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Social Conformity And Bounded Rationality In Arbitrary Games With Incomplete Information : Some First Results

  • Cartwright, Edward

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

  • Wooders, Myrna

    (Department of Economics, University of Warwick)

It has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom they identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with incomplete information. For a given game we first put a lower bound on * so that there exists a Nash *-equilibrium in pure strategies consistent with conformity. We also introduce a new concept of conformity that allows players to conform and yet perform different actions. This is achieved by the endogeneous assignment of roles to players and by allowing actions to be conditional on roles. We conclude by relating our research to some experimental literature.

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Paper provided by University of Warwick, Department of Economics in its series The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) with number 672.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:672
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  1. Rui Pascoa, Mario, 1993. "Approximate equilibrium in pure strategies for non-atomic games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 223-241.
  2. Alexander Kovalenkov & Myrna H. Wooders, 1998. "Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs," Working Papers mwooders-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  3. J. B. Van Huyck & R. C. Battalio & R. O. Beil, 2010. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000393, David K. Levine.
  4. Wooders, Myrna & Edward Cartwright & Selten, Reinhard, 2002. "Social Conformity And Equilibrium In Pure Strategies In Games With Many Players," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 636, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  5. Shaun Hargreaves-Heap & Yanis Varoufakis, 2002. "Some Experimental Evidence On The Evolution Of Discrimination, Co--Operation And Perceptions Of Fairness," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 679-703, July.
  6. Shleifer, Andrei, 2000. "Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292272.
  7. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June.
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