Self-Confidence and Teamwork : An Experimental Test
We use a laboratory experiment to study how perceptions of skill influence teamwork. Our design is based on Gervais and Goldstein (2007) theory of teams. Team output is increasing in skill and in effort, skill and effort are complements, and workers’ effort choices are complements. An overconfident agent thinks that his skill is higher than it actually is. We find that the presence of overconfi-dent workers in teams is beneficial for firms since it raises effort provision and team output. We also find that overconfidence leads to a Pareto improvement in workers’ payoffs. In contrast, underconfidence is detrimental to firms as well as workers.
|Date of creation:||2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: 33(0)472 29 30 89
Fax: 33(0)47229 30 90
Web page: http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Baker, G.P. & Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988.
"Compensation And Incentives: Practice Vs. Theory,"
88-05, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kübler, Dorothea, 2005.
"Courtesy and Idleness: Gender Differences in Team Work and Team Competition,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1768, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta & Kübler, Dorothea, 2005. "Courtesy and Idleness: Gender Differences in Team Work and Team Competition," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 91, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Dorothea Kübler, 2005. "Courtesy and Idleness: Gender Differences in Team Work and Team Competition," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2005-049, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
- Jeremy Clark & Lana Friesen, 2006.
"Overconfidence in Forecasts of Own Performance: An Experimental Study,"
Working Papers in Economics
06/09, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Jeremy Clark & Lana Friesen, 2009. "Overconfidence in Forecasts of Own Performance: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 229-251, 01.
- Knez, Marc & Simester, Duncan, 2001. "Firm-Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 743-72, October.
- Edward P. Lazear & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007.
"Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources,"
NBER Working Papers
13653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edward P. Lazear & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2007. "Personnel Economics: The Economist's View of Human Resources," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(4), pages 91-114, Fall.
- Santos-Pinto, Luís, 2003.
"Positive self-image and incentives in organizations,"
3141, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Feb 2007.
- Luís Santos-Pinto, 2008. "Positive Self-image and Incentives in Organisations," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(531), pages 1315-1332, 08.
- Hanming Fang & Giuseppe Moscarini, 2004.
Yale School of Management Working Papers
ysm386, Yale School of Management.
- David Andolfatto & Steeve Mongrain & Gordon Myers, 2007.
"Rational Truth-Avoidance and Self-Esteem,"
dp07-08, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, .
"Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment,"
IEW - Working Papers
016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
- Leanne Ma & Katerina Sherstyuk & Malcom Dowling & Oliver Hill, 2000.
"Altruism and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods,"
200013, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:31:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December.
- Young Park & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2010. "Overconfidence in tournaments: evidence from the field," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(1), pages 143-166, July.
- Burks, Stephen V. & Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Götte, Lorenz & Rustichini, Aldo, 2010. "Overconfidence is a Social Signaling Bias," IZA Discussion Papers 4840, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990.
"Peer Pressure and Partnerships,"
90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
- Gunnthorsdottir, Anna & Rapoport, Amnon, 2006. "Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 184-199, November.
- Grieco, Daniela & Hogarth, Robin M., 2009. "Overconfidence in absolute and relative performance: The regression hypothesis and Bayesian updating," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 756-771, October.
- Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, 1979.
"Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts,"
NBER Working Papers
0401, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Simon Gervais & Itay Goldstein, 2007. "The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in Firms," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 11(3), pages 453-496.
- Garen, John E, 1985. "Worker Heterogeneity, Job Screening, and Firm Size," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 715-39, August.
- Hvide, Hans K., 2002. "Pragmatic beliefs and overconfidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 15-28, May.
- Rotemberg, Julio J, 1994. "Human Relations in the Workplace," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(4), pages 684-717, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:1126. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nelly Wirth)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.