Approximate Robustness Of Equilibrium To Incomplete Information
AbstractWe relax the Kajii and Morris (1997a) notion of equilibrium ro- bustness by allowing approximate equilibria in close incomplete infor- mation games. The new notion is termed "approximate robustness". The approximately robust equilibrium correspondence turns out to be upper hemicontinuous, unlike the (exactly) robust equilibrium corre- spondence. As a corollary of the upper hemicontinuity, it is shown that approximately robust equilibria exist in all two-player zero-sum games and all two-player two-strategy games, whereas (exactly) robust equilibria may fail to exist for some games in these categories.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1209.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
incomplete information; robustness; Bayesian Nash equi- librium; ?-equilibrium; upper hemicontinuity; zero-sum games.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-10-20 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2012-10-20 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-10-20 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-10-20 (Microeconomics)
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