Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study
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- Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, C. Mirjam, 2008. "Performance measurement, expectancy and agency theory: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 794-809, September.
- Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, Mirjam C., 2007. "Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study," IZA Discussion Papers 3064, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Randolph Sloof & C. Mirjam van Praag, 2008. "The Effect of Noise in a Performance Measure on Work Motivation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 08-074/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Zubanov, Nick & Cadsby, Bram & Song, Fei, 2017. "The "Sales Agent" Problem: Effort Choice under Performance Pay as Behavior toward Risk," IZA Discussion Papers 10542, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Michele Battisti & Giovanna Vallanti, 2013. "Flexible Wage Contracts, Temporary Jobs, and Firm Performance: Evidence From Italian Firms," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 737-764, July.
- Bonsang, Eric & Dohmen, Thomas, 2015. "Risk attitude and cognitive aging," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 112-126.
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Alexandros Karakostas, 2020. "An experimental investigation of the ‘tenuous trade-off’ between risk and incentives in organizations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 88(1), pages 153-190, February.
- Emanuela Lezzi & Piers Fleming & Daniel John Zizzo, 2015. "Does it matter which effort task you use? A comparison of four effort tasks when agents compete for a prize," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 15-05, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
- Sloof, Randolph & van Praag, C. Mirjam, 2010. "The effect of noise in a performance measure on work motivation: A real effort laboratory experiment," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 751-765, October.
- Michele Battisti & Giovanna Vallanti, 2011. "Flexible Wage Contracts, Temporary Jobs and Worker Performance: Evidence from Italian Firms," Working Papers CELEG 1105, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
More about this item
KeywordsExpectancy theory; agency theory; performance measurement; experiments;
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2005-03-13 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-EXP-2005-03-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2005-03-13 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2005-03-13 (Microeconomics)
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