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More connection, less community: network formation and local public goods provision

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  • Alastair Langtry

Abstract

This paper presents a model of network formation and public goods provision in local communities. Here, networks can sustain public good provision by spreading information about people's behaviour. I find a critical threshold in network connectedness at which public good provision drops sharply, even though agents are highly heterogeneous. Technology change can tear a community's social fabric by pushing high-skilled workers to withdraw from their local community. This can help explain rising resentment toward perceived ``elites'' -- their withdrawal actively harms those left behind. Moreover, well-meaning policies that upskill workers can make them worse off by reducing network connectedness.

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  • Alastair Langtry, 2025. "More connection, less community: network formation and local public goods provision," Papers 2504.06872, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2504.06872
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