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Citations for "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation"

by Roger B. Myerson

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  1. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1983. "Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 582, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Geoffroy de Clippel & David Perez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2010-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, . "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1733, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Dean Corbae & Andrew Glover & Daphne Chen, 2013. "Can Employer Credit Checks Create Poverty Traps?," 2013 Meeting Papers 875, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  7. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," Economics Papers 2009-W05, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  8. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  9. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  10. Joachim Rosenmüller, 1998. "Mechanisms in the Core of a Fee Game," Working Papers 303, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  11. Sebastian Krautheim & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2012. "Wages and International Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 3867, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Fabienne Tournadre & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2001. "Learning from Strikes," Post-Print halshs-00151430, HAL.
  13. OKADA, Akira, 2014. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types," Discussion Papers 2013-15, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  14. DE CLIPPEL, Geoffroy, 2002. "Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example," CORE Discussion Papers 2002014, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Elazar Berkovitch, 1985. "Reputation Effect in Equilibrium Search and Bargaining- A Stigma Theory of Unemployment Duration," Discussion Papers 668, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  17. Lucia Quesada, 2003. "Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem," Game Theory and Information 0304002, EconWPA.
  18. Françoise Forges & Roberto Serrano, 2011. "Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems," Working Papers 2011-14, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
  19. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  20. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  21. Roger B. Myerson, 1985. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Discussion Papers 658, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  23. Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2012. "Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 495-514.
  24. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1987. "Bilateral Trade With The Sealed Bid K-Double Action: Existence And Efficiency," Discussion Papers 723R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  25. Roger B. Myerson, 1990. "Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory," Discussion Papers 907, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  26. Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-29, CIRANO.
  27. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  28. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1992. "On the Strategic Role of High Leverage in Entry Deterrence," Papers 92-10, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  29. Helena Hye-Young Kim & Frans Spinnewyn & Luc Lauwers, 2007. "Gradual Revelation Mechanism with Two-Sided Screening," Discussion Paper Series 0710, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  30. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 796, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  31. Nehring, Klaus, 2004. "The veil of public ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 247-270, December.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.