Risk Aversion and Effort in an Incentive Pay Scheme with Multiplicative Noise: Theory and Experimental Evidence
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References listed on IDEAS
- C. Bram Cadsby & Fei Song & Francis Tapon, 2016.
"The Impact of Risk-Aversion and Stress on the Incentive Effect of Performance-Pay,"
Research in Experimental Economics,in: Experiments in Organizational Economics, volume 19, pages 189-227
Emerald Publishing Ltd.
- C. Bram Cadsby & Fei Song & Francis Tapon, 2009. "The Impact of Risk Aversion and Stress on the Incentive Effect of Performance Pay," Working Papers 0912, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Shannon W. Anderson & Henri C. Dekker & Karen L. Sedatole, 2010. "An Empirical Examination of Goals and Performance-to-Goal Following the Introduction of an Incentive Bonus Plan with Participative Goal Setting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 56(1), pages 90-109, January.
- Erling Barth & Bernt Bratsberg & Torbjørn Hægeland & Oddbjørn Raaum, 2008. "Who pays for performance?," International Journal of Manpower, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 29(1), pages 8-29, March.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Zubanov, Nick & Cadsby, Bram & Song, Fei, 2017. "The "Sales Agent" Problem: Effort Choice under Performance Pay as Behavior toward Risk," IZA Discussion Papers 10542, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- C. Bram Cadsby & Jim Engle-Warnick & Tony Fang & Fei Song, 2014.
"Psychological Incentives, Financial Incentives, and Risk Attitudes in Tournaments: An Artefactual Field Experiment,"
1403, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Cadsby, Bram & Engle-Warnick, Jim & Fang, Tony & Song, Fei, 2015. "Psychological Incentives, Financial Incentives, and Risk Attitudes in Tournaments: An Artefactual Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 9565, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
More about this item
Keywordsincentive pay; performance targets; risk aversion;
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-04-03 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2012-04-03 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2012-04-03 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-UPT-2012-04-03 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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