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When is a sequential school choice system (non-)deficient?

Author

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  • Tetsutaro Hatakeyama

    (Keio University)

Abstract

We study sequential assignment systems in which objects are assigned to agents in multiple stages. While such systems are prevalent in real-life school choice and college admissions, Dur and Kesten (Econ Theor 68:251-283, 2019) show that these systems are neither non-wasteful nor straightforward in general. To overcome this negative observation, we consider a model in which the mechanism designer chooses an allocation schedule, i.e., in which stage to allocate each object, as well as the allocation mechanisms it uses within a system. Our analysis newly reveals that (i) in general, no allocation schedules avoid wastefulness/non-straightforwardness and (ii) a non-wasteful/straightforward allocation schedule exists if and only if the preference domain is “tiered.” This result supports practices in which the tiered domain naturally arises (e.g., Chinese college admissions practice). However, this also highlights the difficulty of sequential assignments in more diverse preference domains.

Suggested Citation

  • Tetsutaro Hatakeyama, 2025. "When is a sequential school choice system (non-)deficient?," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(2), pages 301-312, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:29:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-024-00364-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00364-y
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    Keywords

    Sequential assignment system; Non-wastefulness; Straightforwardness; Tiered domain;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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