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Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games

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Author Info

  • Calcagno, Riccardo

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Finance and Control, EMLYON Business School)

  • Sugaya, Takuo

    ()
    (Stanford Graduate School of Business)

  • Kamada, Yuichiro

    ()
    (Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University)

  • Lovo, Stefano

    ()
    (Finance Department, HEC Paris and GREGHEC)

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    Abstract

    We study games endowed with a pre-play phase in which players prepare the actions that will be implemented at a predetermined deadline. In the preparation phase, each player stochastically receives opportunities to revise her actions, and the finally-revised action is taken at the deadline. In 2-player \textquotedblleft common interest" games, where there exists a best action profile for all players, this best action profile is the only equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game. In \textquotedblleft opposing interest" games, which are $2\times 2$ games with Pareto-unranked strict Nash equilibria, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic game is generically unique and corresponds to one of the stage-game strict Nash equilibria. Which equilibrium prevails depends on the payoff structure and on the relative frequency of the arrivals of revision opportunities for each of the players.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Theoretical Economics.

    Volume (Year): 9 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 2 (May)
    Pages:

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    Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:1202

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    Web page: http://econtheory.org

    Related research

    Keywords: Revision games; pre-opening; finite horizon; equilibrium selection; asynchronous moves;

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    References

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    1. Takahashi, Satoru, 2005. "Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 231-247, November.
    2. Yoon, Kiho, 2001. "A Folk Theorem for Asynchronously Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(1), pages 191-200, January.
    3. Dutta, Prajit K., 2012. "Coordination need not be a problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 519-534.
    4. Biais, Bruno & Bisière, Christophe & Pouget, Sébastien, 2009. "Equilibrium Discovery and Preopening Mechanisms in an Experimental Market," IDEI Working Papers 543, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    5. Josef Hofbauer & Daisuke Oyama & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Monotone Methods for Equilibrium Selection under Perfect Foresight Dynamics," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 339, Econometric Society.
    6. Wen, Quan, 2002. "A Folk Theorem for Repeated Sequential Games," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(2), pages 493-512, April.
    7. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1984. "Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation," Working papers 345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    8. repec:bla:restud:v:75:y:2008:i:1:p:99-116 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Guillermo Caruana & Liran Einav, 2008. "A Theory of Endogenous Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(1), pages 99-116.
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    Cited by:
    1. Rohan Dutta & Ryosuke Ishii, 2013. "Coordinating by Not Committing : Efficiency as the Unique Outcome," Cahiers de recherche 10-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.

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