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Costly Coasian Contracts

  • Luca Anderlini

    (St. John's College, Cambridge)

  • Leonardo Felli

    (London School of Economics)

We identify and investigate the basic `hold-up' problem which arises whenever each party to a contingent contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a `contractual solution' to this hold-up problem is not available. This is because a contractual solution to the hold-up problem typically entails writing a `contract over a contract' which generates a fresh set of ex-ante costs, and hence is associated with a new hold-up problem. We conclude the paper investigating two applications of our results to a static and to a dynamic principal-agent model.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9610006.

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Length: 61 pages
Date of creation: 11 Oct 1996
Date of revision: 14 Oct 1996
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9610006
Note: Type of Document - LaTex; prepared on IBM PC - EmTex; to print on PostScript 600DPI; pages: 61 ; figures: included
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://econwpa.repec.org

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  1. Hardman Moore, John & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," CEPR Discussion Papers 60, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Dye, Ronald A, 1985. "Costly Contract Contingencies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(1), pages 233-50, February.
  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  4. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, . "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CRSP working papers 335, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
  5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, . ""Costly Coasian Contracts''," CARESS Working Papres 97-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
  7. Ariel Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1990. "Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1990/215, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  8. Mathias Dewatripont & Philippe Aghion & Patrick Rey, 1994. "Renegotiation design with unverifiable information," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9591, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  9. Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Dilip Abreu & David Pearce & Ennio Stacchetti, 1989. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 198, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  11. Chung, Tai-Yeong, 1991. "Incomplete Contracts, Specific Investments, and Risk Sharing," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(5), pages 1031-42, October.
  12. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Unforseen Contingencies, Property Rights, and Incomplete Contracts," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1796, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  13. Piccione, Michele, 1992. "Finite automata equilibria with discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 180-193, February.
  14. Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 217-240, August.
  15. Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1996. "Costly Contingent Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /1996/313, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  16. Piccione Michele & Rubinstein Ariel, 1993. "Finite Automata Play a Repeated Extensive Game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 160-168, October.
  17. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1993. "Renegotiation in Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 303-23, March.
  18. Jong-Il Kim & Lawrence J. Lau, 1996. "The sources of Asian Pacific economic growth," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(s1), pages 448-54, April.
  19. Innes, Robert D., 1990. "Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 45-67, October.
  20. Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 163-179, Summer.
  21. Piccione, M. & Rubinstein, A., 1992. "Finite Automata Play A Repeated Extensive Game," Papers 5-92, Tel Aviv.
  22. Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8759, University of California at Berkeley.
  23. Barton L. Lipman, 1992. "Limited Rationality and Endogenously Incomplete Contracts," Working Papers 858, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  24. Abreu, Dilip & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1988. "The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(6), pages 1259-81, November.
  25. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521576475 is not listed on IDEAS
  26. Dixit, Avinash & Olson, Mancur, 2000. "Does voluntary participation undermine the Coase Theorem?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 309-335, June.
  27. Rogerson, William P, 1992. "Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 777-93, October.
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