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The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large

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  • Josu'e Ortega

Abstract

Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these are negative. The losses from integration can be large enough that the average rank of an agent's spouse decreases by 37.5% of the length of their preference list in any stable matching mechanism.

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  • Josu'e Ortega, 2018. "The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large," Papers 1810.10287, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1810.10287
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