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Report NEP-DES-2018-11-26
This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alexander Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email, RSS, or Mastodon, or Bluesky.
Other reports in NEP-DES
The following items were announced in this report:
- Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2018, "Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2147, Nov.
- Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2018, "Partially-Honest Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, number 682, Oct.
- Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018, "Unified Versus Divided Enrollment in School Choice: Improving Student Welfare in Chicago," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK, number 18/705, Nov.
- Battal Doğan & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2018, "When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK, number 18/704, Nov.
- Alejandro Melo Ponce, 2018, "The Secret Behind The Tortoise and the Hare: Information Design in Contests," 2018 Papers, Job Market Papers, number pme809, Nov.
- Harold L. Cole & Daniel Neuhann & Guillermo Ordonez, 2017, "A Walrasian Theory of Sovereign Debt Auctions with Asymmetric Information," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 17-015, May, revised 01 May 2017.