Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C70: General

1999

• Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 1999, "Self-Confidence And Social Interactions," Working Papers, Princeton University, School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics, number 151, Dec.
• S. Ghosal & H. M. Polemarchakis, 1999, "Exchange and optimality," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 13, issue 3, pages 629-642.
• Marc Roubens & Michel Grabisch, 1999, "An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 28, issue 4, pages 547-565.
• M. Angeles de Frutos, 1999, "Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 4, issue 3, pages 255-272.
• Theo Offerman, 1999, "Hurting hurts more than Helping helps: The Role of the Self-serving Bias," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 99-018/1, Mar.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1999, "Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-122.
• Johnson, C. & Gilles, R.P., 1999, "Spatial Social Networks," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1999-87.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1999, "Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 3d223895-7f20-4e8e-aa9c-1.
• Benjamin E. Hermalin and Alice M. Isen., 1999, "The Effect of Affect on Economic and Strategic Decision Making," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley, number E99-270, Dec.
• Diego Rodríguez, 1999, "Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 352, Jan.
• Gary Charness & Ernan Haruvy, 1999, "Altruism, equity and reciprocity in a gift-exchange experiment: An encompassing approach," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 368, Mar.
• Gary Charness & Ernan Haruvy, 1999, "Self-serving biases: Evidence from a simulated labor relationship," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 370, Jan.
• Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 1999, "Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 441, Oct, revised Jan 2000.
• R. Benabou & J. Tirole, 1999, "Self-Confidence: Intrapersonal Strategies," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University, number 00s1, Dec.
• R. Benabou & J. Tirole, 1999, "Self-Confidence and Social Interactions," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University, number 00s2, Dec.
• P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 1999, "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University, number 99f3, Apr.
• Dhillon, A. & Lockwood, B., 1999, "When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 549.

1998

• Nicolai J. Foss, 1998, "Austrian Economics and Game Theory a Preliminary Methodological Stocktaking," DRUID Working Papers, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies, number 98-28.
• Mailath,G. & Samuelson,L. & Shaked,A., 1998, "Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 13R.
• Mailath,G.J. & Samuelson,L., 1998, "Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 18.
• Brandts, J. & Charness, G., 1998, "Hot Vs. Cold: Sequential Responses and Preference Stability in Experimental Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 424.98.
• Pietro Reichlin & Paolo Siconolfi, 1998, "Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area, number 326, Feb.
• Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1998, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics, number 98-1, revised Jan 1998.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998, "Costly Coasian Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, number 362, Oct.
• Nyarko, Y., 1998, "The Truth is in the Eye of the Beholder: or Equilibrium in Beliefs and Rational Learning in Games," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 98-12.
• Brian G Main & Andrew Park, 1998, "An experiment with two-way offers into court: restoring the balance in pre-trial negotiation," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh, number 28, Sep.
• Dagan, Nir & Serrano, Roberto, 1998, "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 58, issue 1, pages 43-49, January.
• Selten, Reinhard, 1998, "Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 42, issue 3-5, pages 413-436, May.
• Weibull, Jorgen W., 1998, "Evolution, rationality and equilibrium in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 42, issue 3-5, pages 641-649, May.
• Blume, Andreas, 1998, "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 22, issue 2, pages 171-202, February.
• Barbera, S. & Masso, J. & Serizawa, S., 1998, "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 25, issue 2, pages 272-291, November.
• Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1998, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 25, issue 2, pages 292-310, November.
• Martin, Philippe, 1998, "The Exchange Rate Policy of the Euro: A Matter of Size?," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, volume 12, issue 4, pages 455-482, December.
• Nehring, Klaus, 1998, "Incentive-compatibility in large games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, volume 35, issue 1, pages 57-67, January.
• Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998, "Costly coasian contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 3583, Oct.
• Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998, "Costly bargaining and renegotiation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 3592, Oct.
• S. Sorin, 1998, "Distribution equilibrium I : Definition and examples," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 98-35.
• Blaug, M., 1998, "Fact or Fiction? Conference on Realism in Economics; Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, Erasmus University; 'Ugly Currents in Modern Economics'," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9803.
• Voranger, J. & Maitre, P., 1998, "Connaissance commune, hierarchie des croyances et incertitude endogene: un exemple economique (oligopole)," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 98a44.
• Mailath, G.J. & Morris, S., 1998, "Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 349.
• Reichlin, P. & Siconolfi, P., 1998, "Adverse Selection of Investment Projects and the Business Cycle," Papers, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi, number 326.
• Flam, S.D., 1998, "2 x 2 Games, Fictitious Play and Green's Theorem," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 176.
• Manceau, D. & Bloch, F., 1998, "Product Preannouncement, Market Cannibalization and Price Competition," Papers, Ecole Superieure de Commerce de Paris. Groupe ESCP-, number 98/136.
• Grabisch, M. & Marichal, J.-L. & Roubens, M., 1998, "Equivalent Representations of a Set Function with Applications to Game Theory and Multicriteria Decision Making," Liege - Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie, UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie, number 9801.
• Grabisch, M. & Roubens, M., 1998, "An Axiomatic Approach to the Concept of Interaction Among Players in Cooperative Games," Liege - Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie, UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie, number 9818.
• Moulin, Y. & Muller, R., 1998, "nnaire. Contribution a une anthropologie de la cooperation," Papers, Groupe de recherche en économie financière et en gestion des entreprises, Universite Nancy 2, number 1998-13.
• Armantier, O. & Florens, J.-P. & Richard, J.-F., 1998, "Empirical Game Theoretic Models: Constrained Equilibrium & Simulation," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 98.498.
• Florens, F. & Protopopescu, C. & Richard, J.-F., 1998, "Identification and Estimation of a Game Theoretic Models," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 98.499.
• Byoung Jun & Xavier Vives, 1998, "Dynamic Price Competition and Stackelberg Warfare," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1838.
• Shimer, R. & Smith, L., 1998, "Assortive Matching and Search," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory, number 98-09.
• Penard, T. & Sollogoub, M. & Ulrich, V., 1998, "Insertion des jeunes sur le marche du travail et nature du contrat d'embauche: une approche par la theorie des jeux repetes," Papiers du Laboratoire de Microéconomie Appliquée, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1998-17.
• Bond, E.W. & Gresik, T.A., 1998, "Incentive Compatible Information Transfer Between Asymmetrically Informed Principals," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics, number 8-98-1.
• Sorin, S., 1998, "Distribution Equilibrium I: definition and Examples," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9835.
• Dierker, E. & Dierker, H., 1998, "Product Differentiation and Market Power," Papers, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy, number 9804.
• Ania, A.B. & Troger, T. & Wambach, A., 1998, "An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets Under Adverse Selection," Papers, Washington St. Louis - School of Business and Political Economy, number 9808.
• Saez-Marti, Maria & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1998, "Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, Stockholm School of Economics, number 281, Nov.
• Weibull, Jörgen W. & van Damme, Eric, 1998, "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 501, Aug.
• Weibull, Jörgen W. & Saez-Marti, Maria, 1998, "Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 507, Nov.
• Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco, 1998, "The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders," ISU General Staff Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics, number 199805010700001042, May.
• Michael Powers & Martin Shubik & Shun Yao, 1998, "Insurance market games: Scale effects and public policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 67, issue 2, pages 109-134, June, DOI: 10.1007/BF01236065.
• Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998, "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, volume 45, issue 3, pages 263-289, December, DOI: 10.1023/A:1005038921033.
• Bara, Zoltán, 1998, "A tisztességes elosztás mikroökonómiai elmélete
  [The microeconomic theory of fair distribution]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 6, pages 558-575.
• Hámori, Balázs, 1998, "Kutyastratégiák: fenyegetés, sarcolás, erőszak az átmeneti országok fejlődő piacain
  [Dog strategies: menacing, looting and violance on the developing markets of the countries in transition]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 12, pages 1096-1111.
• Szabó, Miklós, 1998, "Együttélő nemzedékek, generációk közötti transzferek, játékelmélet
  [Coexisting generations, intergenerational transfers, game theory]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 4, pages 379-394.
• Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1998, "Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan, number 006.
• Oscar Volij, 1998, "In Defense of DEFECT or Cooperation does not Justify the Solution Concept," Economic theory and game theory, Oscar Volij, number 007, Dec, revised 26 Aug 1999.
• Cooper, B. & Garcia-Penalosa, C., 1998, "Status Effects and Neganive Utility Growth," Economics Papers, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, number 150.
• Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco, 1998, "The Core of Games with Stackelberg Leaders," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 22139, May.
• David K. Levine, 1998, "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiment," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 1, issue 3, pages 593-622, July, DOI: 10.1006/redy.1998.0023.
• Yaw Nyarko, 1998, "Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 3, pages 643-655.
• Madjid Amir & Siegfried Berninghaus, 1998, "Scale functions in equilibrium selection games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 8, issue 1, pages 1-13.
• Farhad HØsseinov, 1998, "Equitable nature of core allocations in atomless economies," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 3, issue 2, pages 129-135.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1998, "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-94.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998, "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-37.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Gneezy, U., 1998, "Price competition and market concentration : An experimental study," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1998-27.
• van Damme, E.E.C. & Weibull, J., 1998, "Evolution with Mutations Driven by Control Costs," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 197ad72d-2cb6-49c3-a875-e.
• Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G., 1998, "A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number c19f51ac-cd7f-479b-8892-b.
• Gregory B. Pollock & Antonio Cabrales, 1998, "Weak and strong altruism in traitgGroups: Reproductive suicide, personal fitness and expected value," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 316, Sep.
• Gregory B. Pollock & Antonio Cabrales & Steven W. Rissing, 1998, "The evolution of personally disadvantageous punishment among cofoundresses of the ant Acromyrmex versicolor," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 317, Sep.
• Egbert DIERKER & Hildegard DIERKER, 1998, "Product Differentation and Market Power," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics, number vie9804, Sep.
• George J. Mailath & Stephen Morris, 1998, "Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, number imp-mon, Jul.
• George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 1998, "Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be," CARESS Working Papres, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences, number rep-is-sep, Aug.
• Joerg Oechssler & Frank Riedel, 1998, "Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9805002, May, revised 05 Aug 1998.
• Oechssler, Jörg & Riedel, Frank, 1998, "Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces," SFB 373 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, number 1998,68.

1997

• Robert Gibbons, 1997, "An Introduction to Applicable Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 1, pages 127-149, Winter.
• Faruk Gul, 1997, "A Nobel Prize for Game Theorists: The Contributions of Harsanyi, Nash and Selten," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 3, pages 159-174, Summer.
• Colin F. Camerer, 1997, "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 4, pages 167-188, Fall.
• Kennan, J., 1997, "Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9708.
• Andreoni, J. & Brown, P.M. & Vesterlund, L., 1997, "Fairness, Selfishness and Selfish Fairness: Experiments on Games with Unequal Equilibrium," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9726.
• Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1997, "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9729r.
• Brandts, J. & Figueras, N., 1997, "An Exploration of Reputation Formation in Experimental Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 404.97.
• Rabin, Matthew, 1997, "Bargaining Structure, Fairness and Efficiency," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley, number qt35g8s3dd, Jun.
• Philippe Martin, 1997, "The Exchange Rate Policy of the Euro: a Matter of Size?," Working Papers, CEPII research center, number 1997-06, Apr.
• David K Levine, 1997, "Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine, number 2047, Oct.
• Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 1997, "Collusion under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 65, issue 4, pages 875-912, July.
• Sulganik, Eyal & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1997, "The value of information: The case of signal-dependent opportunity sets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 21, issue 10, pages 1615-1625, August.
• Manzini, Paola, 1997, "Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: the role of commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 54, issue 1, pages 15-22, January.
• Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997, "Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 41, issue 1, pages 1-35, January.
• Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997, "A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 2, pages 159-175, February.
• Mailath, George J. & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1997, "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 18, issue 2, pages 193-218, February.
• Noldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1997, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 73, issue 1, pages 118-156, March.
• Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico, 1997, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, pages 388-406, August.
• Garidel, Thomas, 1997, "Pareto-improving asymmetric information in a dynamic insurance market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 119146, Jun.
• Steiner, U., 1997, "Inefficient National Environmental Regulation as a Signal of High Abatement Costs," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 97-2.
• Romagny, B. & Lobry, C. & Canalis-Durand, M., 1997, "Tragedy of the Commons and Prisonner's Dilemma," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 97a20.
• Sumaila, U.R., 1997, "Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Department of Economics, University of Bergen, number 167.
• Renault, R., 1997, "Privately Observed Time Horizons in Repeated Games," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 97.483.
• Davila, J., 1997, "On the Connection Between Correlated Equilibria and Sunspot Equilibria," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 159.
• Chebbi, S., 1997, "Fixed Points, Maximal Elements and Equilibria in Generalized Convex Spaces," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97.18.
• Nomia, O., 1997, "Zero-Sum Games," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97.30.
• Nomia, O., 1997, "The Core of a Finite Exchange Economy: A Direct Proof of its Nonemptiness," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97.74.
• Giraud, G., 1997, "Semi-Algebraic Economies," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97.84.
• Nomia, O., 1997, "Games in Extensive Form," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97.89.
• Nomia, O., 1997, "Preference Aggregation Functions and Arrows Theorem," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 97.90.
• Meidinger, C., 1997, "Equity, Fairness Equilibria and Coordination in the Ultimatum Game," Papiers du Laboratoire de Microéconomie Appliquée, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 1997-5.
• J.J. Laffont & D. Martimort, 1997, "Collusion under asymmetric information
  [[Collusion en information asymétrique]]," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02686625.
• Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997, "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 487, Sep, revised 26 Oct 1998.
• Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997, "Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 489, Oct.
• Ussif Sumaila, 1997, "Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Exploitation of the Arcto-Norwegian Cod Stock," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 10, issue 2, pages 147-165, September, DOI: 10.1023/A:1026459309123.
• Cremer, Helmuth & De Rycke, Marc & Grimaud, Andre, 1997, "Service Quality, Competition, and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, volume 11, issue 1, pages 5-19, January.
• Eső, Péter, 1997, "Árverés és verseny a közbeszerzésben
  [Auction and competition in public procurement]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 597-611.
• Meszerics, Tamás, 1997, "Stratégiai viselkedés és bizottsági döntés
  [Strategic behaviour and committee decison]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 7, pages 687-697.
• Elias L. Khalil, 1997, "The Red Queen Paradox: A Proper Name for a Popular Game - Note," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 153, issue 2, pages 411-415, June.
• Sherstyuk, K., 1997, "Multisided Matching Games," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 544.
• Bardsley, P., 1997, "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 548.
• Stemp, P.J., 1997, "The Government's Discount Rate: Choices and Consequences in a Dynamic Framework," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne, number 579.
• Geir B. Asheim, 1997, "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 64, issue 3, pages 427-443.
• Thomson, W., 1997, "On the Axiomatic Method ; Part II: Its Scope and recent Application to Game Theory and Resource Allocation," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 446.
• Christian Riis & Derek J. Clark, 1997, "Contest success functions: an extension," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 1, pages 201-204.
• Avner Shaked & Larry Samuelson & George J. Mailath, 1997, "Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 3, pages 551-556.
• Alan Kirman, 1997, "The economy as an evolving network," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 7, issue 4, pages 339-353.
• Gis, le Umbhauer, 1997, "Forward induction, evolutionary processes and behavior evolution," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, volume 7, issue 4, pages 415-433.
• G. Chichilnisky & G. M. Heal, 1997, "The geometry of implementation: a necessary and sufficient condition for straightforward games (*)," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, volume 14, issue 2, pages 259-294.
• Blume, A., 1997, "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1997-66.
• Matthew Rabin., 1997, "Bargaining Structure, Fairness and Efficiency," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley, number E00-280, Jun.
• Nir Dagan & Roberto Serrano, 1997, "Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 217, Jan.
• Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman, 1997, "Market Crashes Without External Shocks," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9703009, Mar, revised 25 Nov 1997.

1996

• Sulganik, Eyal & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1996, "The Value of Information: The Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research, number 275613, Jan, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275613.
• Binmore, K. & samuelson, L., 1996, "Muddling Through : Noisy Equilibrium Section," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9410r.
• Binmore, K. & Proulx, C. & Samuelson, L. & Swierzbinski, J., 1996, "Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9517r.
• Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9518r.
• Binmore, K. & Piccione, M. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9603.
• Binmore, K. & Piccione, M. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9603r.
• Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9611.
• Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L., 1996, "How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium?," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9611r.
• Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996, "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9612.
• Eshel, I. & Samuelson, L. & Shaked, A., 1996, "Altruists, Egoists and Hooligans in a Local Interaction Model," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9612r.
• Van Der Stel, H., 1996, "Strategy Proofness, Pareto Optimality and Strictly Convex Norms," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 331.96.
• Chamorro, J.M., 1996, "Spatial Dispersion in Cournot Competition," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 332.96.
• Colom, D.B., 1996, "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Plateaued Preferences," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 333.96.
• Arana, A.Q., 1996, "A Generic Game With no Self-Enforcing Equilibrium," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 342.96.
• James Conklin, 1996, "Computing Value Correspondences for Repeated Games with State Variables," Working Papers, Banco de España, number 9622.
• Baliga, S. & Evans, R., 1996, "Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Transfers," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 9601.
• Gilli, M., 1996, "Learning Standards of Social Behaviour in a Stationary Society," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 9610.
• Fabrice Capoën & Pierre Villa, 1996, "La coordination interne et externe des politiques économiques: une analyse dynamique," Working Papers, CEPII research center, number 1996-13, Dec.
• Kilgour, D.M. & Brams, S.J., 1996, "Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-21.
• Benoit, J.P. & Kornhauser, L.A., 1996, "Game Theoretic Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University, number 96-30.
• S. Ghosal & Heracles M. Polemarchakis, 1996, "Exchange and Optimality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1133, Sep.
• Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1996, "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 71, issue 2, pages 558-573, November.
• F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996, "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-05.
• S. Sorin, 1996, "Bluff and reputation," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-08.
• F. Forges & E. Minelli, 1996, "Self-fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-24.
• N. Gravel & J.-F. Laslier & A. Trannoy, 1996, "Individual freedom of choice in a social setting," Thema Working Papers, THEMA (Théorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), CY Cergy-Paris University, ESSEC and CNRS, number 96-25.
• Anderlini, L & Sabourian, H, 1996, "The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules : A Global Stability Result," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number eco96/05.
• Manzini, P., 1996, "Strategic Wage Bargaining with Destructive Power : The Role of Commitment," Discussion Papers, University of Exeter, Department of Economics, number 9617.
• Alajääskö, Pekka, 1996, "Endogenous Monetary Policy in Macroeconomic Models: The Role of Commitment, Conservative Central Banker and Optimal Central Bank Contracts in the Credibility of Monetary Policy," Research Reports, VATT Institute for Economic Research, number 36.
• Nannerup, N., 1996, "Equilinrium Pollution Taxes in a Two-Sector Open Economy," Papers, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics, number 96-2.
• Weisbuch, G. & Kirman, A.P. & Herreiner, D., 1996, "Market Organisation," G.R.E.Q.A.M., Universite Aix-Marseille III, number 96a20.
• Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 1996, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 0068, May.
• Ray, D. & Vohra, R., 1996, "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme, number 68.
• Glazer, A. & Rothenberg, L.S., 1996, "Bureaucratic Creep," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences, number 95-96-1.
• Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996, "Collusion Under Asymmetric Information," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 95.389.
• Cremer, H. & De Rycke, M. & Grimaud, A., 1996, "Service Quality, Competition and Regulatory Policies in the Postal Sector," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 95.391.
• Laffont, J.J., 1996, "Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data," Papers, Toulouse - GREMAQ, number 95.394.
• Holler, M.J. & Li, X., 1996, "Efficient Public Good Pricing: An Application of Cooperative Game Theory," Faechergruppe Volkswirtschaftlehre, University of Hamburg, Institute of Economics, number 91.
• Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996, "Interactive Implementation," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1751.
• Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996, "Decentralization and Collusion," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1757.
• Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996, "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1774.
• Masso, J. & Barbera, S., 1996, "Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges," ASSET - Instituto De Economia Publica, ASSET (Association of Southern European Economic Theorists), number 156.
• Gaspart, F., 1996, "Vulcans and Klingons (part one): Simulating an Evolutionary Game with Random Matching and Adjustable Expectations," Papers, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales, number 169.
• Benoit, J.P. & Krishna, V., 1996, "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games: A Synthesis," Papers, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics, number 1-96-3.
• Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9605.
• Sorin, S., 1996, "Bluff and Reputation," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9608.
• De Wolf, O. & Fordes, F., 1996, "Rational Choice in Strategic Environments Further Observations," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9623.