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The Patron Game with Heterogeneous Endowments: A Case Against Inequality Aversion

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  • Antonio Filippin

  • Manuela Raimondi

Abstract

In this paper we provide a direct test of the inequality aversion hypothesis based on aggregate outcomes using the Patron Game, a version of a Public Good Game that mandates that only one member of a group contributes to the public good. We find evidence that inequality aversion does not play any role, as the average contribution does not increase when the distribution of endowments is manipulated to generate a situation of favorable inequality for the patron, compared to the case in which there is no inequality ex ante. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Filippin & Manuela Raimondi, 2016. "The Patron Game with Heterogeneous Endowments: A Case Against Inequality Aversion," De Economist, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 69-81, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:decono:v:164:y:2016:i:1:p:69-81
    DOI: 10.1007/s10645-015-9268-6
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Filippin & Manuela Raimondi, 2018. "The Patron Game: the Individual Provision of a Public Good," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-20, June.
    2. Ismael Rodriguez-Lara, 2018. "No evidence of inequality aversion in the investment game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(10), pages 1-16, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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