Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

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Top JEL
/ C: Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
/ / C7: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
/ / / C70: General

1996

• Forges, F. & Minelli, E., 1996, "Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Bayesian Games," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9624.
• Gravel, N. & Laslier, J.F. & Trannoy, A., 1996, "Individual Freedom of Choice in a Social Setting," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9625.
• Brennan, G., 1996, "The Economic of Politics and the Politics of Economics," Papers, Tasmania - Department of Economics, number 1996-1.
• Sulganik,E. & Zilcha,I., 1996, "The value of Information: the Case of Signal-Dependent Opportunity Sets," Papers, Tel Aviv, number 1-96.
• Ranis, G., 1996, "North-South Conflicts and their Management," Papers, Yale - Economic Growth Center, number 746.
• Martin, P. & Sadanand, A., 1996, "Outside Options in Nash Bargaining," Working Papers, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance, number 1996-3.
• Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1996, "Neutrally Stable Outcomes in Cheap Talk Games," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 450, Mar.
• Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996, "Admission and Common Knowledge," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1996_004.
• Asheim, G.B., 1996, "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1996_020.
• Willassen, Y., 1996, "The Stochastic Rotation Problem - A Generalization of faustmann's Formula to Stochastic Forest Growth," Memorandum, Oslo University, Department of Economics, number 1996_031.
• Christian Dustmann & John Micklewright & Najma Rajah, 1996, "Intra-household transfers and the part-time work of children," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies, number W96/03, Jan.
• Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 1996, "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 26, Feb.
• Noeldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 1996, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 27, Feb.
• Szatmári, Alexandra, 1996, "Aukciók, avagy a képbe kerül, ha a Louvre a képbe kerül?," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), volume 0, issue 4, pages 303-314.
• Jean-Pierre Benoît & Vijay Krishna, 1996, "The Folk Theorems for Repeated Games - A Synthesis," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 96-03, Apr.
• Ellison, G., 1996, "Basins of Attraction, Long Run Equilibria, and the Speed of Step-by- Step Evolution," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 96-4.
• Dudley, L., 1996, "The Rationality of Revolution," Cahiers de recherche, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques, number 9619.
• Dudley, L., 1996, "The Rationality of Revolution," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 9619.
• Steven Shavell & Kathryn Spier, 1996, "Threats without Binding Commitment," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 5461, Feb.
• George J. Mailath, 1996, "How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1161, Jul.
• Bardsley, Peter, 1996, "Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , volume 51, issue 4, pages 473-489.
• Marco, Marini, 1996, "Property Rights and Market: Employee Privatization as a Cooperative Bargaining Process," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 31870, Feb.
• Thomson, W., 1996, "Consistent Allocation Rules," RCER Working Papers, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), number 418.
• Arifovic, J & Eaton, C, 1996, "The Evolution of Communication in a Sender/Receiver Game of Common Interest with Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University, number dp96-05.
• Stergios Skaperdas, 1996, "Contest success functions (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 2, pages 283-290.
• Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996, "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 2, pages 283-290, February.
• MÂrio Rui PÂscoa, 1996, "Monopolistic competition and non-neighboring-goods (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 1, pages 129-142.
• Bezalel Peleg, 1996, "Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 2, issue 1, pages 311-324, December, DOI: 10.1007/BF02499138.
• Stergios Skaperdas, 1996, "Contest success functions," Springer Books, Springer, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad, "40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_15.
• Green, G.., 1996, "Market Institutions and Allocations," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 96-05.
• Blume, A., 1996, "Communication, Risk and Efficiency in Games," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 96-03.
• Blume, A., 1996, "Information Transmission and Preference Similarity," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics, number 96-04.
• Olivier Gossner, 1996, "Comparison of information structures," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 169, May.
• Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1996, "A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 200, Mar, revised Dec 1996.
• Nosal, E., 1996, "Contracts renegotiation in a Continuous State Space," Working Papers, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, number 9614.
• Nosal, E., 1996, "Optimal At-Will Contracts," Working Papers, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, number 9615.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1996, "Costly Coasian Contracts," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9610006, Oct, revised 16 Jan 1997.
• Leon A Petrosjan & Nikolay A Zenkevich, 1996, "Game Theory," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 2875, ISBN: ARRAY(0x62b3b4e0), March.
• Leon A. Petrosjan & Nikolay A. Zenkevich, 1996, "Matrix games," World Scientific Book Chapters, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., chapter 1, "Game Theory".
• Leon A. Petrosjan & Nikolay A. Zenkevich, 1996, "Infinite zero-sum two-person games," World Scientific Book Chapters, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., chapter 2, "Game Theory".
• Leon A. Petrosjan & Nikolay A. Zenkevich, 1996, "Nonzero-sum games," World Scientific Book Chapters, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., chapter 3, "Game Theory".
• Leon A. Petrosjan & Nikolay A. Zenkevich, 1996, "Positional games," World Scientific Book Chapters, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., chapter 4, "Game Theory".
• Leon A. Petrosjan & Nikolay A. Zenkevich, 1996, "Differential games," World Scientific Book Chapters, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., chapter 5, "Game Theory".
• Stähler, Frank, 1996, "Markov perfection and cooperation in repeated games," Kiel Working Papers, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, number 760.

1995

• Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1995, "On the Evolution of Altruistic Ethical Rules for Siblings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 85, issue 1, pages 58-81, March.
• Colin F. Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, 1995, "Anomalies: Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 209-219, Spring.
• Binmore, K. & Proulx, C. & Samuelson, L. & Swierzbinski, J., 1995, "Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9517.
• Noldeke, G. & Samuelson, L., 1995, "A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Markets," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9518.
• Che, Y.K. & Chung, T.Y., 1995, "Incomplete Contracts and Cooperative Investments," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9524.
• Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1995, "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9529.
• Vettas, N., 1995, "the Failling Rate of Profit. Entry, Exit, and Coordination with Mixed Strategies," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 299.95.
• Maschler, M., 1995, "Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Case," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 300.95.
• Palomino, F., 1995, "On the Survival of Strictly Dominated Strategies in Large Populations," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 308.95.
• Sakovics, J. & Ponsati, C., 1995, "Rubinstein Batgaining with Tow-Sided Options," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), number 318.95.
• Anderlini, L. & Felli, L., 1997, "Costly Coasian Contracts," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 9704, Jan.
• Pierre Villa, 1995, "L'organisation de la politique économique dans un cadre stratégique," Working Papers, CEPII research center, number 1995-02, Mar.
• Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jîrgen W., 1995, "Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange), CEPREMAP, number 9506.
• Aumann, Robert & Brandenburger, Adam, 1995, "Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 63, issue 5, pages 1161-1180, September.
• Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995, "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 63, issue 6, pages 1371-1399, November.
• Driffill, John & Schultz, Christian, 1995, "Renegotiation in a repeated Cournot duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 47, issue 2, pages 143-148, February.
• Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995, "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 8, issue 1, pages 56-90.
• Uwe Haneke & Vitória Saddi, 1995, "1994 Nobel Prize Economists: Contributions from Nash, Harsanyi and Selten to the Game Theory," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Center of Political Economy, volume 15, issue 1, pages 58-69.
• Uwe Haneke, 1995, "Brazilian inflation and the theory of games," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Center of Political Economy, volume 15, issue 4, pages 547-562.
• Chambers, R.G. & Quiggin, J., 1995, "Exploitation and Efficiency in Agrarian Contracts," Papers, Australian National University - Department of Economics, number 292.
• Nehring, K., 1995, "A Theory of Rational Decision with Incomplete Information," Papers, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs, number 95-13.
• Nehring, K., 1995, "Incentive Compatibility in Large Games," Papers, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs, number 95-16.
• Nehring, K., 1995, "A Theory of Rational Decision with Incomplete Information," Department of Economics, California Davis - Department of Economics, number 95-13.
• Nehring, K., 1995, "Incentive Compatibility in Large Games," Department of Economics, California Davis - Department of Economics, number 95-16.
• Heal, G.M. & Chichilnisky, G., 1995, "The Geometry of Implementation: A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Straightforward Games," Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business, number 95-22.
• Hvide, H.K., 1995, "The Bounds of Bounded Rationality: The Case of Memory Loss," Papers, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-, number 19/95.
• Tomala, T., 1995, "Public Equilibria of Repeated Games with Signal-Dependent Payoffs," Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), number 95.40.
• Forges,F. & Minelli,E., 1995, "Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9518.
• Peleg, B., 1995, "Double Implementation of the Lindahl Equilibrium by a Continuous Mechanism," Papers, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor., number 9524.
• Van Den Elzen,A. & Talman,D., 1995, "An Algorithmic Approach Towards the Tracing Procedure of Harsanyi and Selten," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research, number 95111.
• Gray, D., 1995, "Reforming the Energy Sector in Transition Economies. Selected Experience and Lessons," World Bank - Discussion Papers, World Bank, number 296.
• Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1995, "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 433, Jun.
• Reny, Philip J., 1995, "Local Payoff Security and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 435, Jun.
• Binmore, Ken & Prouix, Chris & Samuelson, Larry & Swierzbinski, Joe, 1995, "Hard Bargains and Lost Opportunities," Economics Series, Institute for Advanced Studies, number 12, Sep.
• Nir Dagan, 1995, "Extensive Form Games with Coalitional Actions," Economic theory and game theory, Nir Dagan, number 015, Dec, revised Jan 1999.
• Geir B. Asheim, 1995, "Individual and Collective Time-Consistency," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1128, Jun.
• Steven Shavell & Kathryn Spier, 1995, "Threats Without Binding Commitment," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1139, Sep.
• Carrera, Jorge Eduardo, 1995, "Efectos precio y comercio en un area monetaria asimetrica
  [Price and trade effects in an asymmetric monetary area]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 7844.
• van den Elzen, A.H. & Talman, A.J.J., 1995, "An algorithmic approach towards the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1995-111.
• van den Elzen, A.H. & Talman, A.J.J., 1995, "An algorithmic approach towards the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 9d5e14b8-ab12-47a6-ae52-d.
• Zeng, J., 1995, "Innovative vs. Imitative R&D and Economic Growth," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9506.
• Busch, L.-A. & Horstmann, I.J., 1995, "Concessions and the Agenda in Bargaining," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 9511.
• Gerard Weisbuch & Alan Kirman & Dorothea Herreiner, 1995, "Market Organization," Working Papers, Santa Fe Institute, number 95-11-102, Nov.
• Luca Anderlini & Hamid Sabourian, 1995, "The Evolution of Algorithmic Learning Rules: A Global Stability Result," Game Theory and Information, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 9510001, Oct.
• Desgranges, Gabriel & Ghosal, Sayantan, 2010, "P-Stable Equilibrium : Definition and Some Properties," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 952.
• Heiner, Ronald Asher & Schmidtchen, Dieter, 1995, "Rational Cooperation In One-Shot Simultaneous Pd-Situations," CSLE Discussion Paper Series, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics, number 95-03.

1994

• Noldeka, G. & Samuelson, L., 1994, "Learning to Signal in Market," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9409.
• Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1994, "Muddling Through: Noisy Equilibrium selection," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9410.
• GHOSAL, Sayantan & POLEMARCHAKIS , Heracles, 1994, "Exchange and Optimality," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 1994072, Dec.
• Michael R. Powers & Martin Shubik & Shuntian Yao, 1994, "Insurance Market Games: Scale Effects and Public Policy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 1076, Aug.
• Mailath George J. & Samuelson Larry & Swinkels Jeroen M., 1994, "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 64, issue 2, pages 325-371, December.
• Björnerstedt, Jonas & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1994, "Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 407, Jan.
• Weibull, Jörgen W., 1994, "The Mass-Action Interpretation of Nash Equilibrium," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 427, Dec, revised Aug 1995.
• Peter Bardsley, 1994, "Tax Compliance games with Imperfect Auditing," Working Papers, School of Economics, La Trobe University, number 1994.22.
• Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1994, "Long-Term Competition—A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Springer Books, Springer, chapter 0, in: Nimrod Megiddo, "Essays in Game Theory", DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4612-2648-2_1.
• Peter Bardsley, 1994, "Tax Compliance games with Imperfect Auditing," Working Papers, School of Economics, La Trobe University, number 1994.22.

1993

• Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.M., 1993, "Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9314.
• Bjornerstedt, J. & Weibull, J.W., 1993, "Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure), number 93-23.
• Brandenburger Adam & Dekel Eddie, 1993, "Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 59, issue 1, pages 189-198, February.
• Nehring, K., 1993, "A Theory of Rational Decision with Incomplete Information," Papers, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs, number 93-25.
• Banerjee, A. & Weibull, J.W., 1993, "Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research, number 1637.
• Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993, "Evolutionary Selection with Discriminating Players," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 375, Mar.
• Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993, "Evolutionary Selection in Normal Form Games," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 383, Jun.
• Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993, "The 'As if' Approach to Game Theory: 3 Positive Results and 4 Obstacles," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 392, Sep.
• Luis Corchón & Bhaskar Chakravorti & Simon Wilkie, 1993, "Credible Implementation," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 1993-02, May.
• Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1993, "Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 4447, Sep.
• George J. Mailath, 1993, "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1041, Apr.
• George J. Mailath, 1993, "Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, number 1042, Apr.
• Robert A. Feldman & Rajnish Mehra, 1993, "Auctions: Theory and Applications," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, volume 40, issue 3, pages 485-511, September.
• Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 1993, "Farsighted Coalitional Stability," Working Papers, University of Chicago, Department of Economics, number _001, May.

1992

• Philip J. Reny, 1992, "Rationality in Extensive-Form Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, volume 6, issue 4, pages 103-118, Fall.
• Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J.M., 1992, "Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems, number 9205.
• Robert J. Aumann & Lloyd S. Shapley, 1992, "Long Term Competition-A Game Theoretic Analysis," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics, number 676, Sep.
• Basevi, Giorgio & Delbono, Flavio & Mariotti, Marco, 1992, "Bargaining with a Composite Player: An Application to the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 685, Jul.
• Chakravorti, B. & Corchon, L.C., 1992, "Credible Implementation," Papers, Bell Communications - Economic Research Group, number 76.
• Barany, I & Lee, J & Shubik, M, 1992, "Classification of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 21, issue 3, pages 267-290.

1991

• Faruk Gul & David G. Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1991, "A Bound of the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 981, May.
• Imre Barany & J. Lee & Martin Shubik, 1991, "Classification of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 996, Oct.
• Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991, "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 59, issue 1, pages 61-79, January.
• Vassilakis, S., 1991, "Rules for Changing the Rules," Papers, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics, number 32.
• Asheim, G.B., 1991, "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Papers, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research, number 9169.
• John Driffill & Christian Schultz, 1991, "Renegotiation in Repeated Cournot-Duopoly," Discussion Papers, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, number 91-13, Sep.
• Asheim, G., 1991, "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 1991-69.
• Asheim, G., 1991, "Individual and Collective Time Consistency," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number b8d92334-24dd-423f-a9b8-c.

1990

• Ashenfelter, O. & Bloom, D., 1990, "Lawyers As Agents Of The Devil In A Prisoner'S Dilemma Game," Papers, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper, number 57.

1989

• Ana B. Ania & Thomas Tröger & Wambach, 1989, "An Evolutionary Analysis of Insurance Markets," Vienna Economics Papers, University of Vienna, Department of Economics, number 9808, Aug.

1988

• Jean Tirole, 1988, "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, number 0262200716, edition 1, ISBN: ARRAY(0x6b630638), December.

1987

• Aumann, Robert J, 1987, "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 55, issue 1, pages 1-18, January.
• Cramton, Peter & Gibbons, Robert & Klemperer, Paul, 1987, "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 55, issue 3, pages 615-632, May.
• Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1987, "Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 55, issue 6, pages 1391-1402, November.
• Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1987, "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Papers of Peter Cramton, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, number 87econ, revised 09 Jun 1998.
• Max H. Bazerman & Henry S. Farber, 1987, "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 1987-1, Jan.
• Dutta, Bhaskar & Mishra, Debasis, 2009, "Minimum Cost Arborescences," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 889.

1985

• Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985, "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 36, issue 2, pages 195-213, August.
• Peter Cramton & Robert Gibbons & Paul Klemperer, 1985, "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics, number 406, Nov.

1984

• Benassy, Jean-Pascal, 1984, "A non-Walrasian model of the business cycle," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 5, issue 1, pages 77-89, March.
• Orley Ashenfelter & Timothy H. Hannan, 1984, "Sex Discrimination and Market Concentration: The Case of the Banking Industry," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section., number 559, Aug.

1983

• Benassy, J. P., 1983, "A Nonwalrasian Model of the Business Cycle," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 110, Dec.

1981

• Eriksson, Göran, 1981, "Growth, Exit and Entry of Firms," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 45, Jun.

1980

• Axell, Bo, 1980, "Imperfect Information Equilibrium, Existence, Configuration and Stability," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 34, Dec, revised Feb 1982.

1975

• AUMANN, Robert J., 1975, "Values of markets with a continuum of traders," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 228, Jan.
• Aumann, Robert J, 1975, "Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 43, issue 4, pages 611-646, July.
• Cartwright, Edward, 2003, "Learning To Play Approximate Nash Equilibria In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 671.
• Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2003, "Social Conformity And Bounded Rationality In Arbitrary Games With Incomplete Information : Some First Results," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 672.
• Wooders, Myrna & Cartwright, Edward & Selten, Reinhard, 2003, "Social Conformity in Games with Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 682.
• Cartwright, Edward & Wooders, Myrna, 2003, "Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS), University of Warwick, Department of Economics, number 687.

1974

• AUMANN, Robert J., 1974, "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," LIDAM Reprints CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 167, Jan, DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(74)90037-8.
• Aumann, Robert J., 1974, "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 1, issue 1, pages 67-96, March.

0

• Licun Xue, , "Stable Agreements in Infinitely Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, number 2000-13.
• Effrosyni Diamantoudi, , "Equilibrium Binding Agreements under Diverse Bahavioral Assumptions," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, number 2001-2.
• Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2013, "Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games," DIAG Technical Reports, Department of Computer, Control and Management Engineering, Universita' degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza", number 2013-15.
• VAN AARLE, Bas & ENGWERDA, Jacob & PLASMANS, Joseph, , "Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: A dynamic game approach," Working Papers, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics, number 1999020.
• VAN AARLE, Bas & ENGWERDA, Jacob & PLASMANS, Joseph, , "Monetary and fiscal policy interaction in the EMU: A dynamic game approach," Working Papers, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics, number 2001005.
• Matthias Hanauske & Jennifer Kunz & Steffen Bernius & Wolfgang Konig, 2009, "Doves and hawks in economics revisited. An evolutionary quantum game theory-based analysis of financial crises," Papers, arXiv.org, number 0904.2113, Apr.
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