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Citations for "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation"

by Roger B. Myerson

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  1. Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2012. "Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 495-514.
  2. Roger B. Myerson, 1985. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Discussion Papers 658, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," Economics Papers 2009-W05, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Geoffroy de Clippel & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 813.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1987. "Bilateral Trade With The Sealed Bid K-Double Action: Existence And Efficiency," Discussion Papers 723R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. de CLIPPEL, Geoffroy & MINELLI, Enrico, 2002. "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," CORE Discussion Papers 2002063, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Roger B. Myerson, 1983. "Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 582, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Roger Myerson, 2004. "Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 659, Econometric Society.
  10. Joachim Rosenmüller, 1998. "Mechanisms in the Core of a Fee Game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 303, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  11. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
  12. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" hal-00812781, HAL.
  14. Lucia Quesada, 2003. "Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem," Game Theory and Information 0304002, EconWPA.
  15. Genesove, David & Hansen, James, 2016. "The Role of Auctions and Negotiation in Housing Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 11392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  17. Kyriazi, Zacharoula & Lejano, Raul & Maes, Frank & Degraer, Steven, 2015. "Bargaining a net gain compensation agreement between a marine renewable energy developer and a marine protected area manager," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 40-48.
  18. Fabienne Tournadre & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Learning from Strikes," Post-Print halshs-00151430, HAL.
  19. Nehring, Klaus, 2004. "The veil of public ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 247-270, December.
  20. Holden, Richard T. & Fudenberg, Drew & Aghion, Philippe, 2009. "Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem," Scholarly Articles 3708929, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  21. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2005. "Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-82, October.
  22. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8158 is not listed on IDEAS
  23. Roger B. Myerson, 1990. "Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory," Discussion Papers 907, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  24. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1992. "On the Strategic Role of High Leverage in Entry Deterrence," Papers 92-10, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  25. Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," Economics Series Working Papers 2009-W05, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  26. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  27. Sebastian Krautheim & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2011. "Wages and International Tax Competition," Working Papers 1123, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  28. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  29. Elazar Berkovitch, 1985. "Reputation Effect in Equilibrium Search and Bargaining- A Stigma Theory of Unemployment Duration," Discussion Papers 668, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  30. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 796, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  31. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  32. Ayvaz-Cavdaroglu, Nur & Kachani, Soulaymane & Maglaras, Costis, 2016. "Revenue management with minimax regret negotiations," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 12-22.
  33. Okada, Akira, 2016. "A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 318-341.
  34. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  35. Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, 2000. "Interim efficient allocation mechanisms," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7220, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  36. Eran Hanany & D. Marc Kilgour & Yigal Gerchak, 2007. "Final-Offer Arbitration and Risk Aversion in Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(11), pages 1785-1792, November.
  37. Barkaoui, Ahmed & Dragicevic, Arnaud Z., 2016. "Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 90-100.
  38. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  39. Helena Hye-Young Kim & Frans Spinnewyn & Luc Lauwers, 2007. "Gradual Revelation Mechanism with Two-Sided Screening," Discussion Paper Series 0710, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  40. Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-29, CIRANO.
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