Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Effciency In Two Player Repeated Games Of Imperfect Monitoring

Contents:

Author Info

  • Eduardo Monteiro
  • Humberto Moreira

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2006/artigos/A06A113.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics] in its series Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting] with number 113.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:anp:en2006:113

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Secretaria da ANPEC Rua Tiradentes, 17 - Ingá Niterói, RJ 24210-510 Brazil
Phone: 55 21 2709 7154
Fax: 55-11-3091-6073
Email:
Web page: http://www.anpec.org.br
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Secretaria da ANPEC Rua Tiradentes, 17 - Ingá Niterói, RJ 24210-510 Brazil

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
  2. Jonathan Levin, 2003. "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 835-857, June.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine.
  4. Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. R. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Bibliography 513, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Michihiro Kandori & Ichiro Obara, 2004. "Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000055, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," Working papers 99-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  8. Radner, Roy & Myerson, Roger & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 59-69, January.
  9. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September.
  10. Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195300796.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:anp:en2006:113. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hugo E. A. da Gama Cerqueira).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.