Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections
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Cited by:
- Tajika, Tomoya, 2022. "Voting on tricky questions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 380-389.
- Gerardi, Dino & Grillo, Edoardo & Monzón, Ignacio, 2022.
"The perils of friendly oversight,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Dino Gerardi & Edoardo Grillo & Ignacio Monzón, 2020. "The Perils of Friendly Oversight," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 630, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2021.
- Dino Gerardi & Edoardo Grillo & Ignacio Monzón, 2022. "The Perils of Friendly Oversight," Working Papers 122, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
- Gerardi, Dino & Monzon, Ignacio & Grillo, Edoardo, 2021. "The Perils of Friendly Oversight," CEPR Discussion Papers 16100, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Ronen Gradwohl & Yuval Heller & Arye Hillman, 2022. "Social Media and Democracy," Papers 2206.14430, arXiv.org.
- Gradwohl, Ronen & Heller, Yuval & Hillman, Arye, 2022. "Social Media and Democracy," MPRA Paper 113609, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Denter, Philipp & Ginzburg, Boris, 2021. "Troll Farms and Voter Disinformation," MPRA Paper 109634, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
Information Aggregation; Bayes Correlated Equilibria; Persuasion; Condorcet Jury Theorem;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2021-08-30 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-DES-2021-08-30 (Economic Design)
- NEP-GTH-2021-08-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-ISF-2021-08-30 (Islamic Finance)
- NEP-MIC-2021-08-30 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2021-08-30 (Positive Political Economics)
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