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Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago

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  • Battal Doğan
  • M. Bumin Yenmez

Abstract

The Chicago Board of Education is implementing a centralized clearinghouse to assign students to schools for 2018-19 admissions. In this clearinghouse, each student can simultaneously be admitted to a selective and a nonselective school. We study this divided enrollment system and show that an alternative unified enrollment system, which elicits the preferences of students over all schools and assigns each student to only one school, is better for students when choice rules of schools are substitutable. Furthermore, we characterize the sources of inefficiency in the divided system.

Suggested Citation

  • Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 18/705, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
  • Handle: RePEc:bri:uobdis:18/705
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Echenique, Federico, 2007. "Counting combinatorial choice rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 231-245, February.
    2. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Common enrollment in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4).
    3. Haluk I. Ergin, 2002. "Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2489-2497, November.
    4. Manjunath, Vikram & Turhan, Bertan, 2016. "Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 25-40.
    5. Turhan, Bertan, 2019. "Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 199-208.
    6. Chambers, Christopher P. & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2018. "A simple characterization of responsive choice," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 217-221.
    7. Onur Kesten, 2010. "School Choice with Consent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 125(3), pages 1297-1348.
    8. Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018. "When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 18/704, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guillaume Haeringer & Vincent Iehlé, 2019. "Gradual College Admission ," Working Papers halshs-02330435, HAL.
    2. Battal Dogan & Serhat Dogan & Kemal Yildiz, 2017. "Lexicographic Choice under Variable Capacity Constraints," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 17.02, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    3. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Yenmez, M. Bumin, 2019. "Common enrollment in school choice," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4).
    4. Andersson, Tommy & Dur, Umut & Ertemel, Sinan & Kesten , Onur, 2018. "Sequential School Choice with Public and Private Schools," Working Papers 2018:39, Lund University, Department of Economics.

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    Keywords

    Market design; school choice; unified enrollment.;

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