IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login

Citations for "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation"

by Roger B. Myerson

For a complete description of this item, click here. For a RSS feed for citations of this item, click here.
as in new window

  1. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2009. "Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott," Working Papers 2009-5, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  2. Bulow, Jeremy I. & Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7411, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Forges, Françoise & Serrano, Roberto, 2013. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information : Some Open Problems," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/8158, Paris Dauphine University.
  4. Roger B. Myerson, 1988. "Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 796, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Geoffroy de Clippel & David Pérez-Castrillo & David Wettstein, 2010. "Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 813.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  6. Roger B. Myerson, 1990. "Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory," Discussion Papers 907, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1987. "Bilateral Trade With The Sealed Bid K-Double Action: Existence And Efficiency," Discussion Papers 723R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Hu Lu & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Optimal Trading Mechanisms with Ex Ante Unidentified Traders," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-29, CIRANO.
  9. Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Negotiation and Arbitration: A Game-Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 666, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Anbarci, Nejat & Feltovich, Nick, 2012. "Bargaining with random implementation: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 495-514.
  11. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Minelli, Enrico, 2004. "Two-person bargaining with verifiable information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 799-813, November.
  12. Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis, 2015. "An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 918-958.
  13. Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  14. Francoise Forges & Enrico Minelli & Rajiv Vohra, 2000. "Incentives and the Core of an Exchange Economy: A Survey," Working Papers 2000-22, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  15. OKADA, Akira, 2014. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types," Discussion Papers 2013-15, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  16. Fabienne Tournadre & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2001. "Learning from Strike," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-67, CIRANO.
  17. Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 169-188, January.
  19. Lucia Quesada, 2003. "Modeling collusion as an informed principal problem," Game Theory and Information 0304002, EconWPA.
  20. Joachim Rosenmüller, 1998. "Mechanisms in the Core of a Fee Game," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 303, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  21. Roger B. Myerson, 1983. "Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 582, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. de Clippel, Geoffroy, 2005. "Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-82, October.
  23. Elazar Berkovitch, 1985. "Reputation Effect in Equilibrium Search and Bargaining- A Stigma Theory of Unemployment Duration," Discussion Papers 668, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  24. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem," MPRA Paper 12530, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  25. Fulghieri, P. & Nagarajan, S., 1992. "On the Strategic Role of High Leverage in Entry Deterrence," Papers 92-10, Columbia - Graduate School of Business.
  26. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "An Introduction to Game Theory," Discussion Papers 623, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  27. Helena Hye-Young Kim & Frans Spinnewyn & Luc Lauwers, 2007. "Gradual Revelation Mechanism with Two-Sided Screening," Discussion Paper Series 0710, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
  28. Geoffroy de Clippel, 2010. "Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2010-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  29. Dean Corbae & Andrew Glover & Daphne Chen, 2013. "Can Employer Credit Checks Create Poverty Traps?," 2013 Meeting Papers 875, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  30. Roger B. Myerson, 1985. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Discussion Papers 658, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  31. Sebastian Krautheim & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2011. "Wages and International Tax Competition," Working Papers 1123, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  32. Nehring, Klaus, 2004. "The veil of public ignorance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 119(2), pages 247-270, December.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.