On Continuity of Robust Equilibria
AbstractWe relax the Kajii and Morris (1997a) notion of equilibrium ro- bustness by allowing approximate equilibria when information in a game becomes incomplete. The new notion is termed "approximate robustness". The approximately robust equilibrium correspondence turns out to be upper hemicontinuous, unlike the (exactly) robust equilibrium correspondence. Another distinction comes to light when we show that, as a corollary of upper hemicontinuity, approximately robust equilibria exist in all zero-sum games. Thus, although approx- imate robustness is only a small variation of the original notion, it is strictly weaker than the latter, and its adoption enriches the domain of games for which robust equilibria exist.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series KIER Working Papers with number 818.
Date of creation: May 2012
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More information through EDIRC
incomplete information; robustness; Bayesian Nash equi- librium; ε-equilibrium; upper hemicontinuity; zero-sum games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-06-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2012-06-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-06-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-06-05 (Microeconomics)
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