IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!)

Citations for "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation"

by Roger B. Myerson

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Barkaoui, Ahmed & Dragicevic, Arnaud Z., 2016. "Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 90-100.
  2. Nehring, Klaus, 2004. "The veil of public ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 247-270, December.
  3. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
  4. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1544-75, September.
  5. OKADA, Akira, 2014. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types," Discussion Papers 2013-15, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  6. Tournadre, Fabienne & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2004. "Learning from strikes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 243-264, April.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Sebastian Krautheim & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2011. "Wages and International Tax Competition," Working Papers 1123, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  9. Roger B. Myerson, 1985. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Discussion Papers 658, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2005. "Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-82, October.
  11. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2012. "Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 413-423.
  12. Lucia Quesada, 2003. "Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem," Game Theory and Information 0304002, EconWPA.
  13. Elazar Berkovitch, 1985. "Reputation Effect in Equilibrium Search and Bargaining- A Stigma Theory of Unemployment Duration," Discussion Papers 668, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1992. "On the Strategic Role of High Leverage in Entry Deterrence," Papers 92-10, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  15. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1987. "Bilateral Trade With The Sealed Bid K-Double Action: Existence And Efficiency," Discussion Papers 723R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  16. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  17. Joachim Rosenmüller, 1998. "Mechanisms in the Core of a Fee Game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 303, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  18. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  19. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard T. Holden, 2009. "Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem," NBER Working Papers 15167, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Kyriazi, Zacharoula & Lejano, Raul & Maes, Frank & Degraer, Steven, 2015. "Bargaining a net gain compensation agreement between a marine renewable energy developer and a marine protected area manager," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 40-48.
  21. Eran Hanany & D. Marc Kilgour & Yigal Gerchak, 2007. "Final-Offer Arbitration and Risk Aversion in Bargaining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(11), pages 1785-1792, November.
  22. Helena Hye-Young Kim & Frans Spinnewyn & Luc Lauwers, 2007. "Gradual Revelation Mechanism with Two-Sided Screening," Discussion Paper Series 0710, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  23. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  24. Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-29, CIRANO.
  25. FORGES, Françoise & MINELLI, Enrico & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2001043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  26. Ayvaz-Cavdaroglu, Nur & Kachani, Soulaymane & Maglaras, Costis, 2016. "Revenue management with minimax regret negotiations," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 12-22.
  27. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  28. Roger B. Myerson, 1990. "Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory," Discussion Papers 907, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  29. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  30. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico, 2004. "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 799-813, November.
  31. Roger B. Myerson, 1983. "Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 582, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  32. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  33. Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2012. "Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 495-514.
  34. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 796, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  35. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8158 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  37. Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, 2000. "Interim efficient allocation mechanisms," UC3M Working papers. Economics 7220, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.