Compensating Nondedicated Cross-Functional Teams
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DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1070.0351
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Cited by:
- Yetunde Anibaba & Godbless Akaighe, 2018. "Dynamics of Decision Making in Cross-Functional Teams," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 12(4), December.
- Susan Biancani & Daniel A. McFarland & Linus Dahlander, 2014. "The Semiformal Organization," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(5), pages 1306-1324, October.
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Keywords
nondedicated cross-functional teams; compensation; agency models; interdependency; social capital;All these keywords.
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