Performance Pay and Malnutrition: Evidence from an Experiment targeting Child Malnutrition in West Bengal
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Cited by:
- Singh, Prakarsh & Masters, William A., 2017.
"Impact of caregiver incentives on child health: Evidence from an experiment with Anganwadi workers in India,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 219-231.
- Singh, Prakarsh & Masters, William A., 2016. "Impact of Caregiver Incentives on Child Health: Evidence from an Experiment with Anganwadi Workers in India," IZA Discussion Papers 10083, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- William A. Masters & Prakarsh Singh, 2016. "Impact of caregiver incentives on child health: Evidence from an experiment with Anganwadi workers in India," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0818, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Prakarsh Singh & William A. Masters, 2016. "Impact of caregiver incentives on child health: evidence from an experiment with Anganwadi workers in India," NCID Working Papers 01/2016, Navarra Center for International Development, University of Navarra.
- William A. Masters & Prakarsh Singh, 2016. "Impact of Caregiver Incentives on Child Health: Evidence from an Experiment with Anganwadi Workers in India," Working Papers id:11258, eSocialSciences.
- Dasgupta, Utteeyo & Mani, Subha & Singh, Prakarsh, 2016.
"Searching for Religious Discrimination among Anganwadi Workers in India: An Experimental Investigation,"
IZA Discussion Papers
10048, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Subha Mani & Prakarsh Singh & Utteeyo Dasgupta, 2016. "Searching for religious discrimination among Anganwadi workers in India An experimental investigation," WIDER Working Paper Series 069, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
More about this item
Keywords
Performance pay; Child malnutrition; Absolute and relative incentives;JEL classification:
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
- I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J38 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Public Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2016-08-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2016-08-28 (Development)
- NEP-EXP-2016-08-28 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2016-08-28 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
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