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Managers and students playing Cournot - evidence from duopoly and triopoly experiments

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  • Israel Waichman
  • Till Requate
  • Ch'ng Kean Siang

Abstract

This article reports results from Cournot duopoly and triopoly experiments with different subject pools: German students, Malaysian students and Malaysian managers. We find that Malaysian managers perform significantly more collusively than Malaysian students. We also find that country matters insofar as German students perform significantly more collusively than their Malaysian counterparts.

Suggested Citation

  • Israel Waichman & Till Requate & Ch'ng Kean Siang, 2011. "Managers and students playing Cournot - evidence from duopoly and triopoly experiments," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 115-120.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:18:y:2011:i:2:p:115-120
    DOI: 10.1080/13504850903442988
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004. "The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 743-771, September.
    2. Francisco Alpízar & Till Requate & Albert Schram, 2004. "Collective versus Random Fining: An Experimental Study on Controlling Ambient Pollution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(2), pages 231-252, October.
    3. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
    4. David Cooper & John Kagel & Qing Liang Gu & Wei Lo, 1999. "Gaming against managers in incentive systems: Experimental results with chinese students and chinese managers," Artefactual Field Experiments 00038, The Field Experiments Website.
    5. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2004. "Two are few and four are many: number effects in experimental oligopolies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(4), pages 435-446, April.
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