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On selecting the right agent

Author

Listed:
  • de Clippel, Geoffroy

    (Department of Economics, Brown University)

  • Eliaz, Kfir

    (Department of Economics, Tel-Aviv University and University of Utah)

  • Fershtman, Daniel

    (Department of Economics, Tel-Aviv University)

  • Rozen, Kareen

    (Department of Economics, Brown University)

Abstract

Each period, a principal must assign one of two agents to a new task. Profit is stochastically higher when the agent is qualified for the task, but the principal cannot observe qualification. Her only decision is which of the two agents to assign, if any, given the public history of selections and profits, but she cannot commit to any rule. While she maximizes expected discounted profits, each agent maximizes his expected discounted selection probabilities. We fully characterize when the principal's first-best payoff is attainable in equilibrium, and identify a simple, belief-free, strategy profile achieving this first-best whenever feasible. Addionally, we provide a partial characterization of the case with many agents and discuss how our analysis extends to other variations of the game.

Suggested Citation

  • de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir & Fershtman, Daniel & Rozen, Kareen, 2021. "On selecting the right agent," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(2), May.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    5. Kishishita, Daiki, 2020. "(Not) delegating decisions to experts: The effect of uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    6. Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser, 2023. "Simple Allocation with Correlated Types," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_486, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    7. Solan, Eilon & Zhao, Chang, 2021. "Dynamic monitoring under resource constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 476-491.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic mechanism design without commitment; dynamic mechanism design without transfers;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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