Contract Incompleteness, Contractual Enforcement and Bureaucracies
No abstract is available for this item.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2000|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 001 Fisher Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544-1021|
Phone: (609) 258-4000
Fax: (609) 258-6419
Web page: http://www.princeton.edu/~ectheory/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dixit, Avinash, 1997. "Power of Incentives in Private versus Public Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 378-82, May.
- Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1985.
"Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation,"
367, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1996.
"Costly Coasian Contracts,"
Game Theory and Information
9610006, EconWPA, revised 14 Oct 1996.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, . "Costly Coasian Contracts," Penn CARESS Working Papers c5b2efc4326ca8bb8162440d6, Penn Economics Department.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, . ""Costly Coasian Contracts''," CARESS Working Papres 97-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly coasian contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3583, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Coasian Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 362, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Anderlini, L. & Felli, L., 1997. "Costly Coasian Contracts," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9704, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Staiger, Robert W., 1995.
"International rules and institutions for trade policy,"
Handbook of International Economics,
in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551
- Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 4962, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998.
"Law and Finance,"
3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," NBER Working Papers 5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Greif, Avner, 2002. "Economic history and game theory," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 52, pages 1989-2024 Elsevier.
- G. Schwartz, 2000. "Non-Enforceability of Trade Treaties and the Most-Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Investment Distortions," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s17, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Shapiro, C. & Willing, D.R., 1990. "Economic Rationales For The Scope Of Privatization," Papers 41, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wop:prinet:00s16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Krichel)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.