Jean-Louis Rullière
(Jean-Louis Rulliere)

Personal Details

First Name:	Jean-Louis
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Rulliere
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pru43
	http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/equipe/perso/rulliere/rulliere.htm

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Lata Gangadharan & Giancarlo Musto & Jean-Louis Rullière, 2013. "Win for Being the Best or for Getting the Best: Theoretical and Experimental Evidence on Tournaments with Endogenous Prizes," Post-Print halshs-00865235, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Prakarsh Singh & Sandip Mitra, 2015. "Performance Pay and Malnutrition: Evidence from an Experiment targeting Child Malnutrition in West Bengal," NCID Working Papers 05/2015, Navarra Center for International Development, University of Navarra.

2. Michel Mougeot & Benjamin Pelloux & Jean-Louis Rullière & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Breaking Collusion in Auctions Through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Market," Post-Print halshs-00642537, HAL.
   • Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen & Benjamin Pelloux & Jean‐Louis Rullière, 2011. "Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO 2 Emission Permit Markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 829-856, October.

   Cited by:

   1. Bizer, Kilian & Henger, Ralph & Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till, 2014. "The political economy of certificates for land use in Germany: Experimental evidence," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 225, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
   2. Pagnozzi, Marco & Saral, Krista J., 2016. "Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale," MPRA Paper 70022, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Marco Pagnozzi & Krista J. Saral, 2019. "Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 477-505, June.
      • Marco Pagnozzi & Krista J. Saral, 2017. "Entry by Successful Speculators in Auctions with Resale," CSEF Working Papers 475, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
      • Marco Pagnozzi & Krista Saral, 2019. "Entry by successful speculators in auctions with resale," Post-Print halshs-01741462, HAL.
   3. Regina Betz & Ben Greiner & Sascha Schweitzer & Stefan Seifert, 2017. "Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi‐item Multi‐unit Auctions: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(605), pages 351-371, October.
      • Regina Betz & Ben Greiner & Sascha Schweitzer & Stefan Seifert, 2014. "Auction Format and Auction Sequence in Multi-Item Multi-Unit Auctions - An experimental study," Discussion Papers 2014-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
   4. Proeger, Till & Meub, Lukas & Bizer, Kilian, 2017. "The role of communication on an experimental market for tradable development rights," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 68(C), pages 614-624.
   5. Proeger Till & Meub Lukas & Bizer Kilian & Henger Ralph, 2017. "Die Effizienz von Zuteilungsmechanismen bei Flächenzertifikaten zwischen Versteigerung und Grandfathering – experimentelle Evidenz," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 66(1), pages 80-109, April.
      • Meub, Lukas & Proeger, Till & Bizer, Kilian & Henger, Ralph, 2015. "Die Effizienz von Zuteilungsmechanismen bei Flächenzertifikaten zwischen Versteigerung und Grandfathering: Experimentelle Evidenz," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 235, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
   6. Alvarez, Francisco & André, Francisco J., 2015. "Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting," MPRA Paper 61698, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   7. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multiunit Auctions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 461-490, July.
      • Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multi-Unit Auctions," Working Papers 201301, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
   8. Alvarez Francisco & André Francisco J., 2016. "Auctioning Emission Permits with Market Power," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(4), pages 1-28, October.

3. Charles R. Plott & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Introduction to the special issue Special issue on Behavioral Public Economics," Post-Print halshs-00661261, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Tracy Xiao Liu & Jenna Bednar & Yan Chen & Scott Page, 2019. "Directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in multiple repeated games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(3), pages 705-734, September.

4. Isabelle Vialle & Luis Santos-Pinto & Jean-Louis Rullière, 2011. "Self-Confidence and Teamwork : An Experimental Test," Working Papers 1126, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
   • Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle & Luis Santos Pinto, 2011. "Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test," Post-Print halshs-00625733, HAL.
   • Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle & Luis Santos Pinto, 2011. "Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test," Post-Print halshs-00625734, HAL.
   • Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle & Luis Santos Pinto, 2012. "Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test," Post-Print halshs-00776294, HAL.
   • Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle & Luis Santos Pinto, 2011. "Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test," Post-Print halshs-00673332, HAL.
   • Jean-Louis Rullière & Luis Santos Pinto & Isabelle Vialle, 2011. "Self-Confidence and Teamwork : An Experimental Test," Post-Print halshs-00632091, HAL.
   • Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle & Luis Santos Pinto, 2012. "Self-confidence and teamwork: An experimental test," Post-Print halshs-00776290, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Alice Solda & Changxia Ke & Lionel Page & William von Hippel, 2019. "Strategically delusional," Working Paper Series 2019/05, Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney.
      • Alice Solda & Changxia Ke & Lionel Page & William von Hippel, 2019. "Strategically delusional," Working Papers halshs-02050263, HAL.
      • Alice Soldà & Changxia Ke & Lionel Page & William von Hippel, 2019. "Strategically delusional," Working Papers 1908, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
      • Alice Soldà & Changxia Ke & Lionel Page & William von Hippel, 2020. "Strategically delusional," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 23(3), pages 604-631, September.
   2. Gary Charness & Aldo Rustichini & Jeroen van de Ven, 2011. "Self-Confidence and Strategic Deterrence," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-151/1, Tinbergen Institute.
   3. Gary Charness & Aldo Rustichini & Jeroen van de Ven, 2013. "Self-Confidence and Strategic Behavior," CESifo Working Paper Series 4517, CESifo.
      • Gary Charness & Aldo Rustichini & Jeroen Ven, 2018. "Self-confidence and strategic behavior," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(1), pages 72-98, March.
   4. Hendrik Hakenes & Svetlana Katolnik, 2018. "Optimal Team Size and Overconfidence," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(4), pages 665-687, August.

5. Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00272928, HAL.
   • Jacquemet, Nicolas & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Vialle, Isabelle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 698-714, November.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," Post-Print halshs-00272928, HAL.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00272928, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Antonio Filippin & Paolo Crosetto, 2014. "A reconsideration of gender differences in risk attitudes," Post-Print hal-01997771, HAL.
      • Antonio FILIPPIN & Paolo CROSETTO, 2014. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," Departmental Working Papers 2014-01, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
      • Filippin, A. & Crosetto, P., 2014. "A reconsideration of gender differences in risk attitudes," Working Papers 2014-01, Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory (GAEL).
      • Antonio Filippin & Paolo Crosetto, 2016. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," Post-Print hal-01356905, HAL.
      • Filippin, Antonio & Crosetto, Paolo, 2014. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," IZA Discussion Papers 8184, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   2. Bigoni, Maria & Le Coq, Chloé & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008. "Risk Aversion, Prospect Theory, and Strategic Risk in Law Enforcement: Evidence From an Antitrust Experiment," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 696, Stockholm School of Economics.
   3. Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2013. "Analyse économique du droit et méthode expérimentale," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00746617, HAL.
      • Yannick Gabuthy & Nicolas Jacquemet, 2013. "Analyse économique du droit et méthode expérimentale," Post-Print halshs-00746617, HAL.

6. Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2007. "Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00259460, HAL.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2007. "Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(3), pages 555-564.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2007. "Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme," Post-Print halshs-00259460, HAL.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2007. "Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00259460, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2005. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data without Order Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 902-912, June.

7. Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2003. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-69, CIRANO.
   • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(10), pages 1379-1389, October.
   • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rulliere & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning teams and incentives in a merger: An experiment with managers and students," Artefactual Field Experiments 00099, The Field Experiments Website.
   • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a merger. An Experiment with Managers and Students," Post-Print halshs-00161723, HAL.
   • Montmarquette, Claude & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie Claire & Zeiliger, Romain, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," IZA Discussion Papers 1057, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," Post-Print halshs-00175004, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. David Masclet & Nathalie Colombier & Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Youenn Lohéac, 2008. "Une étude expérimentale du degré individuel et collectif d'aversion au risque," Post-Print halshs-00144845, HAL.
      • Nathalie Colombier & Laurent Denant-Boemont & Youenn Lohéac & David Masclet, 2008. "Une étude expérimentale du degré individuel et collectif d'aversion au risque," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(4), pages 89-101.
      • David Masclet & Youenn Lohéac & Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Nathalie Colombier, 2008. "Une étude expérimentale du degré individuel et collectif d’aversion au risque," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 185(4), pages 89-101.
   2. Simon Gaechter & Georg von Krogh & Stefan Haefliger, 2006. "Private-Collective Innovation and the Fragility of Knowledge Sharing," Discussion Papers 2006-21, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
   3. Son, Byung-Gak & Lee, Chang-Hun & Ha, Byoung-Chun & Nam, Hyunjeong, 2019. "Investigating the fair treatment of suppliers and its trust fostering role and performance benefits," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 54-66.
   4. Rémi Suchon & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust," Post-Print halshs-02155373, HAL.
      • Suchon, Rémi & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "The Effects of Status Mobility and Group Identity on Trust," IZA Discussion Papers 12086, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
      • Suchon, Rémi & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 430-463.
      • Rémi Suchon & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust," Post-Print hal-04296127, HAL.
      • Rémi Suchon & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust," Working Papers halshs-01978269, HAL.
      • Rémi Suchon & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust," Working Papers 1901, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
   5. Dickinson, David L. & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," IZA Discussion Papers 1222, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
      • Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008. "Does monitoring decrease work effort?: The complementarity between agency and crowding-out theories," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 56-76, May.
      • David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2005. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 05-12, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
      • David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementary between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00176789, HAL.
      • David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Post-Print halshs-00175010, HAL.
      • Marie-Claire Villeval & David Dickinson, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," Working Papers 0409, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
      • David Dickinson & Marie Claire Villeval, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theorie," Post-Print halshs-00180112, HAL.
   6. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Stephen Rassenti, 2011. "Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations," Working Papers 11-05, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
   7. Corgnet, Brice & Sutan, Angela & Veszteg, Róbert F., 2011. "My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(4), pages 347-355, August.
   8. Özalp Özer & Yanchong Zheng & Yufei Ren, 2014. "Trust, Trustworthiness, and Information Sharing in Supply Chains Bridging China and the United States," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(10), pages 2435-2460, October.
   9. Brice Corgnet, 2012. "Peer Evaluations And Team Performance: When Friends Do Worse Than Strangers," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(1), pages 171-181, January.
      • Brice Corgnet, 2012. "Peer Evaluations and Team Performance : When Friends Do Worse Than Strangers," Post-Print hal-02311960, HAL.
      • Brice Corgnet, 2009. "Peer Evaluations and Team Performance: When Friends Do Worse Than Strangers," Faculty Working Papers 12/09, School of Economics and Business Administration, University of Navarra.
   10. Johann Han & Nadja Kairies‐Schwarz & Markus Vomhof, 2017. "Quality competition and hospital mergers—An experiment," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(S3), pages 36-51, December.
   11. Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Group Identity and Social Preferences (chapter X)," Post-Print halshs-03504316, HAL.
   12. Charness, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Henderson, Austin, 2018. "Experimental methods: Measuring effort in economics experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 74-87.
   13. Özalp Özer & Yanchong Zheng & Kay-Yut Chen, 2011. "Trust in Forecast Information Sharing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(6), pages 1111-1137, June.
   14. Randolph Sloof & Mirjam van Praag, 2007. "Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-026/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 22 Sep 2007.
       • Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, C. Mirjam, 2008. "Performance measurement, expectancy and agency theory: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 794-809, September.
       • Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, Mirjam C., 2007. "Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study," IZA Discussion Papers 3064, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   15. Waichman, Israel & Requate, Till & Siang, Ch’ng Kean, 2014. "Communication in Cournot competition: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-16.
   16. Gächter, Simon & von Krogh, Georg & Haefliger, Stefan, 2010. "Initiating private-collective innovation: The fragility of knowledge sharing," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 893-906, September.
   17. Emily W. Choi & Özalp Özer & Yanchong Zheng, 2020. "Network Trust and Trust Behaviors Among Executives in Supply Chain Interactions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(12), pages 5823-5849, December.
   18. Junjun Cheng, 2020. "Bidirectional Relationship Progression in Buyer–Seller Negotiations: Evidence from South Korea," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 293-320, April.
   19. Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Eric Schniter, 2015. "Why real leisure really matters : incentive effects on real effort in the laboratory," Post-Print hal-02311952, HAL.
       • Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Eric Schniter, 2013. "Why Real Leisure Really Matters: Incentive Effects on Real Effort in the Laboratory," Working Papers 13-22, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
       • Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González & Eric Schniter, 2015. "Why real leisure really matters: incentive effects on real effort in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(2), pages 284-301, June.
   20. Waichman, Israel & Requate, Till & Siang, Ch'ng Kean, 2008. "Managers and Students Playing Cournot: Experimental Evidence from Malaysia," Economics Working Papers 2008-19, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
   21. Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, C. Mirjam, 2010. "The effect of noise in a performance measure on work motivation: A real effort laboratory experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 751-765, October.
   22. Jorge N Zumaeta, 2021. "Meta-Analysis of Seven Standard Experimental Paradigms Comparing Student to Non-student," Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies, AMH International, vol. 13(2), pages 22-33.
   23. Waichman Israel & Requate Till & Siang Ch'ng Kean, 2010. "A Cournot Experiment with Managers and Students: Evidence from Germany and Malaysia," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-17, April.
   24. Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Group Identity and Social Preferences by Yan Chen and Sherry X. Li," Post-Print halshs-03504258, HAL.
   25. Grund, Christian & Harbring, Christine & Thommes, Kirsten, 2015. "Cooperation in Diverse Teams: The Role of Temporary Group Membership," IZA Discussion Papers 8761, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   26. Bartuli, Jenny & Djawadi, Behnud Mir & Fahr, René, 2016. "Business Ethics in Organizations: An Experimental Examination of Whistleblowing and Personality," IZA Discussion Papers 10190, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   27. Franco GANDOLFI & Magnus HANSSON, 2015. "A Global Perspective on the Non-Financial Consequences of Downsizing," REVISTA DE MANAGEMENT COMPARAT INTERNATIONAL/REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE MANAGEMENT, Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania, vol. 16(2), pages 185-204, May.

8. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00175255, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(3), pages 253-272, November.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Post-Print halshs-00180439, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00179979, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00180439, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Post-Print halshs-00175255, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Post-Print halshs-00179979, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. David Cooper & Krista Saral & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Why Join a Team?," Working Papers halshs-02295921, HAL.
      • Cooper, David J. & Saral, Krista & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Why Join a Team?," IZA Discussion Papers 12587, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
      • David J. Cooper & Krista Saral & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Why Join a Team?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(11), pages 6980-6997, November.
      • David J. Cooper & Krista Saral & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "Why Join a Team?," Post-Print halshs-03003653, HAL.
      • David J. Cooper & Krista Saral & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "Why Join a Team?," Working Papers 1928, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
   2. Englmaier, Florian & Gebhardt, Georg, 2016. "Social dilemmas in the laboratory and in the field," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 85-96.
   3. Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2015-9, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
      • Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2015. "Incentive contracts for teams: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 496-511.
      • Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2015. "Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 53, Peruvian Economic Association.
   4. Mathieu Lefebvre & Lucie Martin-Bonnel de Longchamp, 2020. "Knowledge acquisition or incentive to foster coordination ? A real-effort weak-link experiment with craftsmen," Working Papers of BETA 2020-09, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
      • Mathieu Lefebvre & Lucie Martin-Bonnel de Longchamp, 2022. "Knowledge acquisition or incentive to foster coordination? A real-effort weak-link experiment with craftsmen," Journal of Behavioral Economics for Policy, Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics (SABE), vol. 6(S1), pages 93-107, July.
      • Mathieu Lefebvre & Lucie Martin-Bonnel de Longchamp, 2022. "Knowledge acquisition or incentive to foster coordination? A real-effort weak-link experiment with craftsmen," Post-Print hal-03777415, HAL.
   5. Florian Englmaier & Georg Gebhardt, 2011. "Free-Riding in the Lab and in the Field," CESifo Working Paper Series 3612, CESifo.
      • Englmaier, Florian & Gebhardt, Georg, 2010. "Free Riding in the Lab and in the Field," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 344, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   6. Hong, Fuhai & Hossain, Tanjim & List, John A., 2015. "Framing manipulations in contests: A natural field experiment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 372-382.
      • Fuhai Hong & Tanjim Hossain & John List, 2015. "Framing Manipulations in Contests: A Natural Field Experiment," Natural Field Experiments 00453, The Field Experiments Website.
   7. Vranceanu, Radu & El Ouardighi, Fouad & Dubart , Delphine, 2013. "Coordination in Teams: A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment," ESSEC Working Papers WP1310, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
      • Radu Vranceanu & Fouad El Ouardighi & Delphine Dubart, 2013. "Coordination in Teams : A Real Effort-task Experiment with Informal Punishment," Working Papers hal-00857364, HAL.
   8. Chao, Hong & Croson, Rachel T.A., 2013. "An experimental comparison of incentive contracts in partnerships," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 78-87.
   9. Gary Charness & Peter J. Kuhn, 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," NBER Working Papers 15913, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
      • Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter J., 2010. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," IZA Discussion Papers 4941, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
      • Charness, Gary & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Lab Labor: What Can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab?," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 3, pages 229-330, Elsevier.
   10. Sandra Maximiano & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2007. "Gift Exchange in a Multi-Worker Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 1025-1050, July.
       • Sandra Maximiano & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2004. "Gift Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-100/1, Tinbergen Institute.
   11. Wang, Yahua & Wang, Huan, 2022. "Effects of farmland use rights transfer on collective action in the commons: Evidence from rural China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
   12. Dutcher, Glenn & Saral, Krista, 2022. "Remote Work and Team Productivity," MPRA Paper 115253, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   13. Jeffrey Carpenter & Andrea Robbett & Prottoy A. Akbar, 2018. "Profit Sharing and Peer Reporting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 4261-4276, September.
       • Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Robbett, Andrea & Akbar, Prottoy, 2016. "Profit Sharing and Peer Reporting," IZA Discussion Papers 9946, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   14. Königstein, Manfred & Ruchala, Gabriele K., 2007. "Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 2697, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   15. Montmarquette, Claude & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie Claire & Zeiliger, Romain, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," IZA Discussion Papers 1057, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
       • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rulliere & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning teams and incentives in a merger: An experiment with managers and students," Artefactual Field Experiments 00099, The Field Experiments Website.
       • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(10), pages 1379-1389, October.
       • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2003. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-69, CIRANO.
       • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a merger. An Experiment with Managers and Students," Post-Print halshs-00161723, HAL.
       • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," Post-Print halshs-00175004, HAL.
   16. Hideo Owan, 2014. "How should teams be formed and managed?," IZA World of Labor, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), pages 1-83, August.
   17. Philip Babcock & Kelly Bedard & Gary Charness & John Hartman & Heather Royer, 2011. "Letting Down the Team? Evidence of Social Effects of Team Incentives," NBER Working Papers 16687, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   18. Marilyne Antonetti & Alexandra Rufini, 2008. "Social norms, coordination and collaboration in heterogeneous teams," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(7), pages 547-554.
   19. Sijun Wang & Yuanjie He, 2008. "Compensating Nondedicated Cross-Functional Teams," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 19(5), pages 753-765, October.

9. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00151509, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rulliere & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2000. "Free-Riding and Fairness in Principal - Multi-agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques bla00048, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2000. "Free-Riding and Fairness in Principal -Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-03718476, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Free-riding and Fairness in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00151509, HAL.

   Cited by:

   1. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Post-Print halshs-00175255, HAL.
      • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Post-Print halshs-00180439, HAL.
      • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00179979, HAL.
      • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00180439, HAL.
      • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(3), pages 253-272, November.
      • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00175255, HAL.
      • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Post-Print halshs-00179979, HAL.
   2. Sacchetti, Silvia & Tortia, Ermanno, 2012. "The internal and external governance of cooperatives: the effective membership and consistency of value," AICCON Working Papers 111-2012, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
   3. Sandra Maximiano & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2007. "Gift Exchange in a Multi-Worker Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 1025-1050, July.
      • Sandra Maximiano & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2004. "Gift Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-100/1, Tinbergen Institute.
   4. Silvia Sacchetti & Ermanno C. Tortia, 2013. "The Internal and External Governance of Cooperatives: Membership and Consistency of Values," Euricse Working Papers 1362, Euricse (European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises).

10. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2000. "Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00145067, HAL.
    • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2000. "Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00145048, HAL.
    • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2000. "Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00145070, HAL.
    • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2000. "Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00145044, HAL.
    • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2000. "Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00145048, HAL.
    • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2000. "Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00145044, HAL.
    • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Fairness and Free-Riding in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships : Experimental Evidence," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00149125, HAL.
    • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Fairness and Free-Riding in Principal-Multi-Agent Relationships : Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00149125, HAL.
    • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2000. "Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00145070, HAL.
    • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2000. "Fairness and Free-Riding in a Principal-Multi-Agent Relationship: Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00145067, HAL.

    Cited by:

    1. Sandra Maximiano & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2007. "Gift Exchange in a Multi-Worker Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 1025-1050, July.
       • Sandra Maximiano & Randolph Sloof & Joep Sonnemans, 2004. "Gift Exchange in a Multi-worker Firm," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-100/1, Tinbergen Institute.

11. Keser, Claudia & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 1999. "Union Bargaining Strength as a Public Good: Experimental Evidence," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-20, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.

    Cited by:

    1. Berninghaus, Siegfried & Guth, Werner & Keser, Claudia, 2003. "Unity suggests strength: an experimental study of decentralized and collective bargaining," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 465-479, August.

12. Güth, W. & Marchand, N. & Rulliere, J.-L., 1997. "On the reliability of reprocal fairness -An experimental study-," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1997,80, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.

    Cited by:

    1. Brandts, J. & Riedl, A.M. & van Winden, F., 2005. "Competition and well-being," Research Memorandum 034, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
       • Jordi Brandts & Arno Riedl & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Competition and Well-Being," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-041/1, Tinbergen Institute.
       • Jordi Brandts & Arno Riedl & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Competition and Well-Being," Working Papers 120, Barcelona School of Economics.
       • Jordi Brandts & Arno Riedl & Frans van Winden, 2004. "Competition and Well-Being," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 608.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
       • van Winden, Frans A.A.M. & Brandts, Jordi & Riedl, Arno, 2006. "Competition and Well-Being," CEPR Discussion Papers 5532, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
       • Brandts, Jordi & Riedl, Arno & van Winden, Frans, 2005. "Competition and Well-Being," IZA Discussion Papers 1769, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Andrew Kloosterman, 2016. "Directed search with heterogeneous firms: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(1), pages 51-66, March.
    3. Ule, Aljaz & Goeree, Jacob K. & Riedl, Arno, 2007. "In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents," Coalition Theory Network Working Papers 9099, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
       • Goeree, J.K. & Riedl, A.M. & Ule, A., 2005. "In search of stars: network formation among heterogeneous agents," Research Memorandum 033, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
       • Goeree, Jacob K. & Riedl, Arno & Ule, Aljaz, 2009. "In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 445-466, November.
       • Aljaž Ule & Jacob K. Goeree & Arno Riedl, 2007. "In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers 2007.65, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
       • Goeree, Jacob K. & Riedl, Arno & Ule, Aljaz, 2005. "In Search of Stars: Network Formation among Heterogeneous Agents," IZA Discussion Papers 1754, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Antonio Filippin & Manuela Raimondi, 2016. "The Patron Game with Heterogeneous Endowments: A Case Against Inequality Aversion," De Economist, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 69-81, March.
       • Antonio Filippin & Manuela Raimondi, 2016. "The Patron Game with Heterogeneous Endowments: A Case Against Inequality Aversion," De Economist, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 69-81, March.
    5. Karen Evelyn Hauge & Snorre Kverndokk & Andreas Lange, 2021. "Why People Oppose Trade Institutions - On Morality, Fairness and Risky Actions," CESifo Working Paper Series 9456, CESifo.
    6. Gneezy, Uri & Haruvy, Ernan & Roth, Alvin E., 2003. "Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 347-368, November.
    7. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
       • Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, "undated". "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
       • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics,, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
       • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Munich Reprints in Economics 20650, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
       • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 1998. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 1812, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Li, Sherry Xin & Dogan, Kutsal & Haruvy, Ernan, 2011. "Group identity in markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 104-115, January.
    9. Philipp E. Otto & Daniel Dittmer, 2019. "Simultaneous but independent ultimatum game: strategic elasticity or social motive dependency?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(1), pages 61-80, March.
    10. Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin, 2016. "A Theory of Experiments: Invariance of Equilibrium to the Strategy Method of Elicitation and Implications for Social Preferences," IAST Working Papers 16-54, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), revised Feb 2020.
        • Chen, Daniel L. & Schonger, Martin, 2016. "A Theory of Experiments: Invariance of Equilibrium to the Strategy Method of Elicitation and Implications for Social Preferences," TSE Working Papers 16-724, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Feb 2020.
    11. Kloosterman, Andrew & Paul, Stephen, 2018. "Ultimatum game bargaining in a partially directed search market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 60-74.
    12. Aaron Nicholas & Birendra Rai, 2019. "Are Efficient Bargaining Power Disparities Unfair? An Experimental Test," Monash Economics Working Papers 02-19, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    13. Brit Grosskopf, 2003. "Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, October.
    14. Doğan, Gönül & van Assen, Marcel & Potters, Jan, 2013. "The effect of link costs on simple buyer–seller networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 229-246.

Articles

1. Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen & Benjamin Pelloux & Jean‐Louis Rullière, 2011. "Breaking Collusion in Auctions through Speculation: An Experiment on CO 2 Emission Permit Markets," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 829-856, October.
   • Michel Mougeot & Benjamin Pelloux & Jean-Louis Rullière & Florence Naegelen, 2011. "Breaking Collusion in Auctions Through Speculation: An Experiment on CO2 Emission Permit Market," Post-Print halshs-00642537, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
2. Charles R. Plott & Jean‐Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2011. "Introduction to the Special Issue on Behavioral and Experimental Public Economics," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(5), pages 631-637, October.

   Cited by:

   1. Tracy Xiao Liu & Jenna Bednar & Yan Chen & Scott Page, 2019. "Directional behavioral spillover and cognitive load effects in multiple repeated games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(3), pages 705-734, September.

3. Jacquemet, Nicolas & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Vialle, Isabelle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 698-714, November.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," Post-Print halshs-00272928, HAL.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00272928, HAL.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2008. "Monitoring optimistic agents," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00272928, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
4. Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2007. "Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(3), pages 555-564.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2007. "Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme," Post-Print halshs-00259460, HAL.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2007. "Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00259460, HAL.
   • Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Louis Rullière & Isabelle Vialle, 2007. "Contrôle des activités illégales en présence d'un biais d'optimisme," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00259460, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
5. Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(10), pages 1379-1389, October.
   • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rulliere & Marie-Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning teams and incentives in a merger: An experiment with managers and students," Artefactual Field Experiments 00099, The Field Experiments Website.
   • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2003. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-69, CIRANO.
   • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a merger. An Experiment with Managers and Students," Post-Print halshs-00161723, HAL.
   • Montmarquette, Claude & Rullière, Jean-Louis & Villeval, Marie Claire & Zeiliger, Romain, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," IZA Discussion Papers 1057, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
   • Claude Montmarquette & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval & Romain Zeiliger, 2004. "Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students," Post-Print halshs-00175004, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
6. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(3), pages 253-272, November.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Post-Print halshs-00180439, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00179979, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00180439, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Post-Print halshs-00175255, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00175255, HAL.
   • Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie Claire Villeval, 2001. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?," Post-Print halshs-00179979, HAL.
   See citations under working paper version above.
7. Werner Güth & Nadège Marchand & Jean-Louis Rullière, 1998. "Equilibration et dépendance du contexte. Une évaluation expérimentale du jeu de négociation sous ultimatum," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(3), pages 785-794.

   Cited by:

   1. Schmidt, Klaus M., 2009. "Social Preferences and Competition," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 298, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
      • Schmidt, Klaus M., 2010. "Social Preferences and Competition," Discussion Papers in Economics 11313, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
      • Schmidt, Klaus M., 2011. "Social preferences and competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 19766, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
      • Klaus M. Schmidt, 2011. "Social Preferences and Competition," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43, pages 207-231, August.
   2. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
      • Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher, 2013. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Jena Economics Research Papers 2013-035, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
      • Werner Güth & Martin G. Kocher, 2013. "More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature," CESifo Working Paper Series 4380, CESifo.
   3. Leroux, Isabelle, 2000. "The Role Of Negotiation In The Structuring Of Territory: The Case Of Biotechnologies In Toulouse," ERSA conference papers ersa00p71, European Regional Science Association.
   4. Fehr, Ernst & Powell, Michael & Wilkening, Tom, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091.
      • Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021. "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(4), pages 1055-1091, April.
      • Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2014. "Behavioral constraints on the design of subgame-perfect implementation mechanisms," ECON - Working Papers 171, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Nov 2020.
   5. Klaus M. Schmidt, 2011. "Social Preferences and Competition," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43(s1), pages 207-231, August.

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 4 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (4) 2003-04-27 2004-03-22 2011-11-01 2012-02-01
2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (4) 2003-04-27 2004-03-22 2011-11-01 2012-02-01
3. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (2) 2003-04-27 2004-03-22
4. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2011-11-01
5. NEP-DEV: Development (1) 2004-03-22
6. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2012-02-01
7. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2011-11-01
8. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2003-04-27
9. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2011-11-01

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