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Michael Powell

Personal Details

First Name:Michael
Middle Name:
Last Name:Powell
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:ppo453
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
Terminal Degree:2011 Economics Department; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Kellogg Graduate School of Management
Northwestern University

Evanston, Illinois (United States)
http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/
RePEc:edi:kgsnwus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Rena M. Conti & Brigham Frandsen & Michael L. Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2021. "Common Agent or Double Agent? Pharmacy Benefit Managers in the Prescription Drug Market," NBER Working Papers 28866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Nicola Bianchi & Giulia Bovini & Jin Li & Matteo Paradisi & Michael L. Powell, 2021. "Career Spillovers in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 28605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Brigham Frandsen & Michael Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2017. "Sticking Points: Common-Agency Problems and Contracting in the U.S. Healthcare System," NBER Working Papers 23177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms," ECON - Working Papers 171, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2020.
  5. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4948, CESifo.
  6. Robert S. Gibbons & Richard T. Holden & Michael L. Powell, 2010. "Rational-Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Good Markets," NBER Working Papers 15783, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Robert S. Gibbons & Richard T. Holden & Michael L. Powell, 2010. "Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited," NBER Working Papers 15779, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Articles

  1. Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell & Bryony Reich, 2025. "Organizing Modular Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 133(3), pages 986-1046.
  2. Nicola Bianchi & Giulia Bovini & Jin Li & Matteo Paradisi & Michael Powell, 2023. "Career Spillovers in Internal Labour Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(4), pages 1800-1831.
  3. George Georgiadis & Michael Powell, 2022. "A/B Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(1), pages 267-303, January.
  4. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
  5. Li, Jin & Powell, Michael, 2020. "Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 358-382.
  6. Brigham Frandsen & Michael Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2019. "Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(2), pages 251-285, June.
  7. Michael Powell, 2019. "Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(1), pages 121-146, March.
  8. Daniel Barron & Michael Powell, 2019. "Policies in Relational Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 228-249, May.
  9. Rongzhu Ke & Jin Li & Michael Powell, 2018. "Managing Careers in Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 197-252.
  10. Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017. "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 217-241, February.
  11. Michael Powell, 2015. "An Influence-Cost Model of Organizational Practices and Firm Boundaries," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(suppl_1), pages 104-142.
  12. Robert Gibbons & Richard Holden & Michael Powell, 2012. "Organization and Information: Firms' Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1813-1841.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Rena M. Conti & Brigham Frandsen & Michael L. Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2021. "Common Agent or Double Agent? Pharmacy Benefit Managers in the Prescription Drug Market," NBER Working Papers 28866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Lin, Haizhen & Wang, Yanhao, 2025. "The value of group purchasing: Evidence from the U.S. hospital industry," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 247(C).
    2. D'Angelo, Alexa B. & Dearolf, Michelle & Restar, Arjee & Tsui, Emma K. & Zewde, Naomi & Grov, Christian, 2025. "Navigating payment and policy barriers to gender-affirming care for transmasculine individuals: A qualitative study and policy assessment," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 366(C).

  2. Nicola Bianchi & Giulia Bovini & Jin Li & Matteo Paradisi & Michael L. Powell, 2021. "Career Spillovers in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 28605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Effrosyni Adamopoulou & Francesco Manaresi & Omar Rachedi & Emircan Yurdagul, 2022. "Minimum Wages and Insurance Within the Firm," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2022_326v3, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    2. Sturm, Patrick, 2025. "Workplace peer effects in retirement," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 112, University of Würzburg, Department of Economics.
    3. Minni, Virginia, 2025. "Making the Invisible Hand Visible: Managers and the Allocation of Workers to Jobs," IZA Discussion Papers 18137, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Francesco Devicienti & Bernardo Fanfani, 2021. "Firms' Margins of Adjustment to Wage Growth. The Case of Italian Collective Bargaining," DISCE - Working Papers del Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza def102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimenti e Istituti di Scienze Economiche (DISCE).
    5. Mitchell Hoffman & Christopher Stanton, 2025. "People, Practices, and Productivity: A Review of New Advances in Personnel Economics," RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series 2521, ROCKWOOL Foundation Berlin (RFBerlin).
    6. Sona Badalyan, 2025. "Retirement Age Reforms and Worker Substitutability: Implications for Employment of Older Workers," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp794, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    7. Agostinho, Rui & Baptista, Rui & Hessels, Jolanda & Castro-Silva, Hugo & van der Zwan, Peter, 2025. "The entrepreneurship fountain of youth: Younger management ranks generate more entrepreneurs," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 40(4).
    8. Allen, Steven G., 2023. "Demand for older workers: What do we know? What do we need to learn?," The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, Elsevier, vol. 24(C).

  3. Brigham Frandsen & Michael Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2017. "Sticking Points: Common-Agency Problems and Contracting in the U.S. Healthcare System," NBER Working Papers 23177, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Leila Agha & Keith Marzilli Ericson & Xiaoxi Zhao, 2020. "The Impact of Organizational Boundaries on Healthcare Coordination and Utilization," NBER Working Papers 28179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-05, McMaster University.
    3. Brekke, Kurt R. & Siciliani, Luigi & Straume, Odd Rune, 2024. "Competition, quality and integrated health care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    4. Luke B. Connelly & Gianluca Fiorentini, 2021. "Structural factors and integrated care interventions: is there a role for economists in the policy debate?," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 22(8), pages 1141-1150, November.
    5. Benjamin R. Handel & Kate Ho, 2021. "Industrial Organization of Health Care Markets," NBER Working Papers 29137, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein & Yunan Ji & Neale Mahoney, 2020. "Randomized trial shows healthcare payment reform has equal-sized spillover effects on patients not targeted by reform," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117(32), pages 18939-18947, August.
    7. Michael L. Barnett & Andrew Olenski & Adam Sacarny, 2020. "Common Practice: Spillovers from Medicare on Private Health Care," NBER Working Papers 27270, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Agha, Leila & Frandsen, Brigham & Rebitzer, James B., 2019. "Fragmented division of labor and healthcare costs: Evidence from moves across regions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 144-159.

  4. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms," ECON - Working Papers 171, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2020.

    Cited by:

    1. Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism design and intentions," ECON - Working Papers 066, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2014.
    2. Hanaki, Nobuyuki & Hayashi, Takashi & Lombardi, Michele & Ogawa, Kazuhito, 2021. "Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: An experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 366-389.
    3. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshitaka Okano & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2015. "The approval mechanism solves the prisoner's dilemma theoretically and experimentally," Working Papers SDES-2015-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
    4. Erlei, Mathias & Roß, Wiebke, 2015. "Bounded rationality as an essential component of the holdup problem," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2015 (Bayreuth) 140886, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
    5. Echenique, Federico & Núñez, Matías, 2025. "Price and Choose," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt5dw4g7k5, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2018. "Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 65-77, June.
    8. Aghion, Philippe & Fehr, Ernst & Holden, Richard & Wilkening, Tom, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 8971, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    9. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
    10. David Frydlinger & Oliver D. Hart, 2019. "Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles," NBER Working Papers 26245, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Hagiwara, Makoto, 2025. "Behavioral subgame perfect implementation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    12. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, "undated". "Approval Mechanism to Solve Prisoner’s Dilemma: Comparison with Varian’s Compensation Mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2019. "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," NBER Working Papers 25918, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Fahn, Matthias & MacLeod, W. Bentley & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2023. "Past and Future Developments in the Economics of Relational Contracts," IZA Discussion Papers 16427, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Federico Echenique & Mat'ias N'u~nez, 2022. "Price & Choose," Papers 2212.05650, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2023.

  5. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Handing Out Guns at a Knife Fight: Behavioral Limitations of Subgame-Perfect Implementation," CESifo Working Paper Series 4948, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Yoshitaka Okano & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2015. "The approval mechanism solves the prisoner's dilemma theoretically and experimentally," Working Papers SDES-2015-12, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2015.
    2. Erlei, Mathias & Roß, Wiebke, 2015. "Bounded rationality as an essential component of the holdup problem," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2015 (Bayreuth) 140886, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
    3. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2015. "Government versus private ownership of public goods: The role of bargaining frictions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10686, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2018. "Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 65-77, June.
    5. Aghion, Philippe & Fehr, Ernst & Holden, Richard & Wilkening, Tom, 2015. "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation," IZA Discussion Papers 8971, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, "undated". "Approval Mechanism to Solve Prisoner’s Dilemma: Comparison with Varian’s Compensation Mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management.

  6. Robert S. Gibbons & Richard T. Holden & Michael L. Powell, 2010. "Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited," NBER Working Papers 15779, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Roman Fossati, 2012. "Outsourcing versus Vertical Integration: A Dynamic Model of Industry Equilibrium," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 12/627, School of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.

Articles

  1. Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell & Bryony Reich, 2025. "Organizing Modular Production," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 133(3), pages 986-1046.

    Cited by:

    1. Xienan Cheng & Mustafa Dogan & Pinar Yildirim, 2025. "Artificial Intelligence in Team Dynamics: Who Gets Replaced and Why?," Papers 2506.12337, arXiv.org.
    2. Alastair Langtry, 2025. "More connection, less community: network formation and local public goods provision," Papers 2504.06872, arXiv.org.

  2. Nicola Bianchi & Giulia Bovini & Jin Li & Matteo Paradisi & Michael Powell, 2023. "Career Spillovers in Internal Labour Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(4), pages 1800-1831.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Li, Jin & Powell, Michael, 2020. "Multilateral interactions improve cooperation under random fluctuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 358-382.

    Cited by:

    1. Ricard Gil & Myongjin Kim & Giorgio Zanarone, 2022. "Relationships Under Stress: Relational Outsourcing in the U.S. Airline Industry After the 2008 Financial Crisis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1256-1277, February.

  5. Brigham Frandsen & Michael Powell & James B. Rebitzer, 2019. "Sticking points: common‐agency problems and contracting in the US healthcare system," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(2), pages 251-285, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Michael Powell, 2019. "Productivity and credibility in industry equilibrium," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(1), pages 121-146, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Martin C. Byford & Joshua S. Gans, 2014. "Permission to Exist," NBER Working Papers 20512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jan Grobovsek, 2016. "Managerial Delegation, Law Enforcement, and Aggregate Productivity," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 271, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    3. Englmaier, Florian & Fahn, Matthias, 2014. "Size Matters - “Over†investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 506, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    4. Prat, Andrea & Dessein, Wouter, 2019. "Organizational Capital, Corporate Leadership, and Firm Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 13513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Steven Callander & Dana Foarta & Takuo Sugaya, 2022. "Market Competition and Political Influence: An Integrated Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(6), pages 2723-2753, November.
    6. Cheng Chen, 2015. "Management Quality, Firm Organization and International Trade," 2015 Meeting Papers 53, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Bryan Hong & Lorenz Kueng & Mu-Jeung Yang, 2015. "Estimating Management Practice Complementarity between Decentralization and Performance Pay," NBER Working Papers 20845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Ufuk Akcigit & Harun Alp & Michael Peters, 2016. "Lack of Selection and Limits to Delegation: Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries," NBER Working Papers 21905, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Florian Englmaier & Matthias Fahn, 2015. "Size Matters - "Over"investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series 5154, CESifo.
    10. Boudreau, Laura & Cajal-Grossi, Julia & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2023. "Global value chains in developing countries: a relational perspective from coffee and garments," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 120184, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Laura Boudreau, 2024. "Multinational Enforcement of Labor Law: Experimental Evidence on Strengthening Occupational Safety and Health Committees," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 92(4), pages 1269-1308, July.

  7. Daniel Barron & Michael Powell, 2019. "Policies in Relational Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 228-249, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Noel, Michael D. & Qiang, Hongjie, 2022. "Open price contracts, locked-in buyers, and opportunism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    2. De Chiara, Alessandro, 2020. "Precontractual investment and modes of procurement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    3. Scur, Daniela & Lemos, Renata, 2019. "The ties that bind: implicit contracts and management practices in family-run firms," CEPR Discussion Papers 13794, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Daniel Barron & Jin Li & Michał Zator, 2022. "Morale and Debt Dynamics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(6), pages 4496-4516, June.
    5. Anil K. Jain, 2022. "Financing Repeat Borrowers: Designing Credible Incentives for Today and Tomorrow," International Finance Discussion Papers 1364, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2022. "Relational Contracts and Hierarchy," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-08, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    7. Macchiavello, Rocco & Morjaria, Ameet, 2023. "Relational contracts: recent empirical advancements and open questions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 123003, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel Garrett, 2022. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 192, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.

  8. Rongzhu Ke & Jin Li & Michael Powell, 2018. "Managing Careers in Organizations," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 197-252.

    Cited by:

    1. Radoslawa Nikolowa & Daniel Ferreira, 2018. "How to Sell Jobs," Working Papers 846, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    2. Oliver Fabel & Sandra Mauser & Yingchao Zhang, 2024. "Performance contests and merit pay with empathic employees," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 45(1), pages 353-372, January.
    3. Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli & Francis Kramaz & Giovanni Pica, 2015. "Insurance Between Firms: The Role of Internal Labor Markets," CSEF Working Papers 386, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 22 Jan 2020.
    4. Schmutzler, Armin & Klein, Arnd Heinrich, 2014. "Optimal Effort Incentives in Dynamic Tournaments," CEPR Discussion Papers 10192, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli & Francis Kramarz & Giovanni Pica, 2023. "Exploiting Growth Opportunities:The Role of Internal Labor Markets," Working Papers 686, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. Sellars, Sarah C. & Schnitkey, Gary D. & Gentry, Laura F., 2023. "Cover Crops on Illinois Farms," Journal of the ASFMRA, American Society of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers, vol. 2023, January.
    7. Hans K. Hvide & Yanren Zhang, 2021. "Too big to succeed? Overstaffing in firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 784-798, November.
    8. Michael Waldman & Jan Zabojnik, 2025. "Asymmetric Learning and the CEO Labor Market," Working Paper 1539, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    9. Erika Deserranno & Philipp Kastrau & Gianmarco León-Ciliotta, 2021. "Promotions and productivity: The role of meritocracy and pay progression in the public sector," Economics Working Papers 1770, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    10. Ferreira, Daniel & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2024. "Prestige, promotion, and pay," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118369, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    11. Guido Friebel & Michael Raith, 2025. "Talent Management: the Role of Bosses," RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series 2531, ROCKWOOL Foundation Berlin (RFBerlin).
    12. Dana Foarta & Takuo Sugaya, 2021. "The management of talent: Optimal contracting for selection and incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 49-77, March.
    13. Bertrand, Marianne & Burgess, Robin & Chawla, Arunish & Xu, Guo, 2020. "The glittering prizes: career incentives and bureaucrat performance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100808, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    14. Jed DeVaro & Antti Kauhanen & Nelli Valmari, 2019. "Internal and External Hiring," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 72(4), pages 981-1008, August.
    15. Jed DeVaro & Oliver Gürtler, 2020. "Strategic shirking in competitive labor markets: A general model of multi‐task promotion tournaments with employer learning," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(2), pages 335-376, April.
    16. Alan Benson & Danielle Li & Kelly Shue, 2019. "Promotions and the Peter Principle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(4), pages 2085-2134.
    17. Aisha J Ali & Javier Fuenzalida & Margarita Gómez & Martin J Williams, 2021. "Four lenses on people management in the public sector: an evidence review and synthesis," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 335-366.
    18. Bonilla, Santiago & Polanec, Sašo, 2020. "Organizational Hierarchies in the Slovenian Manufacturing Sector," MPRA Paper 103009, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Mitchell Hoffman & Christopher Stanton, 2025. "People, Practices, and Productivity: A Review of New Advances in Personnel Economics," RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series 2521, ROCKWOOL Foundation Berlin (RFBerlin).
    20. Jie Gong & Ang Sun & Zhichao Wei, 2018. "Choosing the Pond: On-the-Job Experience and Long-Run Career Outcomes," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(2), pages 860-872, February.
    21. Yanay Farja & Ori Zax, 2020. "Efficiency Wages with Endogenous Monitoring," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 40(1), pages 248-261.
    22. Daniel Ferreira & Radoslawa Nikolowa, 2024. "Prestige, Promotion, and Pay," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 79(1), pages 505-540, February.

  9. Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017. "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 217-241, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019. "Monotone Contracts," Working Papers 1085, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Boleslavsky, Raphael & Taylor, Curtis R., 2024. "Make it 'til you fake it," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    3. Robert S. Gibbons & Manuel Grieder & Holger Herz & Christian Zehnder, 2019. "Building an Equilibrium: Rules Versus Principles in Relational Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 7871, CESifo.
    4. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2020. "Optimal contracts with randomly arriving tasks," Economics Working Papers 1690, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    5. Chen, Ying & Eraslan, Hulya, 2018. "Learning While Setting Precedents," Working Papers 18-001, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    6. Kieron Meagher & Andrew Wait, 2023. "Trust in management in organizations," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 507-507, April.
    7. Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2018. "Repeated Delegation," 2018 Meeting Papers 1292, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Allen Vong, 2025. "Dynamic Mediation and Moral Hazard: From Private To Public Communication," Papers 2511.02436, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
    9. Guo, Yingni & Hörner, Johannes, 2020. "Dynamic Allocation without Money," TSE Working Papers 20-1133, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    10. Eliaz, Kfir & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Rozen, Kareen, 2016. "The Silent Treatment," CEPR Discussion Papers 11335, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Yingni Guo & Johannes Hörner, 2021. "Dynamic Allocation without Money," Working Papers hal-03187506, HAL.
    12. Nicholas Economides, 2015. "Bundling and Tying," Working Papers 15-01, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    13. Liu, Dan & Meagher, Kieron J. & Wait, Andrew, 2022. "Market conditions and firm morality: Employee trust in the honesty of their managers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 89-106.
    14. Eliaz, Kfir & Rozen, Kareen & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Fershtman, Daniel, 2019. "On Selecting the Right Agent," CEPR Discussion Papers 13891, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Matthias Fahn & Anne Schade & Katharina Schüßler, 2017. "What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal Provision of Incentives over the Course of Careers," CESifo Working Paper Series 6635, CESifo.
    16. Newton, Jonathan & Wait, Andrew & Angus, Simon D., 2019. "Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 354-365.
    17. Daniel Habermacher & Nicolás Riquelme, 2025. "Diversity and Empowerment in Organizations," Working Papers 352, Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE).
    18. Dessein, Wouter & Santos, Tano, 2019. "Managerial Style and Attention," CEPR Discussion Papers 13527, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    19. Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017. "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp605, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    20. Prat, Andrea & Dessein, Wouter, 2019. "Organizational Capital, Corporate Leadership, and Firm Dynamics," CEPR Discussion Papers 13513, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    21. Krasikov, Ilia & Lamba, Rohit, 2021. "A theory of dynamic contracting with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    22. Yonghang Ji & Allen Vong, 2025. "Task assignment as dynamic incentives," Papers 2511.05338, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2026.
    23. Halac, Marina & Yared, Pierre, 2018. "Fiscal Rules and Discretion under Self-Enforcement," CEPR Discussion Papers 12571, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Forand, Jean Guillaume & Zapal, Jan, 2020. "Production priorities in dynamic relationships," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(3), July.
    25. Pai, Mallesh & Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew, 2020. "(Bad) Reputation in Relational Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 14408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    26. Ricard Gil & Myongjin Kim & Giorgio Zanarone, 2022. "Relationships Under Stress: Relational Outsourcing in the U.S. Airline Industry After the 2008 Financial Crisis," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1256-1277, February.
    27. Chen, Ying & Oliver, Atara, 2023. "When to ask for an update: Timing in strategic communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 211(C).
    28. Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2023. "What Makes Agility Fragile? A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Rigidity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3578-3601, June.
    29. Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2016. "Dynamic nonmonetary incentives," Economics Working Papers 1545, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    30. Eduardo Engel & Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic & Jennifer Soto, 2019. "Financing PPP Projects with PVR Contracts: Theory and Evidence from the UK and Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 347, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    31. Rahul Deb & Matthew Mitchell & Mallesh Pai, 2019. "Our distrust is very expensive," Working Papers tecipa-632, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    32. Daniel Fershtman & Kfir Eliaz & Alexander Frug, 2025. "Clerks," Economics Working Papers 1928, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    33. Juan Escobar & Qiaoxi Zhang, 2019. "Delegating Learning," Documentos de Trabajo 348, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    34. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2020. "Screening for breakthroughs," Papers 2011.10090, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
    35. Daniel Barron & Robert Gibbons & Ricard Gil & Kevin J.Murphy, 2020. "Relational Adaptation Under Reel Authority," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1868-1889, May.
    36. Rantakari, Heikki, 2023. "How to reward honesty?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 129-145.
    37. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2021. "Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 476-491.
    38. Watson, Joel, 2021. "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt19f9w2xf, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    39. Kishishita, Daiki, 2020. "(Not) delegating decisions to experts: The effect of uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    40. Francesc Dilmé & Daniel Garrett, 2022. "Relational Contracts: Public versus Private Savings," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 192, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    41. Peter Achim & Jan Knoepfle, 2025. "The Tension between Trust and Oversight in Long-term Relationships," Papers 2504.02696, arXiv.org.
    42. Katayama, Hajime & Meagher, Kieron J. & Wait, Andrew, 2018. "Authority and communication in firms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 315-348.

  10. Michael Powell, 2015. "An Influence-Cost Model of Organizational Practices and Firm Boundaries," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 31(suppl_1), pages 104-142.

    Cited by:

    1. Corgnet, Brice & Martin, Ludivine & Ndodjang, Peguy & Sutan, Angela, 2019. "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 23-45.
    2. Alain de Janvry & Guojun He & Elisabeth Sadoulet & Shaoda Wang & Qiong Zhang, 2020. "Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202003, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
    3. Laura Alfaro & Nick Bloom & Paola Conconi & Harald Fadinger & Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen & Nicholas Bloom, 2018. "Come Together: Firm Boundaries and Delegation," CESifo Working Paper Series 7054, CESifo.
    4. Impink, Stephen Michael & Prat, Andrea & Sadun, Raffaella, 2021. "Communication within firms: evidence from CEO turnovers," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 113873, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Moritz Mosenhauer, 2022. "Salience and management‐by‐exception," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(8), pages 3685-3697, December.
    6. Francisco Brahm & Jorge Tarziján, 2016. "Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between internal organization and vertical integration," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(12), pages 2481-2502, December.
    7. Brice Corgnet & Ludivine Martin & Peguy Ndodjang & Angela Sutan, 2015. "On the Merit of Equal Pay: When Influence Activities Interact with Incentive Setting," Working Papers 15-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    8. Yusuke Mori, 2013. "A Formal Theory of Firm Boundaries: A Trade-Off between Rent Seeking and Bargaining Costs," Discussion Paper Series DP2013-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    9. Mori, Yusuke, 2017. "A formal model of firm boundaries and haggling," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 15-17.

  11. Robert Gibbons & Richard Holden & Michael Powell, 2012. "Organization and Information: Firms' Governance Choices in Rational-Expectations Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1813-1841.

    Cited by:

    1. Joshua S. Gans, 2023. "Artificial intelligence adoption in a competitive market," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 90(358), pages 690-705, April.
    2. Elchanan Ben-Porath & Eddie Dekel & Barton L. Lipman, 2013. "A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 2013-004, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    3. Andrew F. Newman & Patrick Legros, 2011. "Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Survey," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2011-036, Boston University - Department of Economics.
    4. Richard Holden & Anup Malani, 2022. "An Examination of Velocity and Initial Coin Offerings," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(12), pages 9026-9041, December.
    5. Konstantinos Serfes, 2013. "A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration under Two-Sided Productivity Heterogeneity," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2013-6, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    6. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Legros, Patrick & Zingales, Luigi (ed.), 2016. "The Impact of Incomplete Contracts on Economics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199826216.
    7. Newman, Andrew, 2012. "A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (Revised Version)," CEPR Discussion Papers 9004, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Bryan Hong & Lorenz Kueng & Mu-Jeung Yang, 2015. "Estimating Management Practice Complementarity between Decentralization and Performance Pay," NBER Working Papers 20845, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Richard Holden & Anup Malani, 2019. "The ICO Paradox: Transactions Costs, Token Velocity, and Token Value," NBER Working Papers 26265, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Patrick Legros & Andrew F. Newman, 2014. "Contracts, Ownership, and Industrial Organization: Past and Future," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 30(suppl_1), pages 82-117.
    11. Albert H. Choi, 2015. "Non-Profit Status and Relational Sanctions: Commitment to Quality through Repeat Interactions and Organizational Choice," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(4).
    12. Guido Maretto, 2017. "Diversification and screening," Nova SBE Working Paper Series wp610, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics.
    13. Guido Maretto, 2011. "Contracts and Market: Risk Sharing with Hidden Types," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2011-005, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    14. Bayo-Moriones, Alberto & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique & Gil, Ricard, 2013. "'Make-or-Buy' of Peripheral Services in Manufacturing: Evidence from Spanish Plant-Level Data," IZA Discussion Papers 7138, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (5) 2010-03-13 2010-03-13 2014-08-28 2014-09-08 2017-02-26. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (2) 2014-08-28 2014-09-08
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (2) 2014-08-28 2014-09-08
  4. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2014-08-28 2014-09-08
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2014-08-28 2014-09-08
  6. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (2) 2017-02-26 2021-06-28
  7. NEP-AGE: Economics of Ageing (1) 2021-04-12
  8. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2021-06-28
  9. NEP-EUR: Microeconomic European Issues (1) 2021-04-12
  10. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2014-09-08
  11. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages (1) 2021-04-12

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