On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting
AbstractWe show that the folk theorem in Wen [Q. Wen (1994), The "Folk Theorem" for repeated games with complete information, Econometrica, 62, 949-954.] may not fully characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoff set in a repeated game with unequal discounting, where a player's equilibrium payoff could be strictly less than her effective minimax payoff.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 100 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
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- Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 571-581.
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