A Cournot Experiment with Managers and Students: Evidence from Germany and Malaysia
We report results from a Cournot triopoly experiment conducted with different subject pools: German students, Malaysian students, and Malaysian managers. We find that Malaysian students perform significantly more competitively than both Malaysian managers and German students. Moreover, the Nash equilibrium point quite accurately describes the behavior of German students and Malaysian managers but not of Malaysian students, even though the quantities selected by Malaysian students are closer to the Nash equilibrium than to the collusive or competitive quantities.
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Volume (Year): 10 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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