400.
    6. David K Levine, 2021. "The Reputation Trap," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001516, David K. Levine.
    7. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    8. Hu, Ju, 2014. "Reputation in the presence of noisy exogenous learning," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 64-73.
    9. Rick Harbaugh & Ted To, 2008. "Opportunistic Discrimination," Working Papers 2008-07, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    10. Silva, Francisco, 2022. "The value of uncertainty in determining an expert's source of expertise," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 379-388.
    11. Ju Hu, 2013. "Reputation in the Presence of Noisy Exogenous Learning," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    12. Nicolas Vieille & Eilon Solan & Jérôme Renault, 2013. "Dynamic sender-receiver games," Post-Print hal-00804028, HAL.
    13. Wang, Yan & Yang, Jian & Qi, Lian, 2017. "A game-theoretic model for the role of reputation feedback systems in peer-to-peer commerce," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 178-193.
    14. Dilmé, Francesc, 2019. "Reputation building through costly adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 181(C), pages 586-626.
    15. Eduardo Faingold, 2020. "Reputation and the Flow of Information in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1697-1723, July.
    16. Harry Pei, 2022. "Reputation Effects under Short Memories," Papers 2207.02744, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    17. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.

  15. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2010. "Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets," Discussion Papers 1508, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities," Papers 2105.01581, arXiv.org.
    2. Anna Sanktjohanser, 2020. "Optimally Stubborn," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2255, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian, 2022. "The bargaining trap," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 249-254.
    4. Selçuk Özyurt, 2015. "Searching for a Bargain: Power of Strategic Commitment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 320-353, February.
    5. Thành Nguyen & Vijay Subramanian & Randall Berry, 2016. "Delay in Trade Networks," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(3), pages 646-661, June.
    6. Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    7. Kimbrough, Erik & Laughren, Kevin & Sheremeta, Roman, 2017. "War and Conflict in Economics: Theories, Applications, and Recent Trends," MPRA Paper 80277, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Ahn, Jungkyu, 2024. "Options illiquidity in an over-the-counter market," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    9. Sanktjohanser, Anna, 2022. "Optimally Stubborn," TSE Working Papers 22-1367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Jonas Send & Marco Serena, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    11. Anton Tsoy, 2016. "Liquidity and Prices in Decentralized Markets with Almost Public Information," 2016 Meeting Papers 8, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Zhang, Hanzhe, 2019. "Prices versus Auctions in Large Markets," Working Papers 2019-13, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    13. Basak, Deepal, 2023. "Bargaining under almost complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    14. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Das, Kaustav, 2017. "Bilateral trading and incomplete information: Price convergence in a small market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 89-113.
    15. Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    16. Özyurt Selçuk, 2016. "Building Reputation in a War of Attrition Game: Hawkish or Dovish Stance?," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 797-816, June.
    17. Kesten, Onur & Kurino, Morimitsu, 2019. "Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 120-143.
    18. Bernardita Vial & Felipe Zurita, 2017. "Entrants' Reputation And Industry Dynamics," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 529-559, May.

  16. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputations with Long Run Players," 2009 Meeting Papers 220, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation," 2009 Meeting Papers 222, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, 2012. "Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Working Paper Archive 587, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    3. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.

  17. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "A two Sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players," Discussion Papers 1510, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities," Papers 2105.01581, arXiv.org.
    2. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo.
    3. Ioannis Kordonis & Alexandros C. Charalampidis & George P. Papavassilopoulos, 2018. "Pretending in Dynamic Games, Alternative Outcomes and Application to Electricity Markets," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 844-873, December.
    4. Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    6. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    7. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
    9. Harrington, Joseph E. & Zhao, Wei, 2012. "Signaling and tacit collusion in an infinitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 277-289.
    10. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Wei Zhao, 2012. "Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Economics Working Paper Archive 587, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    11. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
    12. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.

  18. Mehmet Ekmekci & Alp Atakan, 2009. "Reputation with Long Run Players and Imperfect Observation," 2009 Meeting Papers 222, Society for Economic Dynamics.

    Cited by:

    1. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.

  19. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring," Discussion Papers 1506, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022. "A reputation for honesty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    2. Cesi Berardino & Iozzi Alberto & Valentini Edilio, 2012. "Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-39, September.
    3. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    4. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Monte, Daniel, 2016. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 18-21.
    6. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2019. "Reputation and screening in a noisy environment with irreversible actions," MPRA Paper 100885, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
    8. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022. "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).

  20. Alp Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2009. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," Discussion Papers 1507, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Leandro Gorno & Lucas Maestri & Jian Sun & Dong Wei, 2020. "Learning from Manipulable Signals," Papers 2007.08762, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
    2. Francoise Forges & Antoine Salomon, 2014. "Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4700, CESifo.
    3. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.
    4. Cesi Berardino & Iozzi Alberto & Valentini Edilio, 2012. "Regulating Unverifiable Quality by Fixed-Price Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-39, September.
    5. Thomas E. Wiseman, 2011. "A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Private Learning," 2011 Meeting Papers 181, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2013. "A two-sided reputation result with long-run players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 376-392.
    7. Françoise Forges, 2012. "Folk theorems for Bayesian (public good) games," Post-Print hal-02447604, HAL.
    8. Long, Iain W., 2015. "Better feared than loved: Reputations and the motives for conflict," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 46-61.
    9. Sharma, Priyanka, 2017. "Is more information always better? A case in credit markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 269-283.
    10. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2015. "Reputations in Repeated Games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    11. Nejat Anbarci & Nick Feltovich, 2016. "How fully do people exploit their bargaining position? The effects of bargaining institution and the 50–50 norm," Monash Economics Working Papers 21-16, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    12. Atakan, Alp Enver & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2014. "Reputation in Repeated Moral Hazard Games," MPRA Paper 54427, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Yuval Heller & Erik Mohlin, 2017. "Observations on Cooperation," Working Papers 2017-12, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.
    14. Pai, Mallesh & Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew, 2020. "(Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Monte, Daniel, 2013. "Bounded memory and permanent reputations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 345-354.
    16. Rahul Deb & Matthew Mitchell & Mallesh Pai, 2019. "Our distrust is very expensive," Working Papers tecipa-632, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    17. Monte, Daniel, 2016. "Reputation with one-sided monitoring: Ignorance as a commitment device," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 18-21.
    18. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2019. "Reputation and screening in a noisy environment with irreversible actions," MPRA Paper 100885, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Wolitzky, Alexander, 2011. "Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 595-607.
    20. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
    21. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022. "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    22. Joyee Deb & Yuhta Ishii, 2016. "Reputation Building under Uncertain Monitoring," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2042, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    23. Zhou, Xi & Chen, Shou, 2021. "FinTech innovation regulation based on reputation theory with the participation of new media," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

  21. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2008. "Manipulation through political endorsements," Discussion Papers 1509, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

    Cited by:

    1. Jakub Steiner & Colin Stewart, 2010. "Influential Opinion Leaders," Working Papers tecipa-403, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    2. Kemal Kivanç Aköz & Pablo Hernández‐Lagos, 2019. "Rents from power for a dissident elite and mass mobilization," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 66(4), pages 584-604, September.
    3. Hummel, Patrick, 2012. "Sequential voting in large elections with multiple candidates," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(3), pages 341-348.
    4. Andonie, Costel & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2012. "Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 681-700.
    5. Hans Gersbach & Oriol Tejada & Maik T. Schneider, 2014. "Coalition-Preclusion Contracts and Moderate Policies," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 14/195, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    6. Kemal Kivanç Aköz & Cemal Eren Arbatli, 2016. "Information Manipulation in Election Campaigns," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 181-215, July.
    7. Shin, Euncheol, 2019. "A model of pre-electoral coalition formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 463-485.
    8. Mehmet Ekmekci, 2008. "Manipulation through political endorsements," Discussion Papers 1509, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Patrick Hummel, 2014. "Pre-election polling and third party candidates," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(1), pages 77-98, January.
    10. Kemal K?vanc Akoz & Cemal Eren Arbatli, 2013. "Manipulated voters in competitive election campaigns," HSE Working papers WP BRP 31/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

  22. Mehmet Ekmekci & M. Bumin Yenmez, "undated". "Integrating Schools for Centralized Admissions," GSIA Working Papers 2014-E20, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.

    Cited by:

    1. Josu'e Ortega, 2018. "The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large," Papers 1810.10287, arXiv.org.
    2. Estelle Cantillon, 2017. "Broadening the market design approach to school choice," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 613-634.
    3. Tommy Andersson & Umut Dur & Sinan Ertemel & Onur Kesten, 2024. "Sequential school choice with public and private schools," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 63(2), pages 231-276, September.
    4. Battal Dogan & Bumin Yenmez, 2017. "Unified Enrollment in School Choice: How to Improve Student Assignment in Chicago," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.10, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    5. Ortega, Josué, 2019. "The losses from integration in matching markets can be large," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 48-51.
    6. Machado, Cecilia & Szerman, Christiane, 2016. "Centralized Admission and the Student-College Match," IZA Discussion Papers 10251, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    7. Isa Hafalir & Fuhito Kojima & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 970, Boston College Department of Economics.
    8. Manjunath, Vikram & Turhan, Bertan, 2016. "Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 25-40.

Articles

  1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Leandro Gorno & Lucas Maestri & Jian Sun & Dong Wei, 2022. "Learning from Manipulable Signals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(12), pages 3995-4040, December.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Lauermann, Stephan, 2022. "Information aggregation in Poisson-elections," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2021. "Market Selection and the Information Content of Prices," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(5), pages 2049-2079, September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Mehmet Ekmekci & Stephan Lauermann, 2020. "Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 87(2), pages 997-1033.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Common enrollment in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.

    Cited by:

    1. Machado, Cecilia & Szerman, Christiane, 2021. "Centralized college admissions and student composition," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    2. Yannai A. Gonczarowski & Michael Yin & Shirley Zhang, 2024. "Multi-District School Choice: Playing on Several Fields," Papers 2403.04530, arXiv.org.
    3. Thilo Klein & Robert Aue & Josue Ortega, 2020. "School choice with independent versus consolidated districts," Papers 2006.13209, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
    4. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2021. "Gradual College Admission," Post-Print halshs-02330435, HAL.
    5. Tetsutaro Hatakeyama, 2023. "When is a sequential school choice system (non-)deficient?," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2023-012, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    6. Kumar, Rajnish & Manocha, Kriti & Ortega, Josué, 2020. "On the Integration of Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets," QBS Working Paper Series 2020/03, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
    7. Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2024. "Aftermarket Frictions and the Cost of Off-Platform Options in Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 132(7), pages 2346-2395.
    8. Aue, Robert & Klein, Thilo & Ortega, Josué, 2020. "What Happens when Separate and Unequal School Districts Merge?," QBS Working Paper Series 2020/06, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
    9. Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Andersson, Tommy, 2022. "School Choice," Working Papers 2022:4, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    10. Doğan, Battal & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: Improving student welfare in Chicago," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 366-373.
    11. Isa Hafalir & Fuhito Kojima & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "Interdistrict School Choice: A Theory of Student Assignment," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 970, Boston College Department of Economics.
    12. Kumar, Rajnish & Manocha, Kriti & Ortega, Josué, 2022. "On the integration of Shapley–Scarf markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    13. Benjamin N. Roth & Ran I. Shorrer, 2021. "Making Marketplaces Safe: Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 3694-3713, June.
    14. Adam Kapor & Mohit Karnani & Christopher Neilson, 2019. "Negative Externalities of Off Platform Options and the Efficiency of Centralized Assignment Mechanisms," Working Papers 635, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..

  6. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2016. "Information in Tender Offers With a Large Shareholder," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 87-139, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos & Rakesh Vohra, 2016. "Just Enough or All: Selling a Firm," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 223-256, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2015. "Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 553-605.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2014. "Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(1), pages 1-29.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2014. "Auctions, Actions, and the Failure of Information Aggregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(7), pages 2014-2048, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  11. Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2013. "A two-sided reputation result with long-run players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 376-392.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  12. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Gossner, Olivier & Wilson, Andrea, 2012. "Impermanent types and permanent reputations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(1), pages 162-178.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  13. Alp E. Atakan & Mehmet Ekmekci, 2012. "Reputation in Long-Run Relationships," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 79(2), pages 451-480.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  14. Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2011. "Sustainable reputations with rating systems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 479-503, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  15. Ekmekci, Mehmet, 2009. "Manipulation through political endorsements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1227-1248, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
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