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Social learning and the shadow of the past

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  • Heller, Yuval
  • Mohlin, Erik

Abstract

In various environments new agents may base their decisions on observations of actions taken by a few other agents in the past. In this paper we analyze a broad class of such social learning processes, and study under what circumstances the initial behavior of the population has a lasting effect. Our results show that this question strongly depends on the expected number of actions observed by new agents. Specifically, we show that if the expected number of observed actions is: (1) less than one, then the population converges to the same behavior independently of the initial state; (2) between one and two, then in some (but not all) environments there are decision rules for which the initial state has a lasting impact on future behavior; and (3) more than two, then in all environments there is a decision rule for which the initial state has a lasting impact.

Suggested Citation

  • Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2018. "Social learning and the shadow of the past," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 426-460.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:177:y:2018:i:c:p:426-460
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Sawa, Ryoji & Wu, Jiabin, 2023. "Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 137(C), pages 294-316.
    2. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval & Milchtaich, Igal, 2020. "Instability of Defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics Analysis," MPRA Paper 99594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval & Milchtaich, Igal, 2021. "Instability of defection in the prisoner's dilemma under best experienced payoff dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    4. Ryoji Sawa, 2022. "Statistical Inference in Evolutionary Dynamics," Working Papers e170, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    5. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Amnon Schreiber, 2021. "Sampling dynamics and stable mixing in hawk-dove games," Papers 2107.08423, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2022.
    6. Izquierdo, Segismundo S. & Izquierdo, Luis R., 2022. "Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
    7. Arigapudi, Srinivas & Heller, Yuval & Schreiber, Amnon, 2021. "Sampling Dynamics and Stable Mixing in Hawk–Dove Games," MPRA Paper 108819, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Amnon Schreiber, 2023. "Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination," Papers 2305.10301, arXiv.org.
    9. Srinivas Arigapudi & Yuval Heller & Igal Milchtaich, 2020. "Instability of Defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma Under Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics," Papers 2005.05779, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2021.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social learning; Steady state; Unique limiting behavior; Path dependence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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