Citations of
Satoru Takahashi

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Working papers

1. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2051, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   
   Published as:
   • Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Markus Kinateder, 2006. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 674.06, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Markus Kinateder, 2008. "Repeated Games Played in a Network," Working Papers 2008.22, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
   2. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

2. Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi & Josef Hofbauer, 2003. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000420, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru & Hofbauer, Josef, 2003. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," MPRA Paper 1555, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   • Deisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi & Josef Hofbauer, 2003. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 0318, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Josef Hofbauer & Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 339, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   
   Published as:
   • Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru & Hofbauer, Josef, 2008. "Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 155-192, June. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Hiroshi Uno, 2007. "Nested Potential Games," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(19), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
   2. Daijiro Okada & Olivier Tercieux, 2008. "Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential," Economics Working Papers 0085, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
   3. Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2004. "Iterated Potential and Robustness of Equilibria," MPRA Paper 1599, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Jan 2009. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Oyama, Daisuke & Tercieux, Olivier, 2009. "Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1726-1769, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

1. Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "The number of pure Nash equilibria in a random game with nondecreasing best responses," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 328-340, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Mathevet, Laurent, . "A contraction principle for finite global games," Working Papers 1243, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]

2. Ambrus, Attila & Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 3(1), pages 1-27, March. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Di Maggio, Marco, 2009. "Accountability and Cheap Talk," MPRA Paper 18652, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   2. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2008. "Contracts for Experts with Opposing Interests," Discussion Papers 5, Kyiv School of Economics, revised Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]
   3. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2006. "Persuasion by Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2006-10, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, revised Oct 2009. [Downloadable!]
   4. Peter Eso & James Schummer, 2005. "Robust Deviations from Signaling Equilibria," Discussion Papers 1406, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]

3. Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru & Hofbauer, Josef, 2008. "Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics," Theoretical Economics, Society for Economic Theory, vol. 3(2), pages 155-192, June. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru & Hofbauer, Josef, 2003. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," MPRA Paper 1555, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   • Deisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi & Josef Hofbauer, 2003. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," Vienna Economics Papers 0318, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Josef Hofbauer & Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 339, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
   • Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi & Josef Hofbauer, 2003. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000420, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

   See citations under working paper version above.

4. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2051, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research. [Downloadable!]

   See citations under working paper version above.

5. Takahashi, Satoru, 2005. "Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 231-247, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-028/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Working Papers 0706, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
   2. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2007. "Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 07-070/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]

6. Nikolai S. Kukushkin & Satoru Takahashi & Tetsuo Yamamori, 2005. "Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 229-238, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Kukushkin, Nikolai S., 2008. "Best response adaptation under dominance solvability," MPRA Paper 4108, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

7. Takahashi, Satoru & Wen, Quan, 2003. "On asynchronously repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 239-245, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

   Cited by:

   1. Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1490, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
      Other versions:
      • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Game Theory and Information 0410001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
      • Luca Anderlini & Dino Gerardi & Roger Lagunoff, 2004. "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000577, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
      • Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University), Dino Gerardi (Yale University), Roger Lagunoff (Georgetown University), . "The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games," Working Papers gueconwpa~04-04-09, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

8. Satoru Takahashi & Tetsuo Yamamori, 2002. "The pure Nash equilibrium property and the quasi-acyclic condition," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(22), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]

   Cited by:

   1. Ulrich Berger, 2004. "Two More Classes of Games with the Fictitious Play Property," Game Theory and Information 0408003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-12-13.