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Equilibration et dépendance du contexte. Une évaluation expérimentale du jeu de négociation sous ultimatum

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Güth
  • Nadège Marchand
  • Jean-Louis Rullière

Abstract

[fre] Équilibration et dépendance du contexte. Une évaluation expérimentale du jeu de négociation sous ultimatum. . La justice réciproque apparaît dans le jeu de la négociation sous ultimatum comme un mobile robuste qui conditionne par un processus d'équilibration les comportements des joueurs vers une issue qui ne correspond pas au seul équilibre de Nash parfait en sous-jeu. Prasnikar et Roth [1992] ont montré que la justice réciproque pouvait être dominé par d'autres mobiles psychologiques. Cette étude examine les conditions où, après une phase de compétition entre les joueurs, la justice réciproque regagne de l'influence dans la détermination des comportements. Ce résultat confirme que l'apprentissage comportemental dépend autant du contexte où les joueurs interagissent que du passé des joueurs. [eng] Equilibration and context dependency : an experimental investigation of the ultimatum bargaining game. . Reciprocal fairness has to be proved a robust phenomena in ultimatum bargaining game, but it does not drive players' behaviors through equilibration process to the unique Nash subgame perfect equilibrium. Prasnikar and Roth [1992] showed that reciprocal fairness have to compete and actually may be dominated by other motivational forces. Our study explores whether after an initial phase of competition reciprocal fairness will regain its influence. This result confirms that behavioral learning depends on the context where the players interact concretely as well as on their past experiences.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Nadège Marchand & Jean-Louis Rullière, 1998. "Equilibration et dépendance du contexte. Une évaluation expérimentale du jeu de négociation sous ultimatum," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 49(3), pages 785-794.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1998_num_49_3_410010
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1998.410010
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    Cited by:

    1. Klaus M. Schmidt, 2011. "Social Preferences and Competition," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 43, pages 207-231, August.
    2. Güth, Werner & Kocher, Martin G., 2014. "More than thirty years of ultimatum bargaining experiments: Motives, variations, and a survey of the recent literature," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 396-409.
    3. Leroux, Isabelle, 2000. "The Role Of Negotiation In The Structuring Of Territory: The Case Of Biotechnologies In Toulouse," ERSA conference papers ersa00p71, European Regional Science Association.

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